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Regardless, I show that in evaluating the true effect of public funding, its bearing on political behavior must be considered. Using genetic matching methods, I demonstrate that the acceptance of full public election subsidies provides candidates with time flexibility facilitating higher levels of direct interaction with citizens. I then exploit a natural experiment to demonstrate that Maine and Connecticut voters are more likely to cast ballots for state legislative contests when candidates accept full funding. Specifically, the results of two difference-in-differences models show that the presence of a publicly funded candidate diminishes ballot roll-off by between 1.5 and 2 percentage points. I then argue that ideology is a crucial determinant of participation in full funding systems, which I support with a utility model showing that very conservative candidates face high personal costs that make a privately funded campaign a more attractive option. The model predicts that Republican incumbents should therefore be more likely to face a publicly funded challenger. I confirm this prediction with logistic regression models from data in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine. Since I confirm with genetic matching that fully funded candidates perform better on Election Day, I argue that the practical effect of public funding may be uneven in terms of partisan affiliation. Finally, I evaluate the effects of public funding on the behavior of candidates who choose not to participate. I analyze the transcripts of 16 in-person interviews with sixteen Arizona legislative candidates. I find that the state's matching funds provisions lead to pervasive gaming. Specifically, traditional candidates delay fundraising and spending until the final days of an election, which denies their publicly-funded opponents an opportunity to spend matching funds.","abstract_html":"In this dissertation, I argue that full funding programs such as those functioning in the legislative elections of Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine alter the behavior of candidates and voters alike. I employ original survey and interview data from candidates in eighteen states, finding strong evidence of different campaign strategies when public money is present in a political system. While the effects of some of these changes are generally positive, the ramifications of others are not clear. Regardless, I show that in evaluating the true effect of public funding, its bearing on political behavior must be considered. Using genetic matching methods, I demonstrate that the acceptance of full public election subsidies provides candidates with time flexibility facilitating higher levels of direct interaction with citizens. I then exploit a natural experiment to demonstrate that Maine and Connecticut voters are more likely to cast ballots for state legislative contests when candidates accept full funding. Specifically, the results of two difference-in-differences models show that the presence of a publicly funded candidate diminishes ballot roll-off by between 1.5 and 2 percentage points. I then argue that ideology is a crucial determinant of participation in full funding systems, which I support with a utility model showing that very conservative candidates face high personal costs that make a privately funded campaign a more attractive option. The model predicts that Republican incumbents should therefore be more likely to face a publicly funded challenger. I confirm this prediction with logistic regression models from data in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine. Since I confirm with genetic matching that fully funded candidates perform better on Election Day, I argue that the practical effect of public funding may be uneven in terms of partisan affiliation. Finally, I evaluate the effects of public funding on the behavior of candidates who choose not to participate. I analyze the transcripts of 16 in-person interviews with sixteen Arizona legislative candidates. I find that the state&#x27;s matching funds provisions lead to pervasive gaming. Specifically, traditional candidates delay fundraising and spending until the final days of an election, which denies their publicly-funded opponents an opportunity to spend matching funds.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Miller, Michael"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2010,"date_issued":"2010-10-20","date_published":"2010-10-20","updated_at":"2026-11-19T03:14:35Z","subjects":[],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.bibid","label":"Dc Identifier Bibid","values":["7061370"],"render_values":[{"text":"7061370","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1813/17568","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1813/17568","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Aecommons.cornell.edu%3A1813%2F17568","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Miller, Michael"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2010-10-20T19:43:12Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2015-10-20T06:57:23Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2010-10-20"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["dissertation or thesis"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.bibid","label":"Dc Identifier Bibid","values":["7061370"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/1813/17568"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"cerif:openaire","label":"Cerif Openaire","values":["<Publication xmlns=\"https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/\" id=\"6154b24f-984c-442f-9cb0-0e2382e723fc\"> <Type xmlns=\"https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types\">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type> <Language>en_US</Language> <Title>The \"Fifth Source And The Ballot Box: Public Election Funding And Changing American Elections</Title> <PublishedIn> <Publication> </Publication> </PublishedIn> <PublicationDate>2010-10-20</PublicationDate> <Authors> <Author> <DisplayName>Miller, Michael</DisplayName> <Affiliation> <OrgUnit> </OrgUnit> </Affiliation> </Author> </Authors> <Editors> </Editors> <Publishers> <Publisher> <OrgUnit /> </Publisher> </Publishers> <Abstract>In this dissertation, I argue that full funding programs such as those functioning in the legislative elections of Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine alter the behavior of candidates and voters alike. 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Specifically, the results of two difference-in-differences models show that the presence of a publicly funded candidate diminishes ballot roll-off by between 1.5 and 2 percentage points. I then argue that ideology is a crucial determinant of participation in full funding systems, which I support with a utility model showing that very conservative candidates face high personal costs that make a privately funded campaign a more attractive option. The model predicts that Republican incumbents should therefore be more likely to face a publicly funded challenger. I confirm this prediction with logistic regression models from data in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine. Since I confirm with genetic matching that fully funded candidates perform better on Election Day, I argue that the practical effect of public funding may be uneven in terms of partisan affiliation. Finally, I evaluate the effects of public funding on the behavior of candidates who choose not to participate. 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