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This dissertation describes novel programming languages and run-time enforcement mechanisms for full-system control of timing channels. The proposed approach has two major components: A new software-hardware security interface, and control mechanisms present at separate levels of system abstraction. These control mechanisms include: 1) A type system for an imperative language, so that well-typed programs provably leak only a bounded amount of information via timing channels, 2) SecVerilog, a hardware description language that supports mostly-static, precise reasoning about information flows in hardware designs, and 3) Predictive mitigation, a general run-time mechanism that permits tunable tradeoffs between security and performance. 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