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Flow-limited authorization is an approach to authorization in that it can be used to reason about whether a principal is permitted to perform an action. It is an approach to information flow control in that it can be used to reason about whether a flow of information is secure. This dissertation presents the theoretical foundation of this approach, the Flow-Limited Authorization Model (FLAM). FLAM uses a novel principal algebra that unifies authority and information flow policies and a logic for making secure authorization and information flow decisions. This logic ensures that such decisions cannot be influenced by attackers or leak confidential information. We embed the FLAM logic in a core programming model, the Flow-Limited Authorization Calculus (FLAC). FLAC programs selectively enable flows of information; the type system ensures that attackers cannot create unauthorized flows. A well-typed FLAC not only ensures proper authorization, but also secure information flow. 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