{"id":{"repo_id":"cornell","oai_identifier":"oai:ecommons.cornell.edu:1813/59636"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/cornell/oai:ecommons.cornell.edu:1813/59636","repository":{"repo_id":"cornell","name":"Cornell University","base_url":"https://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"JUDGMENTS OF DIMINISHED CULPABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW","abstract":"In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the execution of individuals with intellectual disability violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. When creating the categorical exemption in Atkins the Court recognized that without the exemption juries might consider intellectual disability to be a two-edged sword: \"it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.\" The Supreme Court also held that the Eight Amendment limits the extent that states can impose the most serious punishments on juveniles, including certain forms of life without parole. This dissertation examines whether the two-edged nature of intellectual disability or young age may influence other decisions in the justice system that ultimately affect criminal sentences. The first Chapter examines whether parole board decisions in South Carolina cause some juvenile offenders to serve de facto life without parole sentences. Chapter Two explores whether mental health experts may be influenced by the facts of a heinous crime or their beliefs about the death penalty when they diagnose intellectual disability in death penalty cases. Chapter Three examines the post-conviction relief process for people appealing their death sentences because they are categorically exempt from the death penalty. It argues that the more-forgiving procedural exemptions applied in claims of innocence should be applied in claims of ineligibility for the death penalty.","abstract_html":"In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the execution of individuals with intellectual disability violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. When creating the categorical exemption in Atkins the Court recognized that without the exemption juries might consider intellectual disability to be a two-edged sword: &quot;it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.&quot; The Supreme Court also held that the Eight Amendment limits the extent that states can impose the most serious punishments on juveniles, including certain forms of life without parole. This dissertation examines whether the two-edged nature of intellectual disability or young age may influence other decisions in the justice system that ultimately affect criminal sentences. The first Chapter examines whether parole board decisions in South Carolina cause some juvenile offenders to serve de facto life without parole sentences. Chapter Two explores whether mental health experts may be influenced by the facts of a heinous crime or their beliefs about the death penalty when they diagnose intellectual disability in death penalty cases. Chapter Three examines the post-conviction relief process for people appealing their death sentences because they are categorically exempt from the death penalty. It argues that the more-forgiving procedural exemptions applied in claims of innocence should be applied in claims of ineligibility for the death penalty.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Hritz, Amelia Courtney"],"institution":"Cornell University","degree_name":"Ph. D., Human Development","degree_level":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_discipline":"Human Development","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":["Ceci, Stephen John"],"committee_members":["Brainerd, Charles","Blume, John H."],"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-08-30","date_published":"2018-08-30","updated_at":"2026-11-19T03:20:08Z","subjects":["adolescence","death penalty","habeas corpus","intellectual disability","juvenile","life without parole","Psychology","Law","Developmental psychology"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7298/X46D5R6Z"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.7298/X46D5R6Z","href":"https://doi.org/10.7298/X46D5R6Z","code":true}]},{"key":"dc:identifier.bibid","label":"Dc Identifier Bibid","values":["10489732"],"render_values":[{"text":"10489732","href":null,"code":true}]},{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["ProQuest Submission ID: 11023","ProQuest Publication ID: 10846537"],"render_values":[{"text":"ProQuest Submission ID: 11023","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"ProQuest Publication ID: 10846537","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1813/59636","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1813/59636","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://ecommons.cornell.edu/server/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Aecommons.cornell.edu%3A1813%2F59636","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.chair","label":"Chair","values":["Ceci, Stephen John"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Brainerd, Charles","Blume, John H."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Hritz, Amelia Courtney"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2018-10-23T13:34:28Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2020-08-22T06:00:27Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2018-08-30"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["dissertation or thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Human Development"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph. D., Human Development"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["Cornell University"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["adolescence","death penalty","habeas corpus","intellectual disability","juvenile","life without parole","Psychology","Law","Developmental psychology"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.bibid","label":"Dc Identifier Bibid","values":["10489732"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["https://doi.org/10.7298/X46D5R6Z"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["ProQuest Submission ID: 11023","ProQuest Publication ID: 10846537"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/1813/59636"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"cerif:openaire","label":"Cerif Openaire","values":["<Publication xmlns=\"https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/\" id=\"37e2b96f-2ca3-4d0a-9abe-215d613b6bb9\"> <Type xmlns=\"https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types\">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type> <Language>en_US</Language> <Title>JUDGMENTS OF DIMINISHED CULPABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW</Title> <PublishedIn> <Publication> </Publication> </PublishedIn> <PublicationDate>2018-08-30</PublicationDate> <DOI>https://doi.org/10.7298/X46D5R6Z</DOI> <Authors> <Author> <DisplayName>Hritz, Amelia Courtney</DisplayName> <Affiliation> <OrgUnit> </OrgUnit> </Affiliation> </Author> </Authors> <Editors> </Editors> <Publishers> <Publisher> <OrgUnit /> </Publisher> </Publishers> <Keyword>adolescence</Keyword> <Keyword>death penalty</Keyword> <Keyword>habeas corpus</Keyword> <Keyword>intellectual disability</Keyword> <Keyword>juvenile</Keyword> <Keyword>life without parole</Keyword> <Keyword>Psychology</Keyword> <Keyword>Law</Keyword> <Keyword>Developmental psychology</Keyword> <Abstract>In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the execution of individuals with intellectual disability violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. When creating the categorical exemption in Atkins the Court recognized that without the exemption juries might consider intellectual disability to be a two-edged sword: \"it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.\" The Supreme Court also held that the Eight Amendment limits the extent that states can impose the most serious punishments on juveniles, including certain forms of life without parole. This dissertation examines whether the two-edged nature of intellectual disability or young age may influence other decisions in the justice system that ultimately affect criminal sentences. The first Chapter examines whether parole board decisions in South Carolina cause some juvenile offenders to serve de facto life without parole sentences. Chapter Two explores whether mental health experts may be influenced by the facts of a heinous crime or their beliefs about the death penalty when they diagnose intellectual disability in death penalty cases. Chapter Three examines the post-conviction relief process for people appealing their death sentences because they are categorically exempt from the death penalty. It argues that the more-forgiving procedural exemptions applied in claims of innocence should be applied in claims of ineligibility for the death penalty.</Abstract> <Access xmlns=\"http://purl.org/coar/access_right\" > </Access> </Publication>"]},{"key":"cris:virtual.author","label":"Cris Virtual Author","values":["Hritz, Amelia Courtney"]},{"key":"cris:virtualsource.collection","label":"Cris Virtualsource Collection","values":["5893a6ea-7af3-41d7-abc6-04bcd26ab5df"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the execution of individuals with intellectual disability violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. When creating the categorical exemption in Atkins the Court recognized that without the exemption juries might consider intellectual disability to be a two-edged sword: \"it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.\" The Supreme Court also held that the Eight Amendment limits the extent that states can impose the most serious punishments on juveniles, including certain forms of life without parole. This dissertation examines whether the two-edged nature of intellectual disability or young age may influence other decisions in the justice system that ultimately affect criminal sentences. The first Chapter examines whether parole board decisions in South Carolina cause some juvenile offenders to serve de facto life without parole sentences. Chapter Two explores whether mental health experts may be influenced by the facts of a heinous crime or their beliefs about the death penalty when they diagnose intellectual disability in death penalty cases. Chapter Three examines the post-conviction relief process for people appealing their death sentences because they are categorically exempt from the death penalty. It argues that the more-forgiving procedural exemptions applied in claims of innocence should be applied in claims of ineligibility for the death penalty."]},{"key":"dc:description.collection","label":"Dc Description Collection","values":["Cornell Theses and Dissertations"]},{"key":"dc:format.mimetype","label":"Dc Format Mimetype","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dcterms:license","label":"Dcterms License","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/1813/59810"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["JUDGMENTS OF DIMINISHED CULPABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW"]},{"key":"dspace:entity.type","label":"Dspace Entity Type","values":["Publication"]},{"key":"others:access_status","label":"Others Access Status","values":["open.access"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"cerif:openaire":["<Publication xmlns=\"https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/1.1/\" id=\"37e2b96f-2ca3-4d0a-9abe-215d613b6bb9\"> <Type xmlns=\"https://www.openaire.eu/cerif-profile/vocab/COAR_Publication_Types\">http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843</Type> <Language>en_US</Language> <Title>JUDGMENTS OF DIMINISHED CULPABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW</Title> <PublishedIn> <Publication> </Publication> </PublishedIn> <PublicationDate>2018-08-30</PublicationDate> <DOI>https://doi.org/10.7298/X46D5R6Z</DOI> <Authors> <Author> <DisplayName>Hritz, Amelia Courtney</DisplayName> <Affiliation> <OrgUnit> </OrgUnit> </Affiliation> </Author> </Authors> <Editors> </Editors> <Publishers> <Publisher> <OrgUnit /> </Publisher> </Publishers> <Keyword>adolescence</Keyword> <Keyword>death penalty</Keyword> <Keyword>habeas corpus</Keyword> <Keyword>intellectual disability</Keyword> <Keyword>juvenile</Keyword> <Keyword>life without parole</Keyword> <Keyword>Psychology</Keyword> <Keyword>Law</Keyword> <Keyword>Developmental psychology</Keyword> <Abstract>In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the execution of individuals with intellectual disability violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. When creating the categorical exemption in Atkins the Court recognized that without the exemption juries might consider intellectual disability to be a two-edged sword: \"it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.\" The Supreme Court also held that the Eight Amendment limits the extent that states can impose the most serious punishments on juveniles, including certain forms of life without parole. This dissertation examines whether the two-edged nature of intellectual disability or young age may influence other decisions in the justice system that ultimately affect criminal sentences. The first Chapter examines whether parole board decisions in South Carolina cause some juvenile offenders to serve de facto life without parole sentences. Chapter Two explores whether mental health experts may be influenced by the facts of a heinous crime or their beliefs about the death penalty when they diagnose intellectual disability in death penalty cases. Chapter Three examines the post-conviction relief process for people appealing their death sentences because they are categorically exempt from the death penalty. It argues that the more-forgiving procedural exemptions applied in claims of innocence should be applied in claims of ineligibility for the death penalty.</Abstract> <Access xmlns=\"http://purl.org/coar/access_right\" > </Access> </Publication>"],"cris:virtual.author":["Hritz, Amelia Courtney"],"cris:virtualsource.collection":["5893a6ea-7af3-41d7-abc6-04bcd26ab5df"],"dc:contributor.chair":["Ceci, Stephen John"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Brainerd, Charles","Blume, John H."],"dc:creator":["Hritz, Amelia Courtney"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2018-10-23T13:34:28Z"],"dc:date.available":["2020-08-22T06:00:27Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2018-08-30"],"dc:description.abstract":["In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the execution of individuals with intellectual disability violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. When creating the categorical exemption in Atkins the Court recognized that without the exemption juries might consider intellectual disability to be a two-edged sword: \"it may diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he will be dangerous in the future.\" The Supreme Court also held that the Eight Amendment limits the extent that states can impose the most serious punishments on juveniles, including certain forms of life without parole. This dissertation examines whether the two-edged nature of intellectual disability or young age may influence other decisions in the justice system that ultimately affect criminal sentences. The first Chapter examines whether parole board decisions in South Carolina cause some juvenile offenders to serve de facto life without parole sentences. Chapter Two explores whether mental health experts may be influenced by the facts of a heinous crime or their beliefs about the death penalty when they diagnose intellectual disability in death penalty cases. Chapter Three examines the post-conviction relief process for people appealing their death sentences because they are categorically exempt from the death penalty. It argues that the more-forgiving procedural exemptions applied in claims of innocence should be applied in claims of ineligibility for the death penalty."],"dc:description.collection":["Cornell Theses and Dissertations"],"dc:format.mimetype":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier.bibid":["10489732"],"dc:identifier.doi":["https://doi.org/10.7298/X46D5R6Z"],"dc:identifier.other":["ProQuest Submission ID: 11023","ProQuest Publication ID: 10846537"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1813/59636"],"dc:language.iso":["en_US"],"dc:subject":["adolescence","death penalty","habeas corpus","intellectual disability","juvenile","life without parole","Psychology","Law","Developmental psychology"],"dcterms:license":["https://hdl.handle.net/1813/59810"],"dc:title":["JUDGMENTS OF DIMINISHED CULPABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW"],"dc:type":["dissertation or thesis"],"dspace:entity.type":["Publication"],"others:access_status":["open.access"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Human Development"],"thesis:degree_level":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph. D., Human Development"],"thesis:institution_name":["Cornell University"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T03:20:08Z"}