{"id":{"repo_id":"duquesne","oai_identifier":"oai:dsc.duq.edu:etd-2592"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/duquesne/oai:dsc.duq.edu:etd-2592","repository":{"repo_id":"duquesne","name":"Duquesne","base_url":"https://dsc.duq.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Attending Intending: Meaning and Making Sense in Husserl and Wittgenstein","abstract":"Husserl and the early Wittgenstein, by defining the concepts of Sinn and Bedeutung, try to clarify how logic relates to language and mental experience. While Husserl uses language to navigate phenomenological experience, the later Wittgenstein finally rejects using language toward these ends. First, I examine the historical claim that Husserl influenced Wittgenstein. Next, common elements Husserl and Wittgentein share are attributed to Frege's influence on both thinkers. However, after subtracting the influence of Frege, a remainder of several structural similarities Wittgenstein and Husserl share are left in opposition to Frege. Of particular importance is their employment of presentative experience, serving to map out the world, and the notion of Sinn, which serves a communicative and regulative function that is independent both of actual existence and psychological cognition.","abstract_html":"Husserl and the early Wittgenstein, by defining the concepts of Sinn and Bedeutung, try to clarify how logic relates to language and mental experience. While Husserl uses language to navigate phenomenological experience, the later Wittgenstein finally rejects using language toward these ends. First, I examine the historical claim that Husserl influenced Wittgenstein. Next, common elements Husserl and Wittgentein share are attributed to Frege&#x27;s influence on both thinkers. However, after subtracting the influence of Frege, a remainder of several structural similarities Wittgenstein and Husserl share are left in opposition to Frege. Of particular importance is their employment of presentative experience, serving to map out the world, and the notion of Sinn, which serves a communicative and regulative function that is independent both of actual existence and psychological cognition.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Morgan, Matthew Radford"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"PhD","degree_level":"Campus Only","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Lanei Rodemeyer","Eleanore Holveck","Fred Evans"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":null,"date_issued":"","date_published":null,"updated_at":"2026-11-19T07:51:40Z","subjects":["Frege","intentionality","picture theory of meaning","reference","representation","semitoics"],"languages":["English"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1575","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1575","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://dsc.duq.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adsc.duq.edu%3Aetd-2592","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Lanei Rodemeyer","Eleanore Holveck","Fred Evans"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Morgan, Matthew Radford"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2023-01-05T08:00:00Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.created","label":"Dc Date Created","values":["2006-01-01T08:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Campus Only"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["PhD"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Frege","intentionality","picture theory of meaning","reference","representation","semitoics"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1575"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Husserl and the early Wittgenstein, by defining the concepts of Sinn and Bedeutung, try to clarify how logic relates to language and mental experience. While Husserl uses language to navigate phenomenological experience, the later Wittgenstein finally rejects using language toward these ends. First, I examine the historical claim that Husserl influenced Wittgenstein. Next, common elements Husserl and Wittgentein share are attributed to Frege's influence on both thinkers. However, after subtracting the influence of Frege, a remainder of several structural similarities Wittgenstein and Husserl share are left in opposition to Frege. Of particular importance is their employment of presentative experience, serving to map out the world, and the notion of Sinn, which serves a communicative and regulative function that is independent both of actual existence and psychological cognition."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Attending Intending: Meaning and Making Sense in Husserl and Wittgenstein"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Lanei Rodemeyer","Eleanore Holveck","Fred Evans"],"dc:creator":["Morgan, Matthew Radford"],"dc:date.available":["2023-01-05T08:00:00Z"],"dc:date.created":["2006-01-01T08:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["Husserl and the early Wittgenstein, by defining the concepts of Sinn and Bedeutung, try to clarify how logic relates to language and mental experience. While Husserl uses language to navigate phenomenological experience, the later Wittgenstein finally rejects using language toward these ends. First, I examine the historical claim that Husserl influenced Wittgenstein. Next, common elements Husserl and Wittgentein share are attributed to Frege's influence on both thinkers. However, after subtracting the influence of Frege, a remainder of several structural similarities Wittgenstein and Husserl share are left in opposition to Frege. Of particular importance is their employment of presentative experience, serving to map out the world, and the notion of Sinn, which serves a communicative and regulative function that is independent both of actual existence and psychological cognition."],"dc:identifier":["https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1575"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:subject":["Frege","intentionality","picture theory of meaning","reference","representation","semitoics"],"dc:title":["Attending Intending: Meaning and Making Sense in Husserl and Wittgenstein"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Campus Only"],"thesis:degree_name":["PhD"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T07:51:40Z"}