{"id":{"repo_id":"duquesne","oai_identifier":"oai:dsc.duq.edu:etd-3329"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/duquesne/oai:dsc.duq.edu:etd-3329","repository":{"repo_id":"duquesne","name":"Duquesne","base_url":"https://dsc.duq.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Form and Matter in Kant's Theoretical Philosophy","abstract":"This dissertation examines the use of the terms “form” and “matter” in Kant’s theoretical philosophy from his earliest publications up to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). I argue that these two concepts have received unfortunately little attention in the development of Kant’s thought and in his mature writings. I begin in Chapter One by examining his increasing use of them in his pre-critical writings culminating in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770), where he first develops his theory of space as a form of intuition. Then in Chapters Two to Five, I examine his account of them in his accounts of space, time, and the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. Throughout the dissertation, but especially in Chapter Three, I attend to the historical evolution of the concepts of form and matter, and I argue that Kant’s use of these terms draws, not directly on Aristotle himself who introduced them to philosophy, but rather to a logical tradition that appropriated and transformed from Aristotle’s original physical and metaphysical use of them. In Chapter Four I attempt a novel interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and I argue in particular that the notion of “reality” must be interpreted in terms of the lawfulness of appearances rather than as externality to the mind. Throughout the dissertation I argue that Kant’s use of these terms results in failure: he is unable to explain how the forms of experience (whether they be space, time, or the categories) relate to the matter or content of experience. In this way, I argue that Kant fails to meet the challenge of Humean skepticism.","abstract_html":"This dissertation examines the use of the terms “form” and “matter” in Kant’s theoretical philosophy from his earliest publications up to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). I argue that these two concepts have received unfortunately little attention in the development of Kant’s thought and in his mature writings. I begin in Chapter One by examining his increasing use of them in his pre-critical writings culminating in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770), where he first develops his theory of space as a form of intuition. Then in Chapters Two to Five, I examine his account of them in his accounts of space, time, and the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. Throughout the dissertation, but especially in Chapter Three, I attend to the historical evolution of the concepts of form and matter, and I argue that Kant’s use of these terms draws, not directly on Aristotle himself who introduced them to philosophy, but rather to a logical tradition that appropriated and transformed from Aristotle’s original physical and metaphysical use of them. In Chapter Four I attempt a novel interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and I argue in particular that the notion of “reality” must be interpreted in terms of the lawfulness of appearances rather than as externality to the mind. Throughout the dissertation I argue that Kant’s use of these terms results in failure: he is unable to explain how the forms of experience (whether they be space, time, or the categories) relate to the matter or content of experience. 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I argue that these two concepts have received unfortunately little attention in the development of Kant’s thought and in his mature writings. I begin in Chapter One by examining his increasing use of them in his pre-critical writings culminating in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770), where he first develops his theory of space as a form of intuition. Then in Chapters Two to Five, I examine his account of them in his accounts of space, time, and the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. Throughout the dissertation, but especially in Chapter Three, I attend to the historical evolution of the concepts of form and matter, and I argue that Kant’s use of these terms draws, not directly on Aristotle himself who introduced them to philosophy, but rather to a logical tradition that appropriated and transformed from Aristotle’s original physical and metaphysical use of them. In Chapter Four I attempt a novel interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and I argue in particular that the notion of “reality” must be interpreted in terms of the lawfulness of appearances rather than as externality to the mind. Throughout the dissertation I argue that Kant’s use of these terms results in failure: he is unable to explain how the forms of experience (whether they be space, time, or the categories) relate to the matter or content of experience. In this way, I argue that Kant fails to meet the challenge of Humean skepticism."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Form and Matter in Kant's Theoretical Philosophy"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Jennifer Bates","Daniel Selcer","Jay Lampert"],"dc:creator":["Higgins-Brake, Aaron"],"dc:date.available":["2024-07-03T07:00:00Z"],"dc:date.created":["2024-08-10T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation examines the use of the terms “form” and “matter” in Kant’s theoretical philosophy from his earliest publications up to the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). I argue that these two concepts have received unfortunately little attention in the development of Kant’s thought and in his mature writings. I begin in Chapter One by examining his increasing use of them in his pre-critical writings culminating in the Inaugural Dissertation (1770), where he first develops his theory of space as a form of intuition. Then in Chapters Two to Five, I examine his account of them in his accounts of space, time, and the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. Throughout the dissertation, but especially in Chapter Three, I attend to the historical evolution of the concepts of form and matter, and I argue that Kant’s use of these terms draws, not directly on Aristotle himself who introduced them to philosophy, but rather to a logical tradition that appropriated and transformed from Aristotle’s original physical and metaphysical use of them. In Chapter Four I attempt a novel interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and I argue in particular that the notion of “reality” must be interpreted in terms of the lawfulness of appearances rather than as externality to the mind. Throughout the dissertation I argue that Kant’s use of these terms results in failure: he is unable to explain how the forms of experience (whether they be space, time, or the categories) relate to the matter or content of experience. In this way, I argue that Kant fails to meet the challenge of Humean skepticism."],"dc:identifier":["https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/2216"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:subject":["Kant","Critique of Pure Reason","Transcendental Idealism","Theoretical Philosophy","History of Philosophy"],"dc:title":["Form and Matter in Kant's Theoretical Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Immediate Access"],"thesis:degree_name":["PhD"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T07:52:21Z"}