{"id":{"repo_id":"fu-berlin","oai_identifier":"oai:refubium.fu-berlin.de:fub188/1663"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/fu-berlin/oai:refubium.fu-berlin.de:fub188/1663","repository":{"repo_id":"fu-berlin","name":"Freie Universität Berlin","base_url":"https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Essays on employment protection","abstract":"The thesis reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on employment protection and presents three original research chapters. The first chapter puts the thesis into perspective with respect to the ongoing discussion of labor market reform in Europe. It presents the main theoretical insights and the empirical evidence on the effects of employment protection. Finally, it gives an introduction to the topics that are analysed in the following chapters. Chapter two considers the relationship between adjustment costs in the labor market and the functional distribution of income. Adjustment costs cause movements of the labor share, if the economy experiences shocks to business conditions or wage levels. With linear adjustment costs and Cobb- Douglas technology, these movements are independent of the size of these shocks, but depend on the size of the adjustment costs only. An empirical analysis complements the investigation and finds evidence that adjustment costs are important for factor share movements. Chapter three adresses the effects of employment protection on firms' competitiveness, if these interact strategically in imperfectly competitive markets. A firm facing employment protection and workers already hired will defend its market position more fiercely than a firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante it will be more reluctant to expand its market position. Using a dynamic model it is shown for the benchmark case of contest competition that the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position. Chapter four considers a quite general private provision problem. If a public project is financed through private contributions with convex costs, project completion may be delayed. The paper examines how asymmetries, the order of moves, and the absence of commitment will affect the completion time. All three factors are shown to cause delay, although for different reasons. Without commitment, individual contributions are strategic complements in the completing Markov perfect equilibrium, such that partial harmonization of strategies is beneficial for all.","abstract_html":"The thesis reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on employment protection and presents three original research chapters. The first chapter puts the thesis into perspective with respect to the ongoing discussion of labor market reform in Europe. It presents the main theoretical insights and the empirical evidence on the effects of employment protection. Finally, it gives an introduction to the topics that are analysed in the following chapters. Chapter two considers the relationship between adjustment costs in the labor market and the functional distribution of income. Adjustment costs cause movements of the labor share, if the economy experiences shocks to business conditions or wage levels. With linear adjustment costs and Cobb- Douglas technology, these movements are independent of the size of these shocks, but depend on the size of the adjustment costs only. An empirical analysis complements the investigation and finds evidence that adjustment costs are important for factor share movements. Chapter three adresses the effects of employment protection on firms&#x27; competitiveness, if these interact strategically in imperfectly competitive markets. A firm facing employment protection and workers already hired will defend its market position more fiercely than a firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante it will be more reluctant to expand its market position. Using a dynamic model it is shown for the benchmark case of contest competition that the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position. Chapter four considers a quite general private provision problem. If a public project is financed through private contributions with convex costs, project completion may be delayed. The paper examines how asymmetries, the order of moves, and the absence of commitment will affect the completion time. All three factors are shown to cause delay, although for different reasons. Without commitment, individual contributions are strategic complements in the completing Markov perfect equilibrium, such that partial harmonization of strategies is beneficial for all.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kessing, Sebastian Georg"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Wirtschaftswissenschaft","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Prof. Dr. Kai A. Konrad","Prof. Giuseppe Bertola, Ph.D."],"year":2003,"date_issued":"2003","date_published":"2003","updated_at":"2026-11-19T03:39:57Z","subjects":["employment protection","labor share","contests","delay"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["open access"],"rights_urls":["http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.urn","label":"URN","values":["urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-2003002028"],"render_values":[{"text":"urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-2003002028","href":null,"code":true}]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-5865"],"render_values":[{"text":"http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-5865","href":"http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-5865","code":true}]},{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["FUDISS_thesis_000000001056","FUDISS_derivate_000000001056"],"render_values":[{"text":"FUDISS_thesis_000000001056","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"FUDISS_derivate_000000001056","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/1663","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/1663","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":"open","embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Arefubium.fu-berlin.de%3Afub188%2F1663","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Prof. Dr. Kai A. 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Introduction 5 1.1 Overview 5 1.2 The analysis of labor market institutions 6 1.3 Employment protection 7 1.4 Theoretical perspective on employment protection 10 1.5 Empirical evidence on employment protection 14 1.6 Employment protection and factor shares 15 1.7 Employment protection and product market competition 18 1.8 Delay in joint projects 23 Factor shares and adjustment costs 29 2.1 Introduction 29 2.2 Non-unit elasticity of substitution 34 2.3 Factor shares in a Markov chain model 5 2.4 Wage fluctuations 44 2.5 Joint fluctuations in business conditions and wages 47 2.6 Inaction in labor demand 49 2.7 Empirical evidence 51 2.8 Conclusion 58 3. Employment protection and product market competition 60 3.1 Introduction 60 3.2 The two period model 64 3.3 The infinite horizon model 70 3.4 Extensions 76 3.5 Conclusion 78 4\\. Delay in joint projects 80 4.1 Introduction 80 4.2 The model 84 4.3 The non-cooperative solution with commitment 85 4.4 Sequential moves and asymmetry 87 4.5 The Markov perfect equilibrium 89 4.6 Conclusion 92 4.7 Appendix 94 5 Zusammenfassung / Summary (in german) 99"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["The thesis reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on employment protection and presents three original research chapters. The first chapter puts the thesis into perspective with respect to the ongoing discussion of labor market reform in Europe. It presents the main theoretical insights and the empirical evidence on the effects of employment protection. Finally, it gives an introduction to the topics that are analysed in the following chapters. Chapter two considers the relationship between adjustment costs in the labor market and the functional distribution of income. Adjustment costs cause movements of the labor share, if the economy experiences shocks to business conditions or wage levels. With linear adjustment costs and Cobb- Douglas technology, these movements are independent of the size of these shocks, but depend on the size of the adjustment costs only. An empirical analysis complements the investigation and finds evidence that adjustment costs are important for factor share movements. Chapter three adresses the effects of employment protection on firms' competitiveness, if these interact strategically in imperfectly competitive markets. A firm facing employment protection and workers already hired will defend its market position more fiercely than a firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante it will be more reluctant to expand its market position. Using a dynamic model it is shown for the benchmark case of contest competition that the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position. Chapter four considers a quite general private provision problem. If a public project is financed through private contributions with convex costs, project completion may be delayed. The paper examines how asymmetries, the order of moves, and the absence of commitment will affect the completion time. All three factors are shown to cause delay, although for different reasons. Without commitment, individual contributions are strategic complements in the completing Markov perfect equilibrium, such that partial harmonization of strategies is beneficial for all.","Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus einem einleitenden Kapitel, sowie drei inhaltlichen Kapiteln, die jeweils eine eigene Fragestellung untersuchen. Das einleitende Kapitel gibt einen Überblick über den theoretischen und empirischen Forschungsstand zum Thema Kündigungsschutz und ordnet diesen in die Diskussion über Reformen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt ein. Das zweite Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie Anpassungskosten auf dem Arbeitsmarkt, also insbesondere Regelungen zum Kündigungsschutz, die dynamische Entwicklung der funktionalen Einkommensverteilung beeinflussen. Unter Verwendung eines dynamischen Arbeitsnachfragemodells wird gezeigt, dass Anpassungskosten zu anti-zyklischen Schwankungen der Lohnquote hinsichtlich konjunktureller Schwankungen führen. Schwankungen der Löhne führen dagegen zu pro-zyklischen Schwankungen der Lohnquote. Für den Referenzfall der Cobb-Douglas Technologie, werden zwei Neutralitätsresultate bezüglich des Ausmaßes der Lohnquotenschwankungenn abgeleitet. Die theoretische Analyse wird durch eine empirische Untersuchung komplementiert. Das dritte Kapitel untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen Kündigungsschutz und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit auf dem Produktmarkt. Ein Unternehmen, das Kündigungsschutzbestimmungen ausgesetzt ist, verteidigt seine Marktposition stärker als ein konkurrierendes Unternehmen, das ohne derartige Restriktion agiert. Ex ante wird es jedoch vorsichtiger sein, seine Marktposition auszudehnen, da es die potentiellen Kosten im Falle einer späteren Verschlechterung der eigenen Marktposition vermeiden möchte. Für den Benchmarkfall, in dem der Wettbewerb zwischen den Unternehmen die Form eines Contests annimmt, überwiegt der defensive Effekt: Ein Unternehmen, das Kündigungsschutzbestimmungen ausgesetzt ist, hat langfristig eine stärkere Position im Markt als ein Wettbewerber der frei von solchen Restriktionen agiert. Das vierte Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit einem allgemeineren Thema, der Verzögerung bei gemeinsamen Projekten. Es wird eine Situation untersucht, in der die Mitglieder einer Gruppe individuell und freiwillig zu einem gemeinsamen Projekt beitragen. Die Situation wird als differentielles Spiel modelliert. Es ergibt sich, das Asymmetrie und sequentielle Zugfolge aus distributiven Gründen zu Verzögerung führen. Das symmetrische Markov-perfekte Gleichgewicht zeigt ebenfalls, dass das Fehlen von Bindungsmechanismen zu einem dynamischen Trittbrettfahrerproblem führt und somit Verzögerungen verursacht. In diesem Fall sind die individuellen Beiträge strategische Komplemente. Dies kontrastiert mit dem Fall eines teilbaren öffentlichen Gutes, wo individuelle Beiträge immer strategische Substitute sind."]},{"key":"dcterms:accessrights","label":"Dcterms Accessrights","values":["free"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Essays on employment protection"]},{"key":"dc:title.alternative","label":"Alternative Title","values":["Essays über Kündigungsschutz"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Prof. Dr. Kai A. Konrad","Prof. Giuseppe Bertola, Ph.D."],"dc:contributor.department":["Wirtschaftswissenschaft"],"dc:creator":["Kessing, Sebastian Georg"],"dc:date.issued":["2003"],"dc:description":["Title page, Table of Contents, Acknowledgements 1\\. Introduction 5 1.1 Overview 5 1.2 The analysis of labor market institutions 6 1.3 Employment protection 7 1.4 Theoretical perspective on employment protection 10 1.5 Empirical evidence on employment protection 14 1.6 Employment protection and factor shares 15 1.7 Employment protection and product market competition 18 1.8 Delay in joint projects 23 Factor shares and adjustment costs 29 2.1 Introduction 29 2.2 Non-unit elasticity of substitution 34 2.3 Factor shares in a Markov chain model 5 2.4 Wage fluctuations 44 2.5 Joint fluctuations in business conditions and wages 47 2.6 Inaction in labor demand 49 2.7 Empirical evidence 51 2.8 Conclusion 58 3. Employment protection and product market competition 60 3.1 Introduction 60 3.2 The two period model 64 3.3 The infinite horizon model 70 3.4 Extensions 76 3.5 Conclusion 78 4\\. Delay in joint projects 80 4.1 Introduction 80 4.2 The model 84 4.3 The non-cooperative solution with commitment 85 4.4 Sequential moves and asymmetry 87 4.5 The Markov perfect equilibrium 89 4.6 Conclusion 92 4.7 Appendix 94 5 Zusammenfassung / Summary (in german) 99"],"dc:description.abstract":["The thesis reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on employment protection and presents three original research chapters. The first chapter puts the thesis into perspective with respect to the ongoing discussion of labor market reform in Europe. It presents the main theoretical insights and the empirical evidence on the effects of employment protection. Finally, it gives an introduction to the topics that are analysed in the following chapters. Chapter two considers the relationship between adjustment costs in the labor market and the functional distribution of income. Adjustment costs cause movements of the labor share, if the economy experiences shocks to business conditions or wage levels. With linear adjustment costs and Cobb- Douglas technology, these movements are independent of the size of these shocks, but depend on the size of the adjustment costs only. An empirical analysis complements the investigation and finds evidence that adjustment costs are important for factor share movements. Chapter three adresses the effects of employment protection on firms' competitiveness, if these interact strategically in imperfectly competitive markets. A firm facing employment protection and workers already hired will defend its market position more fiercely than a firm operating without such restrictions. However, ex ante it will be more reluctant to expand its market position. Using a dynamic model it is shown for the benchmark case of contest competition that the defensive effect dominates. A firm facing employment protection has a stronger average market position. Chapter four considers a quite general private provision problem. If a public project is financed through private contributions with convex costs, project completion may be delayed. The paper examines how asymmetries, the order of moves, and the absence of commitment will affect the completion time. All three factors are shown to cause delay, although for different reasons. Without commitment, individual contributions are strategic complements in the completing Markov perfect equilibrium, such that partial harmonization of strategies is beneficial for all.","Die vorliegende Dissertation besteht aus einem einleitenden Kapitel, sowie drei inhaltlichen Kapiteln, die jeweils eine eigene Fragestellung untersuchen. Das einleitende Kapitel gibt einen Überblick über den theoretischen und empirischen Forschungsstand zum Thema Kündigungsschutz und ordnet diesen in die Diskussion über Reformen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt ein. Das zweite Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie Anpassungskosten auf dem Arbeitsmarkt, also insbesondere Regelungen zum Kündigungsschutz, die dynamische Entwicklung der funktionalen Einkommensverteilung beeinflussen. Unter Verwendung eines dynamischen Arbeitsnachfragemodells wird gezeigt, dass Anpassungskosten zu anti-zyklischen Schwankungen der Lohnquote hinsichtlich konjunktureller Schwankungen führen. Schwankungen der Löhne führen dagegen zu pro-zyklischen Schwankungen der Lohnquote. Für den Referenzfall der Cobb-Douglas Technologie, werden zwei Neutralitätsresultate bezüglich des Ausmaßes der Lohnquotenschwankungenn abgeleitet. Die theoretische Analyse wird durch eine empirische Untersuchung komplementiert. Das dritte Kapitel untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen Kündigungsschutz und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit auf dem Produktmarkt. Ein Unternehmen, das Kündigungsschutzbestimmungen ausgesetzt ist, verteidigt seine Marktposition stärker als ein konkurrierendes Unternehmen, das ohne derartige Restriktion agiert. Ex ante wird es jedoch vorsichtiger sein, seine Marktposition auszudehnen, da es die potentiellen Kosten im Falle einer späteren Verschlechterung der eigenen Marktposition vermeiden möchte. Für den Benchmarkfall, in dem der Wettbewerb zwischen den Unternehmen die Form eines Contests annimmt, überwiegt der defensive Effekt: Ein Unternehmen, das Kündigungsschutzbestimmungen ausgesetzt ist, hat langfristig eine stärkere Position im Markt als ein Wettbewerber der frei von solchen Restriktionen agiert. Das vierte Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit einem allgemeineren Thema, der Verzögerung bei gemeinsamen Projekten. Es wird eine Situation untersucht, in der die Mitglieder einer Gruppe individuell und freiwillig zu einem gemeinsamen Projekt beitragen. Die Situation wird als differentielles Spiel modelliert. Es ergibt sich, das Asymmetrie und sequentielle Zugfolge aus distributiven Gründen zu Verzögerung führen. Das symmetrische Markov-perfekte Gleichgewicht zeigt ebenfalls, dass das Fehlen von Bindungsmechanismen zu einem dynamischen Trittbrettfahrerproblem führt und somit Verzögerungen verursacht. In diesem Fall sind die individuellen Beiträge strategische Komplemente. Dies kontrastiert mit dem Fall eines teilbaren öffentlichen Gutes, wo individuelle Beiträge immer strategische Substitute sind."],"dc:identifier.other":["FUDISS_thesis_000000001056","FUDISS_derivate_000000001056"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/1663","http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/refubium-5865"],"dc:identifier.urn":["urn:nbn:de:kobv:188-2003002028"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:relation.uri":["http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/2003/202/"],"dc:rights.accessrights":["open access"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://www.fu-berlin.de/sites/refubium/rechtliches/Nutzungsbedingungen"],"dc:subject":["employment protection","labor share","contests","delay"],"dc:subject.ddc":["ddc:330"],"dcterms:accessrights":["free"],"dc:title":["Essays on employment protection"],"dc:title.alternative":["Essays über Kündigungsschutz"],"dc:type":["doc-type:doctoralThesis"],"dc:type.dcmitype":["Text"],"person:gender":["n"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T03:39:57Z"}