{"id":{"repo_id":"glasgow","oai_identifier":"oai:theses.gla.ac.uk:6347"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/glasgow/oai:theses.gla.ac.uk:6347","repository":{"repo_id":"glasgow","name":"University of Glasgow","base_url":"https://theses.gla.ac.uk/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"The super-overdetermination problem","abstract":"I examine the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalists, and conclude that if we are to be physicalists, then we should be reductive physicalists. I assess how both reductionists and non-reductionists try to solve the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation. I focus on the problem of mental causation as it is supposed to be faced by non-reductionism: the so-called overdetermination problem. I argue that the traditional articulation of that problem is significantly flawed, and I show how to articulate it properly: what I call the ‘super-overdetermination problem’. In doing so, I demonstrate that the problem of mental causation faced by non-reductionism is in fact a special case of the mind-body problem, as faced by non-reductionism, and that the former can’t be solved independently of the latter. I then assess the prospects for a particular family of non-reductive views that I call immanentism, and show that they fail to solve the super-overdetermination problem. Finally, I put forward two arguments to support the conclusion that physicalism entails reductionism. Both arguments establish, via distinct reasoning, the proposition that mental property instances are identical to physical property instances; and then each argument employs the inference, which I also defend, that if mental instances are physical instances, then mental properties are physical properties; hence, reductionism follows.","abstract_html":"I examine the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalists, and conclude that if we are to be physicalists, then we should be reductive physicalists. I assess how both reductionists and non-reductionists try to solve the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation. I focus on the problem of mental causation as it is supposed to be faced by non-reductionism: the so-called overdetermination problem. I argue that the traditional articulation of that problem is significantly flawed, and I show how to articulate it properly: what I call the ‘super-overdetermination problem’. In doing so, I demonstrate that the problem of mental causation faced by non-reductionism is in fact a special case of the mind-body problem, as faced by non-reductionism, and that the former can’t be solved independently of the latter. I then assess the prospects for a particular family of non-reductive views that I call immanentism, and show that they fail to solve the super-overdetermination problem. Finally, I put forward two arguments to support the conclusion that physicalism entails reductionism. Both arguments establish, via distinct reasoning, the proposition that mental property instances are identical to physical property instances; and then each argument employs the inference, which I also defend, that if mental instances are physical instances, then mental properties are physical properties; hence, reductionism follows.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Donaldson, John"],"institution":"University of Glasgow","degree_name":null,"degree_level":"PhD","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014","date_published":"2014","updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:24:18Z","subjects":["B Philosophy (General)","BF Psychology"],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null,"record_url":null,"record_label":null,"record_kind":null,"record_source":null,"download_url":"https://theses.gla.ac.uk/6347/7/coversheet.pdf","download_label":"Download PDF","download_source":"dc:identifier.uri","access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://theses.gla.ac.uk/cgi/oai2?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=uketd_dc&identifier=oai%3Atheses.gla.ac.uk%3A6347","prefix":"uketd_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Donaldson, John"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2014"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2014"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Glasgow"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["https://theses.gla.ac.uk/6347/"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby URI","values":["https://gla.on.worldcat.org/oclc/934270160"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["PhD"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["B Philosophy (General)","BF Psychology"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://theses.gla.ac.uk/6347/7/coversheet.pdf","https://theses.gla.ac.uk/6347/1/2014DonaldsonJPhD.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["I examine the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalists, and conclude that if we are to be physicalists, then we should be reductive physicalists. I assess how both reductionists and non-reductionists try to solve the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation. I focus on the problem of mental causation as it is supposed to be faced by non-reductionism: the so-called overdetermination problem. I argue that the traditional articulation of that problem is significantly flawed, and I show how to articulate it properly: what I call the ‘super-overdetermination problem’. In doing so, I demonstrate that the problem of mental causation faced by non-reductionism is in fact a special case of the mind-body problem, as faced by non-reductionism, and that the former can’t be solved independently of the latter. I then assess the prospects for a particular family of non-reductive views that I call immanentism, and show that they fail to solve the super-overdetermination problem. Finally, I put forward two arguments to support the conclusion that physicalism entails reductionism. Both arguments establish, via distinct reasoning, the proposition that mental property instances are identical to physical property instances; and then each argument employs the inference, which I also defend, that if mental instances are physical instances, then mental properties are physical properties; hence, reductionism follows."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["pdf"]},{"key":"dcterms:accessrights","label":"Dcterms Accessrights","values":["public"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The super-overdetermination problem"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Donaldson, John"],"dc:date":["2014"],"dc:date.issued":["2014"],"dc:description.abstract":["I examine the debate between reductive and non-reductive physicalists, and conclude that if we are to be physicalists, then we should be reductive physicalists. I assess how both reductionists and non-reductionists try to solve the mind-body problem and the problem of mental causation. I focus on the problem of mental causation as it is supposed to be faced by non-reductionism: the so-called overdetermination problem. I argue that the traditional articulation of that problem is significantly flawed, and I show how to articulate it properly: what I call the ‘super-overdetermination problem’. In doing so, I demonstrate that the problem of mental causation faced by non-reductionism is in fact a special case of the mind-body problem, as faced by non-reductionism, and that the former can’t be solved independently of the latter. I then assess the prospects for a particular family of non-reductive views that I call immanentism, and show that they fail to solve the super-overdetermination problem. Finally, I put forward two arguments to support the conclusion that physicalism entails reductionism. Both arguments establish, via distinct reasoning, the proposition that mental property instances are identical to physical property instances; and then each argument employs the inference, which I also defend, that if mental instances are physical instances, then mental properties are physical properties; hence, reductionism follows."],"dc:format":["pdf"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://theses.gla.ac.uk/6347/7/coversheet.pdf","https://theses.gla.ac.uk/6347/1/2014DonaldsonJPhD.pdf"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:publisher.institution":["University of Glasgow"],"dc:relation.isreferencedby":["https://theses.gla.ac.uk/6347/"],"dc:relation.isreferencedby.uri":["https://gla.on.worldcat.org/oclc/934270160"],"dc:subject":["B Philosophy (General)","BF Psychology"],"dcterms:accessrights":["public"],"dc:title":["The super-overdetermination problem"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"dc:type.qualificationlevel":["PhD"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:24:18Z"}