{"id":{"repo_id":"glasgow","oai_identifier":"oai:theses.gla.ac.uk:85555"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/glasgow/oai:theses.gla.ac.uk:85555","repository":{"repo_id":"glasgow","name":"University of Glasgow","base_url":"https://theses.gla.ac.uk/cgi/oai2"},"display":{"title":"Fighting falsity: essays on deceiving, objecting, and conspiring","abstract":"This thesis is comprised of five discrete but related chapters in applied, social, and political epistemology. Specifically, most of the thesis is centred around fighting falsity; that is, for example, what should you do when one someone asserts something wrong, outlandish, or flat-out dangerous to you or those around you? What is the best course of action if you come across such a claim on the internet? What sort of claims even are wrong, outlandish, or flat-out dangerous? I open with a discussion of bullshit and identify a new phenomenon I call “hedged bullshitting” which I argue is a superlative form of deception we ought to be concerned about. I turn in chapter two to a discussion of what makes for an epistemically good objection (and forbearance from objecting), employing the influential performance-normative framework from virtue epistemology to answer this. I then call for caution in chapter three; objecting can and will go wrong, especially when it comes to certain controversial false assertions, thus we ought to not be so laissez-faire when it comes to engaging with interlocutors. In light of this call for reticence, I explore a different method of fighting falsity in chapter four: censorship and no-platforming. While potentially effective strategies, I argue they make for hiltless swords—they cannot be safely used. In the final chapter, I offer a broad critique of the philosophy of conspiracy theories, rejecting almost every widely held assumption in the literature. I offer my own, more satisfactory definition of conspiracy theories that I argue will best advance the literature.","abstract_html":"This thesis is comprised of five discrete but related chapters in applied, social, and political epistemology. Specifically, most of the thesis is centred around fighting falsity; that is, for example, what should you do when one someone asserts something wrong, outlandish, or flat-out dangerous to you or those around you? What is the best course of action if you come across such a claim on the internet? What sort of claims even are wrong, outlandish, or flat-out dangerous? I open with a discussion of bullshit and identify a new phenomenon I call “hedged bullshitting” which I argue is a superlative form of deception we ought to be concerned about. I turn in chapter two to a discussion of what makes for an epistemically good objection (and forbearance from objecting), employing the influential performance-normative framework from virtue epistemology to answer this. I then call for caution in chapter three; objecting can and will go wrong, especially when it comes to certain controversial false assertions, thus we ought to not be so laissez-faire when it comes to engaging with interlocutors. In light of this call for reticence, I explore a different method of fighting falsity in chapter four: censorship and no-platforming. While potentially effective strategies, I argue they make for hiltless swords—they cannot be safely used. In the final chapter, I offer a broad critique of the philosophy of conspiracy theories, rejecting almost every widely held assumption in the literature. I offer my own, more satisfactory definition of conspiracy theories that I argue will best advance the literature.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Aird, Rory"],"institution":"University of Glasgow","degree_name":null,"degree_level":"PhD","degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025","date_published":"2025","updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:37:21Z","subjects":["B Philosophy (General)"],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/10.5525/gla.thesis.85555","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.doi","record_url":"https://doi.org/10.5525/gla.thesis.85555","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"doi","record_source":"dc:identifier.doi","download_url":"https://theses.gla.ac.uk/85555/1/2025AirdPhD.pdf","download_label":"Download PDF","download_source":"dc:identifier.uri","access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://theses.gla.ac.uk/cgi/oai2?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=uketd_dc&identifier=oai%3Atheses.gla.ac.uk%3A85555","prefix":"uketd_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Aird, Rory"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2025"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2025"]},{"key":"dc:publisher.institution","label":"Dc Publisher Institution","values":["University of Glasgow"]},{"key":"dc:relation.isreferencedby","label":"Dc Relation Isreferencedby","values":["https://theses.gla.ac.uk/85555/"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"dc:type.qualificationlevel","label":"Dc Type Qualificationlevel","values":["PhD"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["B Philosophy (General)"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.doi","label":"DOI","values":["10.5525/gla.thesis.85555"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://theses.gla.ac.uk/85555/1/2025AirdPhD.pdf"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis is comprised of five discrete but related chapters in applied, social, and political epistemology. Specifically, most of the thesis is centred around fighting falsity; that is, for example, what should you do when one someone asserts something wrong, outlandish, or flat-out dangerous to you or those around you? What is the best course of action if you come across such a claim on the internet? What sort of claims even are wrong, outlandish, or flat-out dangerous? I open with a discussion of bullshit and identify a new phenomenon I call “hedged bullshitting” which I argue is a superlative form of deception we ought to be concerned about. I turn in chapter two to a discussion of what makes for an epistemically good objection (and forbearance from objecting), employing the influential performance-normative framework from virtue epistemology to answer this. I then call for caution in chapter three; objecting can and will go wrong, especially when it comes to certain controversial false assertions, thus we ought to not be so laissez-faire when it comes to engaging with interlocutors. In light of this call for reticence, I explore a different method of fighting falsity in chapter four: censorship and no-platforming. While potentially effective strategies, I argue they make for hiltless swords—they cannot be safely used. In the final chapter, I offer a broad critique of the philosophy of conspiracy theories, rejecting almost every widely held assumption in the literature. I offer my own, more satisfactory definition of conspiracy theories that I argue will best advance the literature."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["pdf"]},{"key":"dcterms:accessrights","label":"Dcterms Accessrights","values":["public"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Fighting falsity: essays on deceiving, objecting, and conspiring"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:creator":["Aird, Rory"],"dc:date":["2025"],"dc:date.issued":["2025"],"dc:description.abstract":["This thesis is comprised of five discrete but related chapters in applied, social, and political epistemology. 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In light of this call for reticence, I explore a different method of fighting falsity in chapter four: censorship and no-platforming. While potentially effective strategies, I argue they make for hiltless swords—they cannot be safely used. In the final chapter, I offer a broad critique of the philosophy of conspiracy theories, rejecting almost every widely held assumption in the literature. 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