{"id":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","oai_identifier":"oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/11619"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/mcmaster/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/11619","repository":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","name":"McMaster University","base_url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"THE COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF AND WHAT IS SAID BY DEMONSTRATIVE AND INDEXICAL SENTENCES","abstract":"<p>Frege did not develop an analysis of the sense of demonstrative or indexical expressions. It is possible, though, to understand Frege's analysis of thoughts as providing a set of constraints on the sense of all expressions, including demonstratives and indexicals. It will be shown that, for Frege, the sense of a demonstrative/indexical expression \"α\", must conform with the following four constraints:</p> <p>(FS 1) The sense of \"α\" is a mode of presentation of a reference.</p> <p>(FS 2) The sense of \"α\" must be a determinant of the cognitive significance of a rational person's understanding of the sentence \"α is Φ\".</p> <p>(FS 3) The sense of \"α\", along with the senses of the other constituent expressions of the sentence \"α is Φ\", which expresses a thought, must determine a fixed truth value.</p> <p>(FS 4) The sense of \"α\" is a determinant of the objective content of what is said by someone uttering \"α is Φ\" as well as the objective judgeable content of \"α is Φ\"</p> <p>In this paper, I will attempt to investigate whether there is anything which demonstratives/indexicals possess which conforms with these constraints.</p> <p>I will attempt to show that demonstratives/indexicals possess something which may be characterized as modes of presentation of reference, which are determinants of cognitive significance, as well as determinants of fixed truth values. To this end, I will develop an account of the cognitive significance of a rational person's understanding of demonstrative/indexical sentences. I will also attempt to show that a demonstrative/indexical possesses something which may be characterized as a mode of presentation of reference, and which, with qualification, is a determinant of the objective content of what is said by someone uttering a sentence containing the demonstrative/indexical as a constituent expression.</p> <p>We will see that as a result of my investigation of demonstrative/indexical expressions, we must distinguish four non-identical types of contents which can be possessed by indexical/demonstrative utterances, i.e., cognitive significance, \"grasped content\", \"re-expressible content\" and linguistic meaning.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;Frege did not develop an analysis of the sense of demonstrative or indexical expressions. It is possible, though, to understand Frege&#x27;s analysis of thoughts as providing a set of constraints on the sense of all expressions, including demonstratives and indexicals. It will be shown that, for Frege, the sense of a demonstrative/indexical expression &quot;α&quot;, must conform with the following four constraints:&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;(FS 1) The sense of &quot;α&quot; is a mode of presentation of a reference.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;(FS 2) The sense of &quot;α&quot; must be a determinant of the cognitive significance of a rational person&#x27;s understanding of the sentence &quot;α is Φ&quot;.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;(FS 3) The sense of &quot;α&quot;, along with the senses of the other constituent expressions of the sentence &quot;α is Φ&quot;, which expresses a thought, must determine a fixed truth value.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;(FS 4) The sense of &quot;α&quot; is a determinant of the objective content of what is said by someone uttering &quot;α is Φ&quot; as well as the objective judgeable content of &quot;α is Φ&quot;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In this paper, I will attempt to investigate whether there is anything which demonstratives/indexicals possess which conforms with these constraints.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I will attempt to show that demonstratives/indexicals possess something which may be characterized as modes of presentation of reference, which are determinants of cognitive significance, as well as determinants of fixed truth values. To this end, I will develop an account of the cognitive significance of a rational person&#x27;s understanding of demonstrative/indexical sentences. I will also attempt to show that a demonstrative/indexical possesses something which may be characterized as a mode of presentation of reference, and which, with qualification, is a determinant of the objective content of what is said by someone uttering a sentence containing the demonstrative/indexical as a constituent expression.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;We will see that as a result of my investigation of demonstrative/indexical expressions, we must distinguish four non-identical types of contents which can be possessed by indexical/demonstrative utterances, i.e., cognitive significance, &quot;grasped content&quot;, &quot;re-expressible content&quot; and linguistic meaning.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kobasigawa, Yoshimichi"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Griffin, N."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":1995,"date_issued":"1995-12","date_published":"1995-12","updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:38:38Z","subjects":["Philosophy"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/6574","7619","2397138"],"render_values":[{"text":"opendissertations/6574","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"7619","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"2397138","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11619","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11619","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Amacsphere.mcmaster.ca%3A11375%2F11619","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Griffin, N."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kobasigawa, Yoshimichi"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2014-06-18T16:55:38Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-06-18T16:55:38Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.created","label":"Dc Date Created","values":["2011-12-10"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["1995-12"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/6574","7619","2397138"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11619"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["<p>Frege did not develop an analysis of the sense of demonstrative or indexical expressions. It is possible, though, to understand Frege's analysis of thoughts as providing a set of constraints on the sense of all expressions, including demonstratives and indexicals. It will be shown that, for Frege, the sense of a demonstrative/indexical expression \"α\", must conform with the following four constraints:</p> <p>(FS 1) The sense of \"α\" is a mode of presentation of a reference.</p> <p>(FS 2) The sense of \"α\" must be a determinant of the cognitive significance of a rational person's understanding of the sentence \"α is Φ\".</p> <p>(FS 3) The sense of \"α\", along with the senses of the other constituent expressions of the sentence \"α is Φ\", which expresses a thought, must determine a fixed truth value.</p> <p>(FS 4) The sense of \"α\" is a determinant of the objective content of what is said by someone uttering \"α is Φ\" as well as the objective judgeable content of \"α is Φ\"</p> <p>In this paper, I will attempt to investigate whether there is anything which demonstratives/indexicals possess which conforms with these constraints.</p> <p>I will attempt to show that demonstratives/indexicals possess something which may be characterized as modes of presentation of reference, which are determinants of cognitive significance, as well as determinants of fixed truth values. To this end, I will develop an account of the cognitive significance of a rational person's understanding of demonstrative/indexical sentences. I will also attempt to show that a demonstrative/indexical possesses something which may be characterized as a mode of presentation of reference, and which, with qualification, is a determinant of the objective content of what is said by someone uttering a sentence containing the demonstrative/indexical as a constituent expression.</p> <p>We will see that as a result of my investigation of demonstrative/indexical expressions, we must distinguish four non-identical types of contents which can be possessed by indexical/demonstrative utterances, i.e., cognitive significance, \"grasped content\", \"re-expressible content\" and linguistic meaning.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts (MA)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["THE COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF AND WHAT IS SAID BY DEMONSTRATIVE AND INDEXICAL SENTENCES"]},{"key":"others:access_status","label":"Others Access Status","values":["metadata.only"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Griffin, N."],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Kobasigawa, Yoshimichi"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2014-06-18T16:55:38Z"],"dc:date.available":["2014-06-18T16:55:38Z"],"dc:date.created":["2011-12-10"],"dc:date.issued":["1995-12"],"dc:description.abstract":["<p>Frege did not develop an analysis of the sense of demonstrative or indexical expressions. It is possible, though, to understand Frege's analysis of thoughts as providing a set of constraints on the sense of all expressions, including demonstratives and indexicals. It will be shown that, for Frege, the sense of a demonstrative/indexical expression \"α\", must conform with the following four constraints:</p> <p>(FS 1) The sense of \"α\" is a mode of presentation of a reference.</p> <p>(FS 2) The sense of \"α\" must be a determinant of the cognitive significance of a rational person's understanding of the sentence \"α is Φ\".</p> <p>(FS 3) The sense of \"α\", along with the senses of the other constituent expressions of the sentence \"α is Φ\", which expresses a thought, must determine a fixed truth value.</p> <p>(FS 4) The sense of \"α\" is a determinant of the objective content of what is said by someone uttering \"α is Φ\" as well as the objective judgeable content of \"α is Φ\"</p> <p>In this paper, I will attempt to investigate whether there is anything which demonstratives/indexicals possess which conforms with these constraints.</p> <p>I will attempt to show that demonstratives/indexicals possess something which may be characterized as modes of presentation of reference, which are determinants of cognitive significance, as well as determinants of fixed truth values. To this end, I will develop an account of the cognitive significance of a rational person's understanding of demonstrative/indexical sentences. I will also attempt to show that a demonstrative/indexical possesses something which may be characterized as a mode of presentation of reference, and which, with qualification, is a determinant of the objective content of what is said by someone uttering a sentence containing the demonstrative/indexical as a constituent expression.</p> <p>We will see that as a result of my investigation of demonstrative/indexical expressions, we must distinguish four non-identical types of contents which can be possessed by indexical/demonstrative utterances, i.e., cognitive significance, \"grasped content\", \"re-expressible content\" and linguistic meaning.</p>"],"dc:description.degree":["Master of Arts (MA)"],"dc:identifier.other":["opendissertations/6574","7619","2397138"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11619"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy"],"dc:title":["THE COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF AND WHAT IS SAID BY DEMONSTRATIVE AND INDEXICAL SENTENCES"],"dc:type":["thesis"],"others:access_status":["metadata.only"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:38:38Z"}