{"id":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","oai_identifier":"oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/13210"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/mcmaster/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/13210","repository":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","name":"McMaster University","base_url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"THREE ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE","abstract":"<p>This thesis explores the following three important issues in the field of corporate finance: window dressing in corporate cash holdings, market effects of SEC regulation of short-term borrowing disclosure and market response to dividend change announcements by unregulated versus regulated firms.</p> <p>First, I find strong evidence of upward window dressing in cash holdings by U.S. industrial firms during the fourth fiscal quarter. This behavior is robust to several controls and a December year-end dummy. Further cross-sectional analysis reveals that the window dressing is sensitive to firm size and level of information asymmetry. I also find that firms manipulate discretionary accruals to dress up fourth quarter cash, perhaps to gain favourable credit terms on issuing short-term debt.</p> <p>Second, I use portfolios of financial and non-financial SEC registrants to examine the market reaction to proposed SEC short-term borrowing disclosure regulation. Using event study methodology, I find that the market reaction is positive and significant at the announcement date and negative and significant at the voting date. Overall, I observe a positive market reaction, indicating the usefulness of the disclosure from the vantage point of users. The results for various subsets confirm the expectations and suggest that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to regulation is undesirable.</p> <p>Finally, I use large samples of dividend increase and decrease announcements for the period 1960 to 2010 in order to compare stock price reactions of unregulated and regulated firms. I observe a stronger market reaction to the dividend increase announcements of unregulated firms compared to those of regulated firms after controlling for firm characteristics, market factors and contemporaneous earnings announcements, a result consistent with the dividend signaling hypothesis and uniqueness argument for regulated firms. However, I find that the market reaction to dividend decrease announcements is similar for unregulated and regulated firms. The cross-sectional analysis further confirms that the stronger stock price reaction to dividend increase announcements of unregulated firms is associated with the level of information asymmetry.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;This thesis explores the following three important issues in the field of corporate finance: window dressing in corporate cash holdings, market effects of SEC regulation of short-term borrowing disclosure and market response to dividend change announcements by unregulated versus regulated firms.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;First, I find strong evidence of upward window dressing in cash holdings by U.S. industrial firms during the fourth fiscal quarter. This behavior is robust to several controls and a December year-end dummy. Further cross-sectional analysis reveals that the window dressing is sensitive to firm size and level of information asymmetry. I also find that firms manipulate discretionary accruals to dress up fourth quarter cash, perhaps to gain favourable credit terms on issuing short-term debt.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Second, I use portfolios of financial and non-financial SEC registrants to examine the market reaction to proposed SEC short-term borrowing disclosure regulation. Using event study methodology, I find that the market reaction is positive and significant at the announcement date and negative and significant at the voting date. Overall, I observe a positive market reaction, indicating the usefulness of the disclosure from the vantage point of users. The results for various subsets confirm the expectations and suggest that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to regulation is undesirable.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;Finally, I use large samples of dividend increase and decrease announcements for the period 1960 to 2010 in order to compare stock price reactions of unregulated and regulated firms. I observe a stronger market reaction to the dividend increase announcements of unregulated firms compared to those of regulated firms after controlling for firm characteristics, market factors and contemporaneous earnings announcements, a result consistent with the dividend signaling hypothesis and uniqueness argument for regulated firms. However, I find that the market reaction to dividend decrease announcements is similar for unregulated and regulated firms. The cross-sectional analysis further confirms that the stronger stock price reaction to dividend increase announcements of unregulated firms is associated with the level of information asymmetry.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Khokhar, Abdul Rahman"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Business","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Sarkar, Sudipto","Jiaping Qiu; Trevor Chamberlain"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013-10","date_published":"2013-10","updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:32:14Z","subjects":["Empirical Corporate Finance","Cash Holdings","Dividend Policy","Regulation","Information Asymmetry","Finance and Financial Management"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://doi.org/10.71548/11415"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.71548/11415","href":"https://doi.org/10.71548/11415","code":true}]},{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/8031","9101","4448533"],"render_values":[{"text":"opendissertations/8031","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"9101","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"4448533","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13210","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13210","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Amacsphere.mcmaster.ca%3A11375%2F13210","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Sarkar, Sudipto","Jiaping Qiu; Trevor Chamberlain"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Business"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Khokhar, Abdul Rahman"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2014-06-18T17:03:11Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-06-18T17:03:11Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.created","label":"Dc Date Created","values":["2013-08-16"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2013-10"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Empirical Corporate Finance","Cash Holdings","Dividend Policy","Regulation","Information Asymmetry","Finance and Financial Management"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/8031","9101","4448533"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13210","https://doi.org/10.71548/11415"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["<p>This thesis explores the following three important issues in the field of corporate finance: window dressing in corporate cash holdings, market effects of SEC regulation of short-term borrowing disclosure and market response to dividend change announcements by unregulated versus regulated firms.</p> <p>First, I find strong evidence of upward window dressing in cash holdings by U.S. industrial firms during the fourth fiscal quarter. This behavior is robust to several controls and a December year-end dummy. Further cross-sectional analysis reveals that the window dressing is sensitive to firm size and level of information asymmetry. I also find that firms manipulate discretionary accruals to dress up fourth quarter cash, perhaps to gain favourable credit terms on issuing short-term debt.</p> <p>Second, I use portfolios of financial and non-financial SEC registrants to examine the market reaction to proposed SEC short-term borrowing disclosure regulation. Using event study methodology, I find that the market reaction is positive and significant at the announcement date and negative and significant at the voting date. Overall, I observe a positive market reaction, indicating the usefulness of the disclosure from the vantage point of users. The results for various subsets confirm the expectations and suggest that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to regulation is undesirable.</p> <p>Finally, I use large samples of dividend increase and decrease announcements for the period 1960 to 2010 in order to compare stock price reactions of unregulated and regulated firms. I observe a stronger market reaction to the dividend increase announcements of unregulated firms compared to those of regulated firms after controlling for firm characteristics, market factors and contemporaneous earnings announcements, a result consistent with the dividend signaling hypothesis and uniqueness argument for regulated firms. However, I find that the market reaction to dividend decrease announcements is similar for unregulated and regulated firms. The cross-sectional analysis further confirms that the stronger stock price reaction to dividend increase announcements of unregulated firms is associated with the level of information asymmetry.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["THREE ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE"]},{"key":"others:access_status","label":"Others Access Status","values":["open.access"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Sarkar, Sudipto","Jiaping Qiu; Trevor Chamberlain"],"dc:contributor.department":["Business"],"dc:creator":["Khokhar, Abdul Rahman"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2014-06-18T17:03:11Z"],"dc:date.available":["2014-06-18T17:03:11Z"],"dc:date.created":["2013-08-16"],"dc:date.issued":["2013-10"],"dc:description.abstract":["<p>This thesis explores the following three important issues in the field of corporate finance: window dressing in corporate cash holdings, market effects of SEC regulation of short-term borrowing disclosure and market response to dividend change announcements by unregulated versus regulated firms.</p> <p>First, I find strong evidence of upward window dressing in cash holdings by U.S. industrial firms during the fourth fiscal quarter. This behavior is robust to several controls and a December year-end dummy. Further cross-sectional analysis reveals that the window dressing is sensitive to firm size and level of information asymmetry. I also find that firms manipulate discretionary accruals to dress up fourth quarter cash, perhaps to gain favourable credit terms on issuing short-term debt.</p> <p>Second, I use portfolios of financial and non-financial SEC registrants to examine the market reaction to proposed SEC short-term borrowing disclosure regulation. Using event study methodology, I find that the market reaction is positive and significant at the announcement date and negative and significant at the voting date. Overall, I observe a positive market reaction, indicating the usefulness of the disclosure from the vantage point of users. The results for various subsets confirm the expectations and suggest that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to regulation is undesirable.</p> <p>Finally, I use large samples of dividend increase and decrease announcements for the period 1960 to 2010 in order to compare stock price reactions of unregulated and regulated firms. I observe a stronger market reaction to the dividend increase announcements of unregulated firms compared to those of regulated firms after controlling for firm characteristics, market factors and contemporaneous earnings announcements, a result consistent with the dividend signaling hypothesis and uniqueness argument for regulated firms. However, I find that the market reaction to dividend decrease announcements is similar for unregulated and regulated firms. The cross-sectional analysis further confirms that the stronger stock price reaction to dividend increase announcements of unregulated firms is associated with the level of information asymmetry.</p>"],"dc:description.degree":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"],"dc:identifier.other":["opendissertations/8031","9101","4448533"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13210","https://doi.org/10.71548/11415"],"dc:subject":["Empirical Corporate Finance","Cash Holdings","Dividend Policy","Regulation","Information Asymmetry","Finance and Financial Management"],"dc:title":["THREE ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE"],"dc:type":["thesis"],"others:access_status":["open.access"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:32:14Z"}