{"id":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","oai_identifier":"oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/13307"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/mcmaster/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/13307","repository":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","name":"McMaster University","base_url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"DIAGONALIZATION AND LOGICAL PARADOXES","abstract":"<p>The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a proper treatment for two groups of logical paradoxes: semantic paradoxes and set-theoretic paradoxes. My main thesis is that the two different groups of paradoxes need different kinds of solution. Based on the analysis of the diagonal method and truth-gap theory, I propose a functional-deflationary interpretation for semantic notions such as ‘heterological’, ‘true’, ‘denote’, and ‘define’, and argue that the contradictions in semantic paradoxes are due to a misunderstanding of the non-representational nature of these semantic notions. Thus, they all can be solved by clarifying the relevant confusion: the liar sentence and the heterological sentence do not have truth values, and phrases generating paradoxes of definability (such as that in Berry’s paradox) do not denote an object. I also argue against three other leading approaches to the semantic paradoxes: the Tarskian hierarchy, contextualism, and the paraconsistent approach. I show that they fail to meet one or more criteria for a satisfactory solution to the semantic paradoxes. For the set-theoretic paradoxes, I argue that the criterion for a successful solution in the realm of set theory is mathematical usefulness. Since the standard solution, i.e. the axiomatic solution, meets this requirement, it should be accepted as a successful solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a proper treatment for two groups of logical paradoxes: semantic paradoxes and set-theoretic paradoxes. My main thesis is that the two different groups of paradoxes need different kinds of solution. Based on the analysis of the diagonal method and truth-gap theory, I propose a functional-deflationary interpretation for semantic notions such as ‘heterological’, ‘true’, ‘denote’, and ‘define’, and argue that the contradictions in semantic paradoxes are due to a misunderstanding of the non-representational nature of these semantic notions. Thus, they all can be solved by clarifying the relevant confusion: the liar sentence and the heterological sentence do not have truth values, and phrases generating paradoxes of definability (such as that in Berry’s paradox) do not denote an object. I also argue against three other leading approaches to the semantic paradoxes: the Tarskian hierarchy, contextualism, and the paraconsistent approach. I show that they fail to meet one or more criteria for a satisfactory solution to the semantic paradoxes. For the set-theoretic paradoxes, I argue that the criterion for a successful solution in the realm of set theory is mathematical usefulness. Since the standard solution, i.e. the axiomatic solution, meets this requirement, it should be accepted as a successful solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Zhong, Haixia"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["W., Richard T.","Griffin, Nicholas","Hitchcock, David"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013-10","date_published":"2013-10","updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:34:05Z","subjects":["Diagonalization; Logical Paradoxes; Semantic Paradoxes; Set-theoretic Paradoxes; The Liar Paradox; The Revenge of the Liar; The Heterological Paradox; Berry's Paradox; Definability; Representational Predicates; Truth-gap Theory; Deflationary Theory of Truth","Logic and foundations of mathematics","Philosophy of Language"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://doi.org/10.71548/15752"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.71548/15752","href":"https://doi.org/10.71548/15752","code":true}]},{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/8126","9229","4567243"],"render_values":[{"text":"opendissertations/8126","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"9229","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"4567243","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13307","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13307","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Amacsphere.mcmaster.ca%3A11375%2F13307","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["W., Richard T.","Griffin, Nicholas","Hitchcock, David"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Zhong, Haixia"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2014-06-18T17:03:35Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-06-18T17:03:35Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.created","label":"Dc Date Created","values":["2013-09-09"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2013-10"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["dissertation"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Diagonalization; Logical Paradoxes; Semantic Paradoxes; Set-theoretic Paradoxes; The Liar Paradox; The Revenge of the Liar; The Heterological Paradox; Berry's Paradox; Definability; Representational Predicates; Truth-gap Theory; Deflationary Theory of Truth","Logic and foundations of mathematics","Philosophy of Language"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/8126","9229","4567243"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13307","https://doi.org/10.71548/15752"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["<p>The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a proper treatment for two groups of logical paradoxes: semantic paradoxes and set-theoretic paradoxes. 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For the set-theoretic paradoxes, I argue that the criterion for a successful solution in the realm of set theory is mathematical usefulness. Since the standard solution, i.e. the axiomatic solution, meets this requirement, it should be accepted as a successful solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["DIAGONALIZATION AND LOGICAL PARADOXES"]},{"key":"others:access_status","label":"Others Access Status","values":["open.access"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["W., Richard T.","Griffin, Nicholas","Hitchcock, David"],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Zhong, Haixia"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2014-06-18T17:03:35Z"],"dc:date.available":["2014-06-18T17:03:35Z"],"dc:date.created":["2013-09-09"],"dc:date.issued":["2013-10"],"dc:description.abstract":["<p>The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a proper treatment for two groups of logical paradoxes: semantic paradoxes and set-theoretic paradoxes. 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