{"id":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","oai_identifier":"oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/13770"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/mcmaster/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/13770","repository":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","name":"McMaster University","base_url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Nietzsche's Rejection of Transcendent Truth","abstract":"<p>In this thesis I address Nietzsche's seemingly paradoxical claim that all truth is in fact illusion. I begin with an examination of the claims in On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, where the transcendent truth is rejected on the grounds that it is self-contradictory impossibility. However, if this is the case, then how is it possible for Nietzsche to make such a claim? Docs he not implicitly exclude his own account from this critique? To investigate this matter, I offer an interpretation of his critique of the history of Western morality since the time of Socrates and how it relates to what he terms the human, all-too-human origins of the concept of truth. This leads to a discussion of his claims concerning the essentially perspectival and interpretive nature of human knowing. I argue that this view of knowledge. in which truth and life are viewed as one and the same, saves Nietzsche from the charge of internal inconsistency.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;In this thesis I address Nietzsche&#x27;s seemingly paradoxical claim that all truth is in fact illusion. I begin with an examination of the claims in On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, where the transcendent truth is rejected on the grounds that it is self-contradictory impossibility. However, if this is the case, then how is it possible for Nietzsche to make such a claim? Docs he not implicitly exclude his own account from this critique? To investigate this matter, I offer an interpretation of his critique of the history of Western morality since the time of Socrates and how it relates to what he terms the human, all-too-human origins of the concept of truth. This leads to a discussion of his claims concerning the essentially perspectival and interpretive nature of human knowing. I argue that this view of knowledge. in which truth and life are viewed as one and the same, saves Nietzsche from the charge of internal inconsistency.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Blackwood, Stephen"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Ajzenstat, S."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2002,"date_issued":"2002-09","date_published":"2002-09","updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:32:26Z","subjects":["Philosophy"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://doi.org/10.71548/11969"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.71548/11969","href":"https://doi.org/10.71548/11969","code":true}]},{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/8599","9673","4893467"],"render_values":[{"text":"opendissertations/8599","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"9673","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"4893467","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13770","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13770","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Amacsphere.mcmaster.ca%3A11375%2F13770","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Ajzenstat, S."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Blackwood, Stephen"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2014-06-18T17:05:12Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-06-18T17:05:12Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.created","label":"Dc Date Created","values":["2013-12-06"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2002-09"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/8599","9673","4893467"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13770","https://doi.org/10.71548/11969"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["<p>In this thesis I address Nietzsche's seemingly paradoxical claim that all truth is in fact illusion. 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I argue that this view of knowledge. in which truth and life are viewed as one and the same, saves Nietzsche from the charge of internal inconsistency.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts (MA)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Nietzsche's Rejection of Transcendent Truth"]},{"key":"others:access_status","label":"Others Access Status","values":["open.access"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Ajzenstat, S."],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Blackwood, Stephen"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2014-06-18T17:05:12Z"],"dc:date.available":["2014-06-18T17:05:12Z"],"dc:date.created":["2013-12-06"],"dc:date.issued":["2002-09"],"dc:description.abstract":["<p>In this thesis I address Nietzsche's seemingly paradoxical claim that all truth is in fact illusion. 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