{"id":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","oai_identifier":"oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/13816"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/mcmaster/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/13816","repository":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","name":"McMaster University","base_url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The modal realism of David Lewis","abstract":"<p>It seems everyone who encounters David Lewis's modal real ism finds it utterly strange. I attempt to show that it is strange because it expands our onto logy unnecessarily.</p> <p>I begin by situating Lewis in the tradition of understanding modality with the help of possible worlds. I go on to indicate the internal tensions which arise under Lewis's view when we consider sane kinds of perfectly normal modal discourse. T try to show that the problem comes from an understanding of existence which is quite common in analytic philosophy. I then suggest a way of understanding modal language which finds its inspiration in the writings of st Thomas Aquinas, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Donald Davidson.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;It seems everyone who encounters David Lewis&#x27;s modal real ism finds it utterly strange. I attempt to show that it is strange because it expands our onto logy unnecessarily.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I begin by situating Lewis in the tradition of understanding modality with the help of possible worlds. I go on to indicate the internal tensions which arise under Lewis&#x27;s view when we consider sane kinds of perfectly normal modal discourse. T try to show that the problem comes from an understanding of existence which is quite common in analytic philosophy. I then suggest a way of understanding modal language which finds its inspiration in the writings of st Thomas Aquinas, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Donald Davidson.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Sullivan, Andrew"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Vorobej, M."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":1996,"date_issued":"1996-09","date_published":"1996-09","updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:36:33Z","subjects":["Philosophy"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://doi.org/10.71548/16808"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.71548/16808","href":"https://doi.org/10.71548/16808","code":true}]},{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/8646","9661","4865465"],"render_values":[{"text":"opendissertations/8646","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"9661","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"4865465","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13816","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13816","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Amacsphere.mcmaster.ca%3A11375%2F13816","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Vorobej, M."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Sullivan, Andrew"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2014-06-18T17:05:21Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-06-18T17:05:21Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.created","label":"Dc Date Created","values":["2013-12-02"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["1996-09"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/8646","9661","4865465"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13816","https://doi.org/10.71548/16808"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["<p>It seems everyone who encounters David Lewis's modal real ism finds it utterly strange. I attempt to show that it is strange because it expands our onto logy unnecessarily.</p> <p>I begin by situating Lewis in the tradition of understanding modality with the help of possible worlds. I go on to indicate the internal tensions which arise under Lewis's view when we consider sane kinds of perfectly normal modal discourse. T try to show that the problem comes from an understanding of existence which is quite common in analytic philosophy. I then suggest a way of understanding modal language which finds its inspiration in the writings of st Thomas Aquinas, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Donald Davidson.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts (MA)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The modal realism of David Lewis"]},{"key":"others:access_status","label":"Others Access Status","values":["open.access"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Vorobej, M."],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Sullivan, Andrew"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2014-06-18T17:05:21Z"],"dc:date.available":["2014-06-18T17:05:21Z"],"dc:date.created":["2013-12-02"],"dc:date.issued":["1996-09"],"dc:description.abstract":["<p>It seems everyone who encounters David Lewis's modal real ism finds it utterly strange. I attempt to show that it is strange because it expands our onto logy unnecessarily.</p> <p>I begin by situating Lewis in the tradition of understanding modality with the help of possible worlds. I go on to indicate the internal tensions which arise under Lewis's view when we consider sane kinds of perfectly normal modal discourse. T try to show that the problem comes from an understanding of existence which is quite common in analytic philosophy. I then suggest a way of understanding modal language which finds its inspiration in the writings of st Thomas Aquinas, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Donald Davidson.</p>"],"dc:description.degree":["Master of Arts (MA)"],"dc:identifier.other":["opendissertations/8646","9661","4865465"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13816","https://doi.org/10.71548/16808"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy"],"dc:title":["The modal realism of David Lewis"],"dc:type":["thesis"],"others:access_status":["open.access"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:36:33Z"}