{"id":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","oai_identifier":"oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/16044"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/mcmaster/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/16044","repository":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","name":"McMaster University","base_url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Evil and Appearances: Clarifying Arendtian Political Ontology","abstract":"<p> This thesis explores and clarifies Hannah Arendt' s conception of evil and its impact on her political theory. While following Arendt' s reflections on evil over the course of her career-from The Origins of Totalitarianism through Eichmann in Jerusalem and The Life of the Mind-I make the argument that the common thread in her apparently divergent accounts is a certain understanding of evil's negative ontology. I then demonstrate that Arendt's alternative \"ontology of appearances\" results in an account of \"conscience\" that prevents action based on cognitive certainty, and thus, evil. In the third chapter, I suggest that Arendt' s political theory, with its opposition to biological \"life,\" is a direct response to totalitarianism's emphasis on animality and its de-emphasis on appearance. I claim furthermore that the difficulties of Arendt' s political thought (particularly her vacuous account of freedom and its troubling connection to immortality) are best explained in relation to her account of evil. On this point I suggest critically that her notion of political freedom is paralyzing or preventative in a way that resonates with her account of conscience. Finally, I propose that in seeking to articulate the meaning of immortalizing action, Arendt might have instead elucidated the difference between a totalitarian perversion of human desire, where desires become cognitive prescriptions, and a Platonic notion of properly erotic desire, where action manifests a desiring orientation to an independent object, but in a decisively non-totalitarian fashion.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt; This thesis explores and clarifies Hannah Arendt&#x27; s conception of evil and its impact on her political theory. While following Arendt&#x27; s reflections on evil over the course of her career-from The Origins of Totalitarianism through Eichmann in Jerusalem and The Life of the Mind-I make the argument that the common thread in her apparently divergent accounts is a certain understanding of evil&#x27;s negative ontology. I then demonstrate that Arendt&#x27;s alternative &quot;ontology of appearances&quot; results in an account of &quot;conscience&quot; that prevents action based on cognitive certainty, and thus, evil. In the third chapter, I suggest that Arendt&#x27; s political theory, with its opposition to biological &quot;life,&quot; is a direct response to totalitarianism&#x27;s emphasis on animality and its de-emphasis on appearance. I claim furthermore that the difficulties of Arendt&#x27; s political thought (particularly her vacuous account of freedom and its troubling connection to immortality) are best explained in relation to her account of evil. On this point I suggest critically that her notion of political freedom is paralyzing or preventative in a way that resonates with her account of conscience. Finally, I propose that in seeking to articulate the meaning of immortalizing action, Arendt might have instead elucidated the difference between a totalitarian perversion of human desire, where desires become cognitive prescriptions, and a Platonic notion of properly erotic desire, where action manifests a desiring orientation to an independent object, but in a decisively non-totalitarian fashion.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Klassen, Justin D."],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Religious Studies","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Kroeker, P. 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While following Arendt' s reflections on evil over the course of her career-from The Origins of Totalitarianism through Eichmann in Jerusalem and The Life of the Mind-I make the argument that the common thread in her apparently divergent accounts is a certain understanding of evil's negative ontology. I then demonstrate that Arendt's alternative \"ontology of appearances\" results in an account of \"conscience\" that prevents action based on cognitive certainty, and thus, evil. In the third chapter, I suggest that Arendt' s political theory, with its opposition to biological \"life,\" is a direct response to totalitarianism's emphasis on animality and its de-emphasis on appearance. I claim furthermore that the difficulties of Arendt' s political thought (particularly her vacuous account of freedom and its troubling connection to immortality) are best explained in relation to her account of evil. On this point I suggest critically that her notion of political freedom is paralyzing or preventative in a way that resonates with her account of conscience. Finally, I propose that in seeking to articulate the meaning of immortalizing action, Arendt might have instead elucidated the difference between a totalitarian perversion of human desire, where desires become cognitive prescriptions, and a Platonic notion of properly erotic desire, where action manifests a desiring orientation to an independent object, but in a decisively non-totalitarian fashion.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts (MA)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Evil and Appearances: Clarifying Arendtian Political Ontology"]},{"key":"others:access_status","label":"Others Access Status","values":["open.access"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Kroeker, P. 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In the third chapter, I suggest that Arendt' s political theory, with its opposition to biological \"life,\" is a direct response to totalitarianism's emphasis on animality and its de-emphasis on appearance. I claim furthermore that the difficulties of Arendt' s political thought (particularly her vacuous account of freedom and its troubling connection to immortality) are best explained in relation to her account of evil. On this point I suggest critically that her notion of political freedom is paralyzing or preventative in a way that resonates with her account of conscience. Finally, I propose that in seeking to articulate the meaning of immortalizing action, Arendt might have instead elucidated the difference between a totalitarian perversion of human desire, where desires become cognitive prescriptions, and a Platonic notion of properly erotic desire, where action manifests a desiring orientation to an independent object, but in a decisively non-totalitarian fashion.</p>"],"dc:description.degree":["Master of Arts (MA)"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/16044","https://doi.org/10.71548/20817"],"dc:language.iso":["en"],"dc:subject":["Hannah Arendt","conception of evil","political theory"],"dc:title":["Evil and Appearances: Clarifying Arendtian Political Ontology"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"others:access_status":["open.access"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:38:22Z"}