{"id":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","oai_identifier":"oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/28774"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/mcmaster/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/28774","repository":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","name":"McMaster University","base_url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Self-Beliefs and Epistemic Justifications","abstract":"I explore the epistemic justification of self-beliefs regarding personality traits within the internalism-externalism debate. Historically, the question of epistemic justification of self-beliefs has been discussed only with respect to our beliefs about our current mental states while the epistemic justification of our self-beliefs about our personality traits was assumed not to be any different from the justification of our beliefs about the external world. However, I use empirical psychology to highlight a few unique characteristics of our self-beliefs about personality traits that make the typical application of internalist or externalist standards less straightforward. These characteristics have to do with the biases and the self-verification that accompany our self-beliefs about our personality traits. I argue that externalism, in general, and virtue reliabilism, in particular, are more suitable to the context of our self-beliefs about our personality traits than other theories of justification. However, I contend that within the virtue reliabilism framework, a self-belief-forming process can become more competent if it generates self-belief from the instances where individuals manifest the trait in question while having the motivation and opportunity to do otherwise. I show how this condition makes the self-belief-forming process more competent and, therefore, makes the produced self-beliefs more epistemically justified.","abstract_html":"I explore the epistemic justification of self-beliefs regarding personality traits within the internalism-externalism debate. Historically, the question of epistemic justification of self-beliefs has been discussed only with respect to our beliefs about our current mental states while the epistemic justification of our self-beliefs about our personality traits was assumed not to be any different from the justification of our beliefs about the external world. However, I use empirical psychology to highlight a few unique characteristics of our self-beliefs about personality traits that make the typical application of internalist or externalist standards less straightforward. These characteristics have to do with the biases and the self-verification that accompany our self-beliefs about our personality traits. I argue that externalism, in general, and virtue reliabilism, in particular, are more suitable to the context of our self-beliefs about our personality traits than other theories of justification. However, I contend that within the virtue reliabilism framework, a self-belief-forming process can become more competent if it generates self-belief from the instances where individuals manifest the trait in question while having the motivation and opportunity to do otherwise. I show how this condition makes the self-belief-forming process more competent and, therefore, makes the produced self-beliefs more epistemically justified.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Mahhouk, Shahdah"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Stotts, Megan"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2023,"date_issued":"2023","date_published":"2023","updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:36:58Z","subjects":["Self-Beliefs","Epistemic justification","Virtue Reliabilism"],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://doi.org/10.71548/17730"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.71548/17730","href":"https://doi.org/10.71548/17730","code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/28774","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/28774","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Amacsphere.mcmaster.ca%3A11375%2F28774","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Stotts, Megan"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Mahhouk, Shahdah"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2023-08-04T19:16:56Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2023-08-04T19:16:56Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2023"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Self-Beliefs","Epistemic justification","Virtue Reliabilism"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/28774","https://doi.org/10.71548/17730"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["I explore the epistemic justification of self-beliefs regarding personality traits within the internalism-externalism debate. Historically, the question of epistemic justification of self-beliefs has been discussed only with respect to our beliefs about our current mental states while the epistemic justification of our self-beliefs about our personality traits was assumed not to be any different from the justification of our beliefs about the external world. However, I use empirical psychology to highlight a few unique characteristics of our self-beliefs about personality traits that make the typical application of internalist or externalist standards less straightforward. These characteristics have to do with the biases and the self-verification that accompany our self-beliefs about our personality traits. I argue that externalism, in general, and virtue reliabilism, in particular, are more suitable to the context of our self-beliefs about our personality traits than other theories of justification. However, I contend that within the virtue reliabilism framework, a self-belief-forming process can become more competent if it generates self-belief from the instances where individuals manifest the trait in question while having the motivation and opportunity to do otherwise. I show how this condition makes the self-belief-forming process more competent and, therefore, makes the produced self-beliefs more epistemically justified."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Philosophy (MA)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Self-Beliefs and Epistemic Justifications"]},{"key":"dc:title.alternative","label":"Alternative Title","values":["WHAT MAKES OUR SELF-BELIEFS ABOUT OUR PERSONALITY TRAITS EPISTEMICALLY JUSTIFIED?"]},{"key":"others:access_status","label":"Others Access Status","values":["open.access"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Stotts, Megan"],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Mahhouk, Shahdah"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2023-08-04T19:16:56Z"],"dc:date.available":["2023-08-04T19:16:56Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2023"],"dc:description.abstract":["I explore the epistemic justification of self-beliefs regarding personality traits within the internalism-externalism debate. Historically, the question of epistemic justification of self-beliefs has been discussed only with respect to our beliefs about our current mental states while the epistemic justification of our self-beliefs about our personality traits was assumed not to be any different from the justification of our beliefs about the external world. However, I use empirical psychology to highlight a few unique characteristics of our self-beliefs about personality traits that make the typical application of internalist or externalist standards less straightforward. These characteristics have to do with the biases and the self-verification that accompany our self-beliefs about our personality traits. I argue that externalism, in general, and virtue reliabilism, in particular, are more suitable to the context of our self-beliefs about our personality traits than other theories of justification. However, I contend that within the virtue reliabilism framework, a self-belief-forming process can become more competent if it generates self-belief from the instances where individuals manifest the trait in question while having the motivation and opportunity to do otherwise. I show how this condition makes the self-belief-forming process more competent and, therefore, makes the produced self-beliefs more epistemically justified."],"dc:description.degree":["Master of Philosophy (MA)"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/28774","https://doi.org/10.71548/17730"],"dc:language.iso":["en"],"dc:subject":["Self-Beliefs","Epistemic justification","Virtue Reliabilism"],"dc:title":["Self-Beliefs and Epistemic Justifications"],"dc:title.alternative":["WHAT MAKES OUR SELF-BELIEFS ABOUT OUR PERSONALITY TRAITS EPISTEMICALLY JUSTIFIED?"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"others:access_status":["open.access"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:36:58Z"}