{"id":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","oai_identifier":"oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/29713"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/mcmaster/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/29713","repository":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","name":"McMaster University","base_url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Essays in Information and Privacy Economics","abstract":"This thesis consists of three chapters in microeconomic theory concerning strategic interactions among parties with asymmetric information. The first chapter, ''Cheap Talk with Private Signal Structure\" (co-authored with Maxim Ivanov) and published in Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 132 (2022), pages 288-304, addresses the question of how a designer of information --- which is privately observed by other players --- can benefit from designing it privately. The second chapter, ''Multidimensional Signaling with a Resource Constraint\" (co-authored with Seungjin Han), studies competitive monotone equilibria in a multidimensional signaling economy where senders invest in their multidimensional signals (cognitive and non-cognitive) while facing a resource constraint. The third chapter, ''Consumer Privacy Disclosure in Competitive Markets\", studies how competition among multi-product sellers with market power shapes the implications of consumer privacy on market outcomes.","abstract_html":"This thesis consists of three chapters in microeconomic theory concerning strategic interactions among parties with asymmetric information. The first chapter, &#x27;&#x27;Cheap Talk with Private Signal Structure&quot; (co-authored with Maxim Ivanov) and published in Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 132 (2022), pages 288-304, addresses the question of how a designer of information --- which is privately observed by other players --- can benefit from designing it privately. The second chapter, &#x27;&#x27;Multidimensional Signaling with a Resource Constraint&quot; (co-authored with Seungjin Han), studies competitive monotone equilibria in a multidimensional signaling economy where senders invest in their multidimensional signals (cognitive and non-cognitive) while facing a resource constraint. The third chapter, &#x27;&#x27;Consumer Privacy Disclosure in Competitive Markets&quot;, studies how competition among multi-product sellers with market power shapes the implications of consumer privacy on market outcomes.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Sam, Alex"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Economics","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Han, Seungjin"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024","date_published":"2024","updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:37:13Z","subjects":["Strategic Communication","Information Economics","Privacy Economics"],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://doi.org/10.71548/18123"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.71548/18123","href":"https://doi.org/10.71548/18123","code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/29713","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/29713","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Amacsphere.mcmaster.ca%3A11375%2F29713","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Han, Seungjin"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Sam, Alex"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2024-05-01T13:15:53Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2024-05-01T13:15:53Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2024"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Strategic Communication","Information Economics","Privacy Economics"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/29713","https://doi.org/10.71548/18123"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This thesis consists of three chapters in microeconomic theory concerning strategic interactions among parties with asymmetric information. The first chapter, ''Cheap Talk with Private Signal Structure\" (co-authored with Maxim Ivanov) and published in Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 132 (2022), pages 288-304, addresses the question of how a designer of information --- which is privately observed by other players --- can benefit from designing it privately. The second chapter, ''Multidimensional Signaling with a Resource Constraint\" (co-authored with Seungjin Han), studies competitive monotone equilibria in a multidimensional signaling economy where senders invest in their multidimensional signals (cognitive and non-cognitive) while facing a resource constraint. The third chapter, ''Consumer Privacy Disclosure in Competitive Markets\", studies how competition among multi-product sellers with market power shapes the implications of consumer privacy on market outcomes."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Essays in Information and Privacy Economics"]},{"key":"others:access_status","label":"Others Access Status","values":["open.access"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Han, Seungjin"],"dc:contributor.department":["Economics"],"dc:creator":["Sam, Alex"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2024-05-01T13:15:53Z"],"dc:date.available":["2024-05-01T13:15:53Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2024"],"dc:description.abstract":["This thesis consists of three chapters in microeconomic theory concerning strategic interactions among parties with asymmetric information. The first chapter, ''Cheap Talk with Private Signal Structure\" (co-authored with Maxim Ivanov) and published in Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 132 (2022), pages 288-304, addresses the question of how a designer of information --- which is privately observed by other players --- can benefit from designing it privately. The second chapter, ''Multidimensional Signaling with a Resource Constraint\" (co-authored with Seungjin Han), studies competitive monotone equilibria in a multidimensional signaling economy where senders invest in their multidimensional signals (cognitive and non-cognitive) while facing a resource constraint. 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