{"id":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","oai_identifier":"oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/5728"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/mcmaster/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/5728","repository":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","name":"McMaster University","base_url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The Moral Permissibility of Physician Assisted Death","abstract":"<p>This thesis is an investigation of the moral responsibility of physicians in assisted death. I begin with a discussion of the problem that drives the debate concerning end of life decision making. I conclude that the problem faced by those attempting to make decisiosn at the end of life is the bad death. A bad death is marked by a long, debilitating, incapacitating, dying process. Given the problem of the bad death, I discuss what responsibilities the physician might have toward a dying patient. I conclude that the responsibility of a physician is to the wellness of his or her patient, whether that patient is dying or not. For the dying patient, continued existence, or a bad death may count as harm, and a good death as a benefit. Since promoting wellness for a patient means maximizing the benefits and minimizing (or eliminating) the harms, wellness for a dying patient might mean the avoidance of the bad death and the active pursuit of the good death, which I call death management. Since the physician's responsibility is to promote wellness, the physician has a responsibility to promote the good death for a dying patient. Much of my argument hangs on the concept of \"dying\". I argue for a particular definition of dying and the conceptual distinction between death management and suicide. I defend the claim that physicians have a responsibility to provide death management against the moral difference thesis which holds that it is morally worse to actively kill someone than to merely let that person die. I argue against this thesis and defend instead the moral equivalence thesis which holds that there is no moral difference between bare acts and bare omissions. I also discuss the doctrine of double effect, which represents a potential challenge to my argument. However, I show that the doctrine of double effect is, in fact, not applicable to cases of death management. I condlude with a brief look at some of the concerns should death management become a social policy or legally sanctioned practice. My replies are necessarily brief, but sufficient to show that these concerns are not fatal to the legitimacy of death management.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;This thesis is an investigation of the moral responsibility of physicians in assisted death. I begin with a discussion of the problem that drives the debate concerning end of life decision making. I conclude that the problem faced by those attempting to make decisiosn at the end of life is the bad death. A bad death is marked by a long, debilitating, incapacitating, dying process. Given the problem of the bad death, I discuss what responsibilities the physician might have toward a dying patient. I conclude that the responsibility of a physician is to the wellness of his or her patient, whether that patient is dying or not. For the dying patient, continued existence, or a bad death may count as harm, and a good death as a benefit. Since promoting wellness for a patient means maximizing the benefits and minimizing (or eliminating) the harms, wellness for a dying patient might mean the avoidance of the bad death and the active pursuit of the good death, which I call death management. Since the physician&#x27;s responsibility is to promote wellness, the physician has a responsibility to promote the good death for a dying patient. Much of my argument hangs on the concept of &quot;dying&quot;. I argue for a particular definition of dying and the conceptual distinction between death management and suicide. I defend the claim that physicians have a responsibility to provide death management against the moral difference thesis which holds that it is morally worse to actively kill someone than to merely let that person die. I argue against this thesis and defend instead the moral equivalence thesis which holds that there is no moral difference between bare acts and bare omissions. I also discuss the doctrine of double effect, which represents a potential challenge to my argument. However, I show that the doctrine of double effect is, in fact, not applicable to cases of death management. I condlude with a brief look at some of the concerns should death management become a social policy or legally sanctioned practice. My replies are necessarily brief, but sufficient to show that these concerns are not fatal to the legitimacy of death management.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Tapley, Robin L."],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Waluchow, W."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":1997,"date_issued":"1997-10","date_published":"1997-10","updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:33:44Z","subjects":["Philosophy"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://doi.org/10.71548/14820"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.71548/14820","href":"https://doi.org/10.71548/14820","code":true}]},{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/1074","2627","1316192"],"render_values":[{"text":"opendissertations/1074","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"2627","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"1316192","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/5728","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri","record_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/11375/5728","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"handle","record_source":"dc:identifier.uri","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=dim&identifier=oai%3Amacsphere.mcmaster.ca%3A11375%2F5728","prefix":"dim"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Waluchow, W."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Tapley, Robin L."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2014-06-18T16:32:50Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2014-06-18T16:32:50Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.created","label":"Dc Date Created","values":["2010-05-18"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["1997-10"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["opendissertations/1074","2627","1316192"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/5728","https://doi.org/10.71548/14820"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["<p>This thesis is an investigation of the moral responsibility of physicians in assisted death. I begin with a discussion of the problem that drives the debate concerning end of life decision making. I conclude that the problem faced by those attempting to make decisiosn at the end of life is the bad death. A bad death is marked by a long, debilitating, incapacitating, dying process. Given the problem of the bad death, I discuss what responsibilities the physician might have toward a dying patient. I conclude that the responsibility of a physician is to the wellness of his or her patient, whether that patient is dying or not. For the dying patient, continued existence, or a bad death may count as harm, and a good death as a benefit. Since promoting wellness for a patient means maximizing the benefits and minimizing (or eliminating) the harms, wellness for a dying patient might mean the avoidance of the bad death and the active pursuit of the good death, which I call death management. Since the physician's responsibility is to promote wellness, the physician has a responsibility to promote the good death for a dying patient. Much of my argument hangs on the concept of \"dying\". I argue for a particular definition of dying and the conceptual distinction between death management and suicide. I defend the claim that physicians have a responsibility to provide death management against the moral difference thesis which holds that it is morally worse to actively kill someone than to merely let that person die. I argue against this thesis and defend instead the moral equivalence thesis which holds that there is no moral difference between bare acts and bare omissions. I also discuss the doctrine of double effect, which represents a potential challenge to my argument. However, I show that the doctrine of double effect is, in fact, not applicable to cases of death management. I condlude with a brief look at some of the concerns should death management become a social policy or legally sanctioned practice. My replies are necessarily brief, but sufficient to show that these concerns are not fatal to the legitimacy of death management.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Moral Permissibility of Physician Assisted Death"]},{"key":"others:access_status","label":"Others Access Status","values":["open.access"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Waluchow, W."],"dc:contributor.department":["Philosophy"],"dc:creator":["Tapley, Robin L."],"dc:date.accessioned":["2014-06-18T16:32:50Z"],"dc:date.available":["2014-06-18T16:32:50Z"],"dc:date.created":["2010-05-18"],"dc:date.issued":["1997-10"],"dc:description.abstract":["<p>This thesis is an investigation of the moral responsibility of physicians in assisted death. I begin with a discussion of the problem that drives the debate concerning end of life decision making. I conclude that the problem faced by those attempting to make decisiosn at the end of life is the bad death. A bad death is marked by a long, debilitating, incapacitating, dying process. Given the problem of the bad death, I discuss what responsibilities the physician might have toward a dying patient. I conclude that the responsibility of a physician is to the wellness of his or her patient, whether that patient is dying or not. For the dying patient, continued existence, or a bad death may count as harm, and a good death as a benefit. Since promoting wellness for a patient means maximizing the benefits and minimizing (or eliminating) the harms, wellness for a dying patient might mean the avoidance of the bad death and the active pursuit of the good death, which I call death management. Since the physician's responsibility is to promote wellness, the physician has a responsibility to promote the good death for a dying patient. Much of my argument hangs on the concept of \"dying\". I argue for a particular definition of dying and the conceptual distinction between death management and suicide. I defend the claim that physicians have a responsibility to provide death management against the moral difference thesis which holds that it is morally worse to actively kill someone than to merely let that person die. I argue against this thesis and defend instead the moral equivalence thesis which holds that there is no moral difference between bare acts and bare omissions. I also discuss the doctrine of double effect, which represents a potential challenge to my argument. However, I show that the doctrine of double effect is, in fact, not applicable to cases of death management. I condlude with a brief look at some of the concerns should death management become a social policy or legally sanctioned practice. My replies are necessarily brief, but sufficient to show that these concerns are not fatal to the legitimacy of death management.</p>"],"dc:description.degree":["Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)"],"dc:identifier.other":["opendissertations/1074","2627","1316192"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/11375/5728","https://doi.org/10.71548/14820"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy"],"dc:title":["The Moral Permissibility of Physician Assisted Death"],"dc:type":["thesis"],"others:access_status":["open.access"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T19:33:44Z"}