{"id":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","oai_identifier":"oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/8421"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/mcmaster/oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/8421","repository":{"repo_id":"mcmaster","name":"McMaster University","base_url":"https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Heidegger on Plato's Cave Alethology","abstract":"<p>In Plato's Doctrine of the Truth (PLW), Martin Heidegger argues that Plato, in the Republic, yokes truth to a preconceived notion of logical and moral rightness. This yoke is a result, Heidegger argues, of Plato's basic orientation towards beings. For Plato the essential characteristic of beings, so runs the argument in PLW, lies in the [symbol removed], a being's whatness, its essential nature. Heidegger maintains that Plato is wrong in so characterizing beings, since unhiddeness [symbol removed] and not whatness is the primordial characteristic (Grundzug) of beings. Heidegger further argues that Plato holds a Correspondence Theory of Truth, that for Plato [symbol removed] is really [symbol removed] (rightness), and that [symbol removed] is the correspondence [symbol removed] of the correct [symbol removed] to the right [symbol removed].</p> <p>In PLW we find Heidegger in the midst of a contemporary philosophical debate, more or less on the side of those who expound, in multifarious ways, the existentialist's l'existence précède l'essence, while opposing the so-called Platonic-Scholastic Essentia antecedit Existentiam. My purpose in this thesis is twofold: first I show how Heidegger's thesis in PLW is based on his alethology in Being and Time (SZ), and secondly I show how Heidegger, by neglecting the role that to agathon plays as the originating locus [symbol removed] of aletheia, misconstrues the notion of truth put forth in the Republic.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;In Plato&#x27;s Doctrine of the Truth (PLW), Martin Heidegger argues that Plato, in the Republic, yokes truth to a preconceived notion of logical and moral rightness. This yoke is a result, Heidegger argues, of Plato&#x27;s basic orientation towards beings. For Plato the essential characteristic of beings, so runs the argument in PLW, lies in the [symbol removed], a being&#x27;s whatness, its essential nature. Heidegger maintains that Plato is wrong in so characterizing beings, since unhiddeness [symbol removed] and not whatness is the primordial characteristic (Grundzug) of beings. Heidegger further argues that Plato holds a Correspondence Theory of Truth, that for Plato [symbol removed] is really [symbol removed] (rightness), and that [symbol removed] is the correspondence [symbol removed] of the correct [symbol removed] to the right [symbol removed].&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;In PLW we find Heidegger in the midst of a contemporary philosophical debate, more or less on the side of those who expound, in multifarious ways, the existentialist&#x27;s l&#x27;existence précède l&#x27;essence, while opposing the so-called Platonic-Scholastic Essentia antecedit Existentiam. My purpose in this thesis is twofold: first I show how Heidegger&#x27;s thesis in PLW is based on his alethology in Being and Time (SZ), and secondly I show how Heidegger, by neglecting the role that to agathon plays as the originating locus [symbol removed] of aletheia, misconstrues the notion of truth put forth in the Republic.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Borody, Wayne Andrew"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Madison, G. 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This yoke is a result, Heidegger argues, of Plato's basic orientation towards beings. For Plato the essential characteristic of beings, so runs the argument in PLW, lies in the [symbol removed], a being's whatness, its essential nature. Heidegger maintains that Plato is wrong in so characterizing beings, since unhiddeness [symbol removed] and not whatness is the primordial characteristic (Grundzug) of beings. Heidegger further argues that Plato holds a Correspondence Theory of Truth, that for Plato [symbol removed] is really [symbol removed] (rightness), and that [symbol removed] is the correspondence [symbol removed] of the correct [symbol removed] to the right [symbol removed].</p> <p>In PLW we find Heidegger in the midst of a contemporary philosophical debate, more or less on the side of those who expound, in multifarious ways, the existentialist's l'existence précède l'essence, while opposing the so-called Platonic-Scholastic Essentia antecedit Existentiam. My purpose in this thesis is twofold: first I show how Heidegger's thesis in PLW is based on his alethology in Being and Time (SZ), and secondly I show how Heidegger, by neglecting the role that to agathon plays as the originating locus [symbol removed] of aletheia, misconstrues the notion of truth put forth in the Republic.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Master of Arts (MA)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Heidegger on Plato's Cave Alethology"]},{"key":"others:access_status","label":"Others Access Status","values":["open.access"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Madison, G. 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Heidegger further argues that Plato holds a Correspondence Theory of Truth, that for Plato [symbol removed] is really [symbol removed] (rightness), and that [symbol removed] is the correspondence [symbol removed] of the correct [symbol removed] to the right [symbol removed].</p> <p>In PLW we find Heidegger in the midst of a contemporary philosophical debate, more or less on the side of those who expound, in multifarious ways, the existentialist's l'existence précède l'essence, while opposing the so-called Platonic-Scholastic Essentia antecedit Existentiam. 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