{"id":{"repo_id":"msu","oai_identifier":"oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_3100"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/msu/oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_3100","repository":{"repo_id":"msu","name":"Michigan State University","base_url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai"},"display":{"title":"Through the grapevine : network effects on the design of executive compensation contracts","abstract":"Effective design of executive compensation contracts involves the choice and weighting of performance measures, as well as the mix between fixed and incentive-based pay components, with a view to fostering talent retention and goal congruence. Despite large variability in firms’ characteristics and goals, compensation design is subject to isomorphic pressures, which cannot be completely explained by industry affiliation or peer group membership. Inter-firm professional network connections, such as board interlocks and compensation consultants, provide means and opportunities to observe and imitate organizational behavior across firms. Using information disclosed in proxy statements of publicly traded companies, I predict and find that firms connected through board interlocks or common compensation consultants display a higher degree of isomorphism in the design of executive compensation contracts. However, consultants with larger customer base and greater expertise mitigate these isomorphic tendencies. Additionally, interlocks and compensation consultants exert different influences on different aspects of the compensation design.","abstract_html":"Effective design of executive compensation contracts involves the choice and weighting of performance measures, as well as the mix between fixed and incentive-based pay components, with a view to fostering talent retention and goal congruence. Despite large variability in firms’ characteristics and goals, compensation design is subject to isomorphic pressures, which cannot be completely explained by industry affiliation or peer group membership. Inter-firm professional network connections, such as board interlocks and compensation consultants, provide means and opportunities to observe and imitate organizational behavior across firms. Using information disclosed in proxy statements of publicly traded companies, I predict and find that firms connected through board interlocks or common compensation consultants display a higher degree of isomorphism in the design of executive compensation contracts. However, consultants with larger customer base and greater expertise mitigate these isomorphic tendencies. Additionally, interlocks and compensation consultants exert different influences on different aspects of the compensation design.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Gallani, Susanna"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Krishnan, Ranjani","Sedatole, Karen L.","Susarla, Anjana","Wooldridge, Jeffrey M.","Michigan State University"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015","date_published":"2015","updated_at":"2026-11-18T18:03:26Z","subjects":["Business networks","Executives--Salaries, etc.","Labor contract"],"languages":["English"],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd:3100","isbn:9781321713381","isbn:132171338X","oclc:933586512","local:Gallani_grad.msu_0128D_13653","umi:3701011"],"render_values":[{"text":"etd:3100","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"isbn:9781321713381","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"isbn:132171338X","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"oclc:933586512","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"local:Gallani_grad.msu_0128D_13653","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"umi:3701011","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/7vss-ar93","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/7vss-ar93","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"doi","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_dc&identifier=oai%3Ad.lib.msu.edu%3Aetd_3100","prefix":"oai_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Krishnan, Ranjani","Sedatole, Karen L.","Susarla, Anjana","Wooldridge, Jeffrey M.","Michigan State University"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Gallani, Susanna"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015"]},{"key":"dc:relation","label":"Dc Relation","values":["Electronic Theses & Dissertations"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Text","Theses"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Business networks","Executives--Salaries, etc.","Labor contract"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd:3100","isbn:9781321713381","isbn:132171338X","oclc:933586512","local:Gallani_grad.msu_0128D_13653","umi:3701011","https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/7vss-ar93"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Effective design of executive compensation contracts involves the choice and weighting of performance measures, as well as the mix between fixed and incentive-based pay components, with a view to fostering talent retention and goal congruence. Despite large variability in firms’ characteristics and goals, compensation design is subject to isomorphic pressures, which cannot be completely explained by industry affiliation or peer group membership. Inter-firm professional network connections, such as board interlocks and compensation consultants, provide means and opportunities to observe and imitate organizational behavior across firms. Using information disclosed in proxy statements of publicly traded companies, I predict and find that firms connected through board interlocks or common compensation consultants display a higher degree of isomorphism in the design of executive compensation contracts. However, consultants with larger customer base and greater expertise mitigate these isomorphic tendencies. Additionally, interlocks and compensation consultants exert different influences on different aspects of the compensation design.","(Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Business Administration - Doctor of Philosophy, 2015","Includes bibliographical references (pages 79-87)"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["viii, 87 pages","application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Through the grapevine : network effects on the design of executive compensation contracts"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Krishnan, Ranjani","Sedatole, Karen L.","Susarla, Anjana","Wooldridge, Jeffrey M.","Michigan State University"],"dc:creator":["Gallani, Susanna"],"dc:date":["2015"],"dc:description":["Effective design of executive compensation contracts involves the choice and weighting of performance measures, as well as the mix between fixed and incentive-based pay components, with a view to fostering talent retention and goal congruence. Despite large variability in firms’ characteristics and goals, compensation design is subject to isomorphic pressures, which cannot be completely explained by industry affiliation or peer group membership. Inter-firm professional network connections, such as board interlocks and compensation consultants, provide means and opportunities to observe and imitate organizational behavior across firms. Using information disclosed in proxy statements of publicly traded companies, I predict and find that firms connected through board interlocks or common compensation consultants display a higher degree of isomorphism in the design of executive compensation contracts. However, consultants with larger customer base and greater expertise mitigate these isomorphic tendencies. Additionally, interlocks and compensation consultants exert different influences on different aspects of the compensation design.","(Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. 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