{"id":{"repo_id":"msu","oai_identifier":"oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_3539"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/msu/oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_3539","repository":{"repo_id":"msu","name":"Michigan State University","base_url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai"},"display":{"title":"Essays in executive incentives and labor markets","abstract":"This dissertation is composed of a set of studies that examine the incentives of senior executives and the matching between executives and firms. In one essay, I examine the incentives of different managers to strategically time their disclosure of insider trades. I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that insiders choose the timing of their disclosures to minimize any negative information signals that may be conveyed by their trading decisions. In a second essay, I consider the matching process between a firm’s real assets and its managerial human capital. I find that certain types of CEO educational profiles are highly correlated with firm and industry characteristics. This evidence indicates that educational backgrounds capture important managerial characteristics that have a significant impact on the optimal matching process between CEOs and firms. In a final essay, I examine the role of a firm’s ownership structure on the types of senior managers that the firm is able to attract. I find that the presence of certain types of block owners leads to a substantive constraint in the set of candidates that are willing to consider leading a firm, thus suggesting a substantial human capital cost to certain firm ownership structures.","abstract_html":"This dissertation is composed of a set of studies that examine the incentives of senior executives and the matching between executives and firms. In one essay, I examine the incentives of different managers to strategically time their disclosure of insider trades. I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that insiders choose the timing of their disclosures to minimize any negative information signals that may be conveyed by their trading decisions. In a second essay, I consider the matching process between a firm’s real assets and its managerial human capital. I find that certain types of CEO educational profiles are highly correlated with firm and industry characteristics. This evidence indicates that educational backgrounds capture important managerial characteristics that have a significant impact on the optimal matching process between CEOs and firms. In a final essay, I examine the role of a firm’s ownership structure on the types of senior managers that the firm is able to attract. I find that the presence of certain types of block owners leads to a substantive constraint in the set of candidates that are willing to consider leading a firm, thus suggesting a substantial human capital cost to certain firm ownership structures.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Brooks, Damien Alexander"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Hadlock, Charles J.","Booth, Geoffrey G.","Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam","Simonov, Andrei"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015","date_published":"2015","updated_at":"2026-11-18T18:07:54Z","subjects":["Executives--Supply and demand","Human capital","Incentives in industry"],"languages":["English"],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd:3539","isbn:9781321993882","isbn:1321993889","oclc:933586761","umi:3719126","local:Brooks_grad.msu_0128D_13939"],"render_values":[{"text":"etd:3539","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"isbn:9781321993882","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"isbn:1321993889","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"oclc:933586761","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"umi:3719126","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"local:Brooks_grad.msu_0128D_13939","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":null,"outbound_label":null,"outbound_source":null,"record_url":null,"record_label":null,"record_kind":null,"record_source":null,"download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_dc&identifier=oai%3Ad.lib.msu.edu%3Aetd_3539","prefix":"oai_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Hadlock, Charles J.","Booth, Geoffrey G.","Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam","Simonov, Andrei"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Brooks, Damien Alexander"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:coverage","label":"Dc Coverage","values":["United States"]},{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015"]},{"key":"dc:relation","label":"Dc Relation","values":["Electronic Theses & Dissertations"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Text","Theses"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Executives--Supply and demand","Human capital","Incentives in industry"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd:3539","isbn:9781321993882","isbn:1321993889","oclc:933586761","umi:3719126","local:Brooks_grad.msu_0128D_13939"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This dissertation is composed of a set of studies that examine the incentives of senior executives and the matching between executives and firms. In one essay, I examine the incentives of different managers to strategically time their disclosure of insider trades. I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that insiders choose the timing of their disclosures to minimize any negative information signals that may be conveyed by their trading decisions. In a second essay, I consider the matching process between a firm’s real assets and its managerial human capital. I find that certain types of CEO educational profiles are highly correlated with firm and industry characteristics. This evidence indicates that educational backgrounds capture important managerial characteristics that have a significant impact on the optimal matching process between CEOs and firms. In a final essay, I examine the role of a firm’s ownership structure on the types of senior managers that the firm is able to attract. I find that the presence of certain types of block owners leads to a substantive constraint in the set of candidates that are willing to consider leading a firm, thus suggesting a substantial human capital cost to certain firm ownership structures.","Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Business Administration - Finance, 2015","Includes bibliographical references (pages 105-110)"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["viii, 110 pages","application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Essays in executive incentives and labor markets"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Hadlock, Charles J.","Booth, Geoffrey G.","Schwartz-Ziv, Miriam","Simonov, Andrei"],"dc:coverage":["United States"],"dc:creator":["Brooks, Damien Alexander"],"dc:date":["2015"],"dc:description":["This dissertation is composed of a set of studies that examine the incentives of senior executives and the matching between executives and firms. In one essay, I examine the incentives of different managers to strategically time their disclosure of insider trades. I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that insiders choose the timing of their disclosures to minimize any negative information signals that may be conveyed by their trading decisions. In a second essay, I consider the matching process between a firm’s real assets and its managerial human capital. I find that certain types of CEO educational profiles are highly correlated with firm and industry characteristics. This evidence indicates that educational backgrounds capture important managerial characteristics that have a significant impact on the optimal matching process between CEOs and firms. In a final essay, I examine the role of a firm’s ownership structure on the types of senior managers that the firm is able to attract. 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