{"id":{"repo_id":"msu","oai_identifier":"oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_48237"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/msu/oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_48237","repository":{"repo_id":"msu","name":"Michigan State University","base_url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai"},"display":{"title":"A critical analysis of Habermas's qualified defense of strong judicial review","abstract":"\"The question of how best to resolve constitutional indeterminacy has recently returned to prominence in American political philosophy. Jurgen Habermas's contribution to this debate, which takes the form of a qualified defense of strong judicial review, is interesting, but it has not been the subject of much scholarly attention. In this dissertation I provide a recapitulation of Habermas's account, locating it within the context of both Habermas's ambitious communication theory of society and the ongoing American debate. This accomplished, I next subject Habermas's defense of strong judicial review to critical scrutiny. Through this process I demonstrate that Habermas's defense of strong judicial review does not sit comfortably with certain main premises of his social theory. Most importantly, I show that Habermas's attempt to legitimate strong judicial review runs afoul of his contention that members of rationalized societies should be expected, on reflection, to endorse a communicative criterion for analysis of the legitimacy of legal institutions. Because history teaches that there are alternative practically realizable forms of constitutional interpretation which come closer to realizing a situation in which communicatively processed public opinion influences constitutional interpretation, Habermas's qualified defense of strong judicial review must ultimately be understood as in significant tension with his overall social theory. I conclude my account by engaging in some speculation about both why Habermas might not have noticed this and what further lines of research are suggested by this analysis.\"--Page ii.","abstract_html":"&quot;The question of how best to resolve constitutional indeterminacy has recently returned to prominence in American political philosophy. Jurgen Habermas&#x27;s contribution to this debate, which takes the form of a qualified defense of strong judicial review, is interesting, but it has not been the subject of much scholarly attention. In this dissertation I provide a recapitulation of Habermas&#x27;s account, locating it within the context of both Habermas&#x27;s ambitious communication theory of society and the ongoing American debate. This accomplished, I next subject Habermas&#x27;s defense of strong judicial review to critical scrutiny. Through this process I demonstrate that Habermas&#x27;s defense of strong judicial review does not sit comfortably with certain main premises of his social theory. Most importantly, I show that Habermas&#x27;s attempt to legitimate strong judicial review runs afoul of his contention that members of rationalized societies should be expected, on reflection, to endorse a communicative criterion for analysis of the legitimacy of legal institutions. Because history teaches that there are alternative practically realizable forms of constitutional interpretation which come closer to realizing a situation in which communicatively processed public opinion influences constitutional interpretation, Habermas&#x27;s qualified defense of strong judicial review must ultimately be understood as in significant tension with his overall social theory. I conclude my account by engaging in some speculation about both why Habermas might not have noticed this and what further lines of research are suggested by this analysis.&quot;--Page ii.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Sprague-Rice, Aidan Michael"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Hedrick, Todd","Rauscher, Frederick","Lotz, Christian","Esquith, Stephen"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019","date_published":"2019","updated_at":"2026-11-18T18:53:22Z","subjects":["Habermas, Jürgen","Law--Philosophy","Jurisprudence","Judicial review","Philosophy"],"languages":["English"],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd:48237","isbn:9781392839300","isbn:1392839300","oclc:1138556376","umi:27543382","local:SpragueRice_grad.msu_0128D_17213"],"render_values":[{"text":"etd:48237","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"isbn:9781392839300","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"isbn:1392839300","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"oclc:1138556376","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"umi:27543382","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"local:SpragueRice_grad.msu_0128D_17213","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/d2na-r163","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/d2na-r163","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"doi","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_dc&identifier=oai%3Ad.lib.msu.edu%3Aetd_48237","prefix":"oai_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Hedrick, Todd","Rauscher, Frederick","Lotz, Christian","Esquith, Stephen"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Sprague-Rice, Aidan Michael"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:coverage","label":"Dc Coverage","values":["United States"]},{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019"]},{"key":"dc:relation","label":"Dc Relation","values":["Electronic Theses & Dissertations"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Text","Theses"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Habermas, Jürgen","Law--Philosophy","Jurisprudence","Judicial review","Philosophy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd:48237","isbn:9781392839300","isbn:1392839300","oclc:1138556376","umi:27543382","local:SpragueRice_grad.msu_0128D_17213","https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/d2na-r163"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["\"The question of how best to resolve constitutional indeterminacy has recently returned to prominence in American political philosophy. Jurgen Habermas's contribution to this debate, which takes the form of a qualified defense of strong judicial review, is interesting, but it has not been the subject of much scholarly attention. In this dissertation I provide a recapitulation of Habermas's account, locating it within the context of both Habermas's ambitious communication theory of society and the ongoing American debate. This accomplished, I next subject Habermas's defense of strong judicial review to critical scrutiny. Through this process I demonstrate that Habermas's defense of strong judicial review does not sit comfortably with certain main premises of his social theory. Most importantly, I show that Habermas's attempt to legitimate strong judicial review runs afoul of his contention that members of rationalized societies should be expected, on reflection, to endorse a communicative criterion for analysis of the legitimacy of legal institutions. Because history teaches that there are alternative practically realizable forms of constitutional interpretation which come closer to realizing a situation in which communicatively processed public opinion influences constitutional interpretation, Habermas's qualified defense of strong judicial review must ultimately be understood as in significant tension with his overall social theory. I conclude my account by engaging in some speculation about both why Habermas might not have noticed this and what further lines of research are suggested by this analysis.\"--Page ii.","Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Philosophy, 2019","Includes bibliographical references (pages 287-297)"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["x, 297 pages","application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["A critical analysis of Habermas's qualified defense of strong judicial review"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Hedrick, Todd","Rauscher, Frederick","Lotz, Christian","Esquith, Stephen"],"dc:coverage":["United States"],"dc:creator":["Sprague-Rice, Aidan Michael"],"dc:date":["2019"],"dc:description":["\"The question of how best to resolve constitutional indeterminacy has recently returned to prominence in American political philosophy. Jurgen Habermas's contribution to this debate, which takes the form of a qualified defense of strong judicial review, is interesting, but it has not been the subject of much scholarly attention. In this dissertation I provide a recapitulation of Habermas's account, locating it within the context of both Habermas's ambitious communication theory of society and the ongoing American debate. This accomplished, I next subject Habermas's defense of strong judicial review to critical scrutiny. Through this process I demonstrate that Habermas's defense of strong judicial review does not sit comfortably with certain main premises of his social theory. Most importantly, I show that Habermas's attempt to legitimate strong judicial review runs afoul of his contention that members of rationalized societies should be expected, on reflection, to endorse a communicative criterion for analysis of the legitimacy of legal institutions. Because history teaches that there are alternative practically realizable forms of constitutional interpretation which come closer to realizing a situation in which communicatively processed public opinion influences constitutional interpretation, Habermas's qualified defense of strong judicial review must ultimately be understood as in significant tension with his overall social theory. I conclude my account by engaging in some speculation about both why Habermas might not have noticed this and what further lines of research are suggested by this analysis.\"--Page ii.","Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Philosophy, 2019","Includes bibliographical references (pages 287-297)"],"dc:format":["x, 297 pages","application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["etd:48237","isbn:9781392839300","isbn:1392839300","oclc:1138556376","umi:27543382","local:SpragueRice_grad.msu_0128D_17213","https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/d2na-r163"],"dc:language":["English"],"dc:relation":["Electronic Theses & Dissertations"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright"],"dc:subject":["Habermas, Jürgen","Law--Philosophy","Jurisprudence","Judicial review","Philosophy"],"dc:title":["A critical analysis of Habermas's qualified defense of strong judicial review"],"dc:type":["Text","Theses"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T18:53:22Z"}