{"id":{"repo_id":"msu","oai_identifier":"oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_50691"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/msu/oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_50691","repository":{"repo_id":"msu","name":"Michigan State University","base_url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai"},"display":{"title":"Examining the impact of shareholder activism on the targeted firms' temporal orientation and resource decisions","abstract":"Prior research on shareholder activism has expanded our knowledge on how activism affects firms, especially with respect to the types and magnitudes of activist-impelled changes. However, it remains unanswered how deeply activist intervention morphs the targeted firms and how long such changes persist. Focusing on the firm temporal orientation, I develop theory on how activism influences the targeted firm's time horizon, both when attacked by activists and when activists leave the firm. I open the dissertation by reviewing the rapidly evolving research in shareholder activism. In my first empirical study, I examine how activist intervention shortens the targeted firm's time horizon, and how the degree of shortening is contingent on the relative motivation and capability of activist investors vis-a-vis managers. In the second study, I propose that targeted firms shift their course of strategy once activist investors leave the firm, specifically by increasing their resource-consuming investments. Yet, because of the inherent temporal tradeoff such investments present, I posit that the degree of shift is likely affected by leader attributes and situational factors. Specifically, I argue that the CEOs who are high in their future temporal focus and who have a high level of prospective wealth will increase their resource-consuming investments to a greater degree. In addition to testing hypotheses, the empirical data revealed an unexpected insight into the time horizon changes in non-targeted firms. With my dissertation, I aim to contribute to streams of research on shareholder activism, firm temporal orientation, and corporate governance.","abstract_html":"Prior research on shareholder activism has expanded our knowledge on how activism affects firms, especially with respect to the types and magnitudes of activist-impelled changes. However, it remains unanswered how deeply activist intervention morphs the targeted firms and how long such changes persist. Focusing on the firm temporal orientation, I develop theory on how activism influences the targeted firm&#x27;s time horizon, both when attacked by activists and when activists leave the firm. I open the dissertation by reviewing the rapidly evolving research in shareholder activism. In my first empirical study, I examine how activist intervention shortens the targeted firm&#x27;s time horizon, and how the degree of shortening is contingent on the relative motivation and capability of activist investors vis-a-vis managers. In the second study, I propose that targeted firms shift their course of strategy once activist investors leave the firm, specifically by increasing their resource-consuming investments. Yet, because of the inherent temporal tradeoff such investments present, I posit that the degree of shift is likely affected by leader attributes and situational factors. Specifically, I argue that the CEOs who are high in their future temporal focus and who have a high level of prospective wealth will increase their resource-consuming investments to a greater degree. In addition to testing hypotheses, the empirical data revealed an unexpected insight into the time horizon changes in non-targeted firms. With my dissertation, I aim to contribute to streams of research on shareholder activism, firm temporal orientation, and corporate governance.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Lee, Jennifer"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["McNamara, Gerry","Conlon, Donald","Shani, Guy","Gai, Shelby","Haleblian, John"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2022,"date_issued":"2022","date_published":"2022","updated_at":"2026-11-18T18:57:07Z","subjects":["Stockholders","Corporate governance","Corporations--Investor relations"],"languages":["English"],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd:50691","isbn:9798841782063","oclc:on1373601601","oclc:1373601601","umi:29327248","local:Lee_grad.msu_0128D_19349"],"render_values":[{"text":"etd:50691","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"isbn:9798841782063","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"oclc:on1373601601","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"oclc:1373601601","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"umi:29327248","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"local:Lee_grad.msu_0128D_19349","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/5y21-vz50","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/5y21-vz50","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"doi","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_dc&identifier=oai%3Ad.lib.msu.edu%3Aetd_50691","prefix":"oai_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["McNamara, Gerry","Conlon, Donald","Shani, Guy","Gai, Shelby","Haleblian, John"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Lee, Jennifer"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2022"]},{"key":"dc:relation","label":"Dc Relation","values":["Electronic Theses & Dissertations"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Text","Theses"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Stockholders","Corporate governance","Corporations--Investor relations"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["English"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd:50691","isbn:9798841782063","oclc:on1373601601","oclc:1373601601","umi:29327248","local:Lee_grad.msu_0128D_19349","https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/5y21-vz50"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Prior research on shareholder activism has expanded our knowledge on how activism affects firms, especially with respect to the types and magnitudes of activist-impelled changes. However, it remains unanswered how deeply activist intervention morphs the targeted firms and how long such changes persist. Focusing on the firm temporal orientation, I develop theory on how activism influences the targeted firm's time horizon, both when attacked by activists and when activists leave the firm. I open the dissertation by reviewing the rapidly evolving research in shareholder activism. In my first empirical study, I examine how activist intervention shortens the targeted firm's time horizon, and how the degree of shortening is contingent on the relative motivation and capability of activist investors vis-a-vis managers. In the second study, I propose that targeted firms shift their course of strategy once activist investors leave the firm, specifically by increasing their resource-consuming investments. Yet, because of the inherent temporal tradeoff such investments present, I posit that the degree of shift is likely affected by leader attributes and situational factors. Specifically, I argue that the CEOs who are high in their future temporal focus and who have a high level of prospective wealth will increase their resource-consuming investments to a greater degree. In addition to testing hypotheses, the empirical data revealed an unexpected insight into the time horizon changes in non-targeted firms. With my dissertation, I aim to contribute to streams of research on shareholder activism, firm temporal orientation, and corporate governance.","Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Business Administration, 2022","Includes bibliographical references (pages 108-126)"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["vi, 126 pages","application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Examining the impact of shareholder activism on the targeted firms' temporal orientation and resource decisions"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["McNamara, Gerry","Conlon, Donald","Shani, Guy","Gai, Shelby","Haleblian, John"],"dc:creator":["Lee, Jennifer"],"dc:date":["2022"],"dc:description":["Prior research on shareholder activism has expanded our knowledge on how activism affects firms, especially with respect to the types and magnitudes of activist-impelled changes. However, it remains unanswered how deeply activist intervention morphs the targeted firms and how long such changes persist. Focusing on the firm temporal orientation, I develop theory on how activism influences the targeted firm's time horizon, both when attacked by activists and when activists leave the firm. I open the dissertation by reviewing the rapidly evolving research in shareholder activism. In my first empirical study, I examine how activist intervention shortens the targeted firm's time horizon, and how the degree of shortening is contingent on the relative motivation and capability of activist investors vis-a-vis managers. In the second study, I propose that targeted firms shift their course of strategy once activist investors leave the firm, specifically by increasing their resource-consuming investments. Yet, because of the inherent temporal tradeoff such investments present, I posit that the degree of shift is likely affected by leader attributes and situational factors. Specifically, I argue that the CEOs who are high in their future temporal focus and who have a high level of prospective wealth will increase their resource-consuming investments to a greater degree. In addition to testing hypotheses, the empirical data revealed an unexpected insight into the time horizon changes in non-targeted firms. With my dissertation, I aim to contribute to streams of research on shareholder activism, firm temporal orientation, and corporate governance.","Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. 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