{"id":{"repo_id":"msu","oai_identifier":"oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_53153"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/msu/oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_53153","repository":{"repo_id":"msu","name":"Michigan State University","base_url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai"},"display":{"title":"Expecting Efficiency, Faulting for Failure : A Structural Explanation for Toxicity in Team-Based Competitive Cooperative Games","abstract":"Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Information and Media - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","abstract_html":"Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Information and Media - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Lei, Yiming"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Ewoldsen, David","Rhodes, Nancy","Bente, Gary","Peng, Taiquan"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2026,"date_issued":"2026","date_published":"2026","updated_at":"2026-11-18T18:59:41Z","subjects":["Communication","Social psychology"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd:53153","local:Lei_grad.msu_0128D_22177"],"render_values":[{"text":"etd:53153","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"local:Lei_grad.msu_0128D_22177","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/rkmp-bw59","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/rkmp-bw59","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"doi","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_dc&identifier=oai%3Ad.lib.msu.edu%3Aetd_53153","prefix":"oai_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Ewoldsen, David","Rhodes, Nancy","Bente, Gary","Peng, Taiquan"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Lei, Yiming"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2026"]},{"key":"dc:relation","label":"Dc Relation","values":["Electronic Theses & Dissertations"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text","Electronic dissertations"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Communication","Social psychology"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd:53153","local:Lei_grad.msu_0128D_22177","https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/rkmp-bw59"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Information and Media - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","Modern team-based competitive cooperative online video games are widely characterized by toxicity, with players frequently engaging in verbal abuse and, at times, deliberately undermining team performance through poor gameplay. Research in behavioral game theory suggests that within-group cooperation increases in the presence of intergroup conflict, while research in media psychology indicates that cooperative gameplay can enhance subsequent prosocial intentions and behaviors. Contrary to these expectations, toxicity persists in game environments where both intergroup conflict (e.g., competing teams) and within-group cooperation are present. Drawing from behavioral game theory, this research explicates that toxic behaviors in team-based video games are punishment behaviors aimed at regulating non-cooperation. However, because team-based video games lack the structural incentives that typically give rise to punishment behavior, toxicity emerges in paradoxical ways.To better understand this paradox, the present research analyzed the structure of team-based competitive cooperative games through the lens of behavioral game theory. Using a repeated 4-player, 2-team coordination game with intergroup conflict and outcome uncertainty, Study 1 (N = 114) explored the effect of game outcomes and levels of effort from the teammate on participants’ own decisions on effort input and their evaluations of teammates. Using a hierarchical coordination game with intergroup conflict, Study 2 (N = 122) investigated the boundary conditions for punishment behavior emerging from different levels of knowledge of the game and coordination efficiency. Results from both studies indicate that team-based competitive cooperative video games are structurally coordination-based and largely exploitation-free. However, once players perceive that common knowledge about efficiency-ranked strategies has been established, deviations from the perceived optimal strategy may be interpreted as non-cooperation. Under conditions of intergroup conflict, such deviations can further be construed as harmful to group interests. These interpretations, in turn, can elicit punishment behaviors toward teammates. These findings highlight that although mismatched effort is an inherent risk in coordination, team-based competitive cooperative video games tend to create an environment in which suboptimal coordination is punished even in the absence of any fundamental conflict of interest. The findings also extend understanding of punishment behavior, which has been widely examined in social dilemmas but less studied in coordination contexts. Implications and limitations are discussed.","Description based on online resource. Title from PDF t.p. (Michigan State University Fedora Repository, viewed ).","Includes bibliographical references."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf","1 online resource (94 p.) : ill."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Expecting Efficiency, Faulting for Failure : A Structural Explanation for Toxicity in Team-Based Competitive Cooperative Games"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Ewoldsen, David","Rhodes, Nancy","Bente, Gary","Peng, Taiquan"],"dc:creator":["Lei, Yiming"],"dc:date":["2026"],"dc:description":["Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Information and Media - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","Modern team-based competitive cooperative online video games are widely characterized by toxicity, with players frequently engaging in verbal abuse and, at times, deliberately undermining team performance through poor gameplay. Research in behavioral game theory suggests that within-group cooperation increases in the presence of intergroup conflict, while research in media psychology indicates that cooperative gameplay can enhance subsequent prosocial intentions and behaviors. Contrary to these expectations, toxicity persists in game environments where both intergroup conflict (e.g., competing teams) and within-group cooperation are present. Drawing from behavioral game theory, this research explicates that toxic behaviors in team-based video games are punishment behaviors aimed at regulating non-cooperation. However, because team-based video games lack the structural incentives that typically give rise to punishment behavior, toxicity emerges in paradoxical ways.To better understand this paradox, the present research analyzed the structure of team-based competitive cooperative games through the lens of behavioral game theory. Using a repeated 4-player, 2-team coordination game with intergroup conflict and outcome uncertainty, Study 1 (N = 114) explored the effect of game outcomes and levels of effort from the teammate on participants’ own decisions on effort input and their evaluations of teammates. Using a hierarchical coordination game with intergroup conflict, Study 2 (N = 122) investigated the boundary conditions for punishment behavior emerging from different levels of knowledge of the game and coordination efficiency. Results from both studies indicate that team-based competitive cooperative video games are structurally coordination-based and largely exploitation-free. However, once players perceive that common knowledge about efficiency-ranked strategies has been established, deviations from the perceived optimal strategy may be interpreted as non-cooperation. Under conditions of intergroup conflict, such deviations can further be construed as harmful to group interests. These interpretations, in turn, can elicit punishment behaviors toward teammates. These findings highlight that although mismatched effort is an inherent risk in coordination, team-based competitive cooperative video games tend to create an environment in which suboptimal coordination is punished even in the absence of any fundamental conflict of interest. The findings also extend understanding of punishment behavior, which has been widely examined in social dilemmas but less studied in coordination contexts. Implications and limitations are discussed.","Description based on online resource. Title from PDF t.p. (Michigan State University Fedora Repository, viewed ).","Includes bibliographical references."],"dc:format":["application/pdf","1 online resource (94 p.) : ill."],"dc:identifier":["etd:53153","local:Lei_grad.msu_0128D_22177","https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/rkmp-bw59"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:relation":["Electronic Theses & Dissertations"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright"],"dc:subject":["Communication","Social psychology"],"dc:title":["Expecting Efficiency, Faulting for Failure : A Structural Explanation for Toxicity in Team-Based Competitive Cooperative Games"],"dc:type":["text","Electronic dissertations"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T18:59:41Z"}