{"id":{"repo_id":"msu","oai_identifier":"oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_53259"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/msu/oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_53259","repository":{"repo_id":"msu","name":"Michigan State University","base_url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai"},"display":{"title":"The Leader's Long Shadow : Party Personalism, Local State Exploitation, and Electoral Accountability in Emerging Democracies","abstract":"Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Political Science - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","abstract_html":"Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. 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Political Science - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","This dissertation examines how personalist political parties influence local political dynamics in emerging democracies. Building on existing research illustrating the harmful effects of party personalism on national-level outcomes, this dissertation shows that party personalism also trickles down to negatively influence local-level outcomes. It identifies a chain of micro-level mechanisms linking personalist party governance to local state exploitation and the deterioration of local electoral accountability, challenging expectations that, in a competitive democratic environment, voters sanction parties that misuse public office. I argue that a leader's dominance over the party serves as a learning heuristic that signals to officials which behavior is permissible, while reducing the likelihood that voters will sanction officials for exploiting state resources. The dissertation thus offers a theoretical framework linking macro-level leader dominance to micro-level effects on local officials and voters, treating political competition - the very attribute expected to constrain such misuse - as a macro-level condition that can alter the stakes and form of this chain rather than reliably restrain it. To test this argument, I use a mixed-methods design across three empirical chapters, drawing on original surveys and interviews with officials, voters, and party operatives in Moldova. Chapter 2 surveys 156 local officials across 12 districts, showing that greater perceived party personalism predicts higher instrumental willingness - or officials' readiness to let career calculations guide administrative choices; that patronage involvement raises it further; and that relational patronage ties matter more than weak, single-shot ties. Chapter 3 shifts to voters, matching a survey of 269 respondents in the same districts to show that more personalist environments are associated with greater reported exposure to electoral clientelism, which weakens electoral accountability most reliably when reinforced by leader attachment. Chapter 4 turns to political competition, drawing on both datasets to test whether it constrains these mechanisms, as democratic theory expects, or conditions them by raising the perceived cost of defeat. It finds some evidence of conditioning effects: the official-side and accountability-side interactions move in the expected direction, while the supply of clientelism shows the opposite pattern. This suggests that political competition operates through competing channels, raising the electoral value of clientelist distribution while also exposing it, indicating that officials in close races may trade visible clientelism for less observable institutional abuse. This dissertation contributes to the literature on the harmful effects of party personalism for democratic politics by tracing how personalist parties erode local governance and accountability beyond the leader's direct reach. It shows that political competition does not consistently serve as a safeguard in the settings examined, since it can reorganize the form of state exploitation rather than solely reduce its level. In doing so, the dissertation points to local public administration as a key site of democratic vulnerability, where accountability can weaken well before formal institutions collapse - once officials believe such parties will protect them and voters interpret targeted aid as proof of that protection.","Description based on online resource. Title from PDF t.p. (Michigan State University Fedora Repository, viewed ).","Includes bibliographical references."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf","1 online resource (121 p.) : ill."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Leader's Long Shadow : Party Personalism, Local State Exploitation, and Electoral Accountability in Emerging Democracies"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Frantz, Erica","Bodea, Cristina","Chang, Eric","Bracic, Ana"],"dc:creator":["Skritki, Stanislav"],"dc:date":["2026"],"dc:description":["Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Political Science - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","This dissertation examines how personalist political parties influence local political dynamics in emerging democracies. Building on existing research illustrating the harmful effects of party personalism on national-level outcomes, this dissertation shows that party personalism also trickles down to negatively influence local-level outcomes. It identifies a chain of micro-level mechanisms linking personalist party governance to local state exploitation and the deterioration of local electoral accountability, challenging expectations that, in a competitive democratic environment, voters sanction parties that misuse public office. I argue that a leader's dominance over the party serves as a learning heuristic that signals to officials which behavior is permissible, while reducing the likelihood that voters will sanction officials for exploiting state resources. The dissertation thus offers a theoretical framework linking macro-level leader dominance to micro-level effects on local officials and voters, treating political competition - the very attribute expected to constrain such misuse - as a macro-level condition that can alter the stakes and form of this chain rather than reliably restrain it. To test this argument, I use a mixed-methods design across three empirical chapters, drawing on original surveys and interviews with officials, voters, and party operatives in Moldova. Chapter 2 surveys 156 local officials across 12 districts, showing that greater perceived party personalism predicts higher instrumental willingness - or officials' readiness to let career calculations guide administrative choices; that patronage involvement raises it further; and that relational patronage ties matter more than weak, single-shot ties. Chapter 3 shifts to voters, matching a survey of 269 respondents in the same districts to show that more personalist environments are associated with greater reported exposure to electoral clientelism, which weakens electoral accountability most reliably when reinforced by leader attachment. Chapter 4 turns to political competition, drawing on both datasets to test whether it constrains these mechanisms, as democratic theory expects, or conditions them by raising the perceived cost of defeat. It finds some evidence of conditioning effects: the official-side and accountability-side interactions move in the expected direction, while the supply of clientelism shows the opposite pattern. This suggests that political competition operates through competing channels, raising the electoral value of clientelist distribution while also exposing it, indicating that officials in close races may trade visible clientelism for less observable institutional abuse. This dissertation contributes to the literature on the harmful effects of party personalism for democratic politics by tracing how personalist parties erode local governance and accountability beyond the leader's direct reach. It shows that political competition does not consistently serve as a safeguard in the settings examined, since it can reorganize the form of state exploitation rather than solely reduce its level. In doing so, the dissertation points to local public administration as a key site of democratic vulnerability, where accountability can weaken well before formal institutions collapse - once officials believe such parties will protect them and voters interpret targeted aid as proof of that protection.","Description based on online resource. Title from PDF t.p. (Michigan State University Fedora Repository, viewed ).","Includes bibliographical references."],"dc:format":["application/pdf","1 online resource (121 p.) : ill."],"dc:identifier":["etd:53259","local:Skritki_grad.msu_0128D_22306","https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/8khp-pg42"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:relation":["Electronic Theses & Dissertations"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright"],"dc:subject":["Political science"],"dc:title":["The Leader's Long Shadow : Party Personalism, Local State Exploitation, and Electoral Accountability in Emerging Democracies"],"dc:type":["text","Electronic dissertations"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T18:59:44Z"}