{"id":{"repo_id":"msu","oai_identifier":"oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_53388"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/msu/oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_53388","repository":{"repo_id":"msu","name":"Michigan State University","base_url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai"},"display":{"title":"ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF WETLANDS POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES","abstract":"Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Economics - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","abstract_html":"Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. 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Economics - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","Chapter 1: Environmental Offset Markets with Omitted Damages: the U.S. Wetlands Mitigation Banking ProgramDevelopers who impact wetlands deemed Waters of the United States must mitigate the loss of ecosystem services on site or purchase credits from wetland restoration projects elsewhere. This requirement has created one of the largest ecosystem offset markets in the world. Regulators attempt to limit spatial displacement of ecosystem services through geo- graphic restrictions on trading. This paper asks how well existing restrictions improve welfare when credits omit flood mitigation, a spatially heterogeneous service. I show theoretically that welfare depends on whether price variation tracks marginal damages. To quantify this mismatch, I collect credit prices from state and local sources and estimate marginal damages using data on wetland loss and flood insurance claims. I find that wetland loss increases flood claims and that estimated damages vary substantially within trading zones. Observed pricing creates greater deadweight loss than uniform correct-on-average pricing. Relative welfare losses are over an order of magnitude larger where prices vary more. Therefore, price variation that does not track omitted damages can make deadweight loss much worse. Chapter 2: No Net Loss for Whom? Wetland Mitigation Banking and the Distribution of Wetlands Across People Wetland mitigation banking in the United States is one of the largest ecosystem offset markets in the world. Its central policy objective is “No Net Loss,” typically interpreted as no net loss of wetland acres or mitigation credits. Yet aggregate preservation does not necessarily preserve wetland services or their proximity to people. I find that mitigation moves wetlands substantial distances and that, across people, bank-side gains reach fewer residents than the wetlands lost at permit sites. Wetland losses are also statistically associated with the local shares of several environmental justice populations. I then compare the person- centered distributions of gains and losses using generalized Lorenz curves. Under explicit normative preferences, the distribution preserved by avoiding permit-side losses is generally preferred to the distribution produced by bank-side gains. Descriptive concentration curves commonly used in the environmental justice literature can yield different, but complementary, conclusions about distributional equity. I show that this contrast arises because the two tools rank different objects, weight different populations, and summarize different notions of distribution.","Description based on online resource. Title from PDF t.p. (Michigan State University Fedora Repository, viewed ).","Includes bibliographical references."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf","1 online resource (187 p.) : ill."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF WETLANDS POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Anderson, Soren","Kim, Kyoo Il","Sears, Molly","Kirkpatrick, Justin"],"dc:creator":["Tucker, Sam"],"dc:date":["2026"],"dc:description":["Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Economics - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","Chapter 1: Environmental Offset Markets with Omitted Damages: the U.S. Wetlands Mitigation Banking ProgramDevelopers who impact wetlands deemed Waters of the United States must mitigate the loss of ecosystem services on site or purchase credits from wetland restoration projects elsewhere. This requirement has created one of the largest ecosystem offset markets in the world. Regulators attempt to limit spatial displacement of ecosystem services through geo- graphic restrictions on trading. This paper asks how well existing restrictions improve welfare when credits omit flood mitigation, a spatially heterogeneous service. I show theoretically that welfare depends on whether price variation tracks marginal damages. To quantify this mismatch, I collect credit prices from state and local sources and estimate marginal damages using data on wetland loss and flood insurance claims. I find that wetland loss increases flood claims and that estimated damages vary substantially within trading zones. Observed pricing creates greater deadweight loss than uniform correct-on-average pricing. Relative welfare losses are over an order of magnitude larger where prices vary more. Therefore, price variation that does not track omitted damages can make deadweight loss much worse. Chapter 2: No Net Loss for Whom? Wetland Mitigation Banking and the Distribution of Wetlands Across People Wetland mitigation banking in the United States is one of the largest ecosystem offset markets in the world. Its central policy objective is “No Net Loss,” typically interpreted as no net loss of wetland acres or mitigation credits. Yet aggregate preservation does not necessarily preserve wetland services or their proximity to people. I find that mitigation moves wetlands substantial distances and that, across people, bank-side gains reach fewer residents than the wetlands lost at permit sites. Wetland losses are also statistically associated with the local shares of several environmental justice populations. I then compare the person- centered distributions of gains and losses using generalized Lorenz curves. Under explicit normative preferences, the distribution preserved by avoiding permit-side losses is generally preferred to the distribution produced by bank-side gains. Descriptive concentration curves commonly used in the environmental justice literature can yield different, but complementary, conclusions about distributional equity. I show that this contrast arises because the two tools rank different objects, weight different populations, and summarize different notions of distribution.","Description based on online resource. Title from PDF t.p. (Michigan State University Fedora Repository, viewed ).","Includes bibliographical references."],"dc:format":["application/pdf","1 online resource (187 p.) : ill."],"dc:identifier":["etd:53388","local:Tucker_grad.msu_0128D_22445","https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/rp6d-p317"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:relation":["Electronic Theses & Dissertations"],"dc:rights":["Attribution 4.0 International"],"dc:subject":["Environmental economics","Environmental justice","Economics","Environmental protection--Economic aspects"],"dc:title":["ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF WETLANDS POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES"],"dc:type":["text","Electronic dissertations"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T18:59:53Z"}