{"id":{"repo_id":"msu","oai_identifier":"oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_53399"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/msu/oai:d.lib.msu.edu:etd_53399","repository":{"repo_id":"msu","name":"Michigan State University","base_url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai"},"display":{"title":"RETHINKING MORAL NORMS IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE : MOUSE-TRACKING EVIDENCE OF ATTENUATED MORAL EXPECTATIONS AND GREATER HESITATION IN JUDGMENTS OF ARTIFICIAL AGENTS’ VIRTUOUS BEHAVIOR","abstract":"Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Information and Media - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","abstract_html":"Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Information and Media - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kim, Taenyun"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Ewoldsen, David R","Peng, Wei","Rhodes, Nancy","Schmälzle, Ralf","Brandt, Mark"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2026,"date_issued":"2026","date_published":"2026","updated_at":"2026-11-18T18:59:53Z","subjects":["Social psychology"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["In Copyright"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd:53399","local:Kim_grad.msu_0128D_22456"],"render_values":[{"text":"etd:53399","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"local:Kim_grad.msu_0128D_22456","href":null,"code":true}]}],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/z5ts-dh32","outbound_label":"DOI","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/z5ts-dh32","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"doi","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://d.lib.msu.edu/oai?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_dc&identifier=oai%3Ad.lib.msu.edu%3Aetd_53399","prefix":"oai_dc"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Ewoldsen, David R","Peng, Wei","Rhodes, Nancy","Schmälzle, Ralf","Brandt, Mark"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kim, Taenyun"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2026"]},{"key":"dc:relation","label":"Dc Relation","values":["Electronic Theses & Dissertations"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text","Electronic dissertations"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Social psychology"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["In Copyright"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["etd:53399","local:Kim_grad.msu_0128D_22456","https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/z5ts-dh32"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Information and Media - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","Artificial agents, including AI systems and robots, are increasingly embedded in human social life, raising an important question for moral psychology and human–machine communication (HMC): Do people expect them to follow the same moral norms as humans? Although people judge artificial agents as morally wrong and blameworthy for misconduct, they do so less strongly than for humans. Less is known about whether human moral norms—standards for what people should or should not do—apply equally to artificial agents or whether judging their behavior requires more cognitive efforts. This dissertation uses mouse tracking and Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) to compare judgments of human and artificial agents’ virtues and vices across seven moral domains.Across two preregistered studies, participants evaluated the same behaviors performed by humans or artificial agents. Study 1 developed and validated moral vignettes and compared judgments of rightness–wrongness, responsibility, and intentionality. Study 2 examined moral norm judgments and their real-time dynamics. Across both studies, artificial agents were treated as moral targets but not as equivalent to humans. Their virtuous behaviors received weaker moral judgments, whereas their vicious behaviors were judged similarly to those of humans. In Study 1, artificial agents’ virtuous actions were judged as less morally right, particularly for family values involving developers (e.g., “protects the company that developed them”) and heroism (e.g., “puts themselves at risk to help others”). They were also viewed as less responsible and intentional, especially for virtuous behaviors. In Study 2, participants judged less strongly that artificial agents should perform virtuous behaviors, whereas judgments that they should not perform vicious behaviors were largely comparable to those for humans. Family values transferred least readily to artificial agents, while fairness (e.g., “makes a fair deal”) and property rights (e.g., “respects others’ personal space”) transferred more readily. Deference (e.g., “shows respect for their superior”) was distinctive: artificial agents were similarly expected to defer but more strongly prohibited from violating deference norms. Mouse trajectories indicated greater difficulty judging artificial agents, particularly in virtue scenarios. Although movement initiation did not differ, these judgments involved longer response and idle times, greater trajectory deviation, longer paths, and more directional changes. These findings suggest that people initially apply familiar moral expectations to artificial agents but later reconsider their fit with nonbiological, human-made agents. Together, the findings contribute to moral psychology, cognitive science, HMC, and media and information studies by identifying artificial agents as a distinctive category of moral target: consequential enough to invite human normative expectations but ontologically ambiguous enough to produce uneven norm transfer and real-time judgment conflict. They also suggest that morally aligned design requires not only preventing violations but also clarifying when artificial agents should fulfill positive obligations, defer to humans, or refuse human commands.","Description based on online resource. Title from PDF t.p. (Michigan State University Fedora Repository, viewed ).","Includes bibliographical references."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf","1 online resource (186 p.) : ill."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["RETHINKING MORAL NORMS IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE : MOUSE-TRACKING EVIDENCE OF ATTENUATED MORAL EXPECTATIONS AND GREATER HESITATION IN JUDGMENTS OF ARTIFICIAL AGENTS’ VIRTUOUS BEHAVIOR"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Ewoldsen, David R","Peng, Wei","Rhodes, Nancy","Schmälzle, Ralf","Brandt, Mark"],"dc:creator":["Kim, Taenyun"],"dc:date":["2026"],"dc:description":["Thesis (Ph.D.)--Michigan State University. Information and Media - Doctor of Philosophy, 2026","Artificial agents, including AI systems and robots, are increasingly embedded in human social life, raising an important question for moral psychology and human–machine communication (HMC): Do people expect them to follow the same moral norms as humans? Although people judge artificial agents as morally wrong and blameworthy for misconduct, they do so less strongly than for humans. Less is known about whether human moral norms—standards for what people should or should not do—apply equally to artificial agents or whether judging their behavior requires more cognitive efforts. This dissertation uses mouse tracking and Morality-as-Cooperation (MAC) to compare judgments of human and artificial agents’ virtues and vices across seven moral domains.Across two preregistered studies, participants evaluated the same behaviors performed by humans or artificial agents. Study 1 developed and validated moral vignettes and compared judgments of rightness–wrongness, responsibility, and intentionality. Study 2 examined moral norm judgments and their real-time dynamics. Across both studies, artificial agents were treated as moral targets but not as equivalent to humans. Their virtuous behaviors received weaker moral judgments, whereas their vicious behaviors were judged similarly to those of humans. In Study 1, artificial agents’ virtuous actions were judged as less morally right, particularly for family values involving developers (e.g., “protects the company that developed them”) and heroism (e.g., “puts themselves at risk to help others”). They were also viewed as less responsible and intentional, especially for virtuous behaviors. In Study 2, participants judged less strongly that artificial agents should perform virtuous behaviors, whereas judgments that they should not perform vicious behaviors were largely comparable to those for humans. Family values transferred least readily to artificial agents, while fairness (e.g., “makes a fair deal”) and property rights (e.g., “respects others’ personal space”) transferred more readily. Deference (e.g., “shows respect for their superior”) was distinctive: artificial agents were similarly expected to defer but more strongly prohibited from violating deference norms. Mouse trajectories indicated greater difficulty judging artificial agents, particularly in virtue scenarios. Although movement initiation did not differ, these judgments involved longer response and idle times, greater trajectory deviation, longer paths, and more directional changes. These findings suggest that people initially apply familiar moral expectations to artificial agents but later reconsider their fit with nonbiological, human-made agents. Together, the findings contribute to moral psychology, cognitive science, HMC, and media and information studies by identifying artificial agents as a distinctive category of moral target: consequential enough to invite human normative expectations but ontologically ambiguous enough to produce uneven norm transfer and real-time judgment conflict. They also suggest that morally aligned design requires not only preventing violations but also clarifying when artificial agents should fulfill positive obligations, defer to humans, or refuse human commands.","Description based on online resource. Title from PDF t.p. (Michigan State University Fedora Repository, viewed ).","Includes bibliographical references."],"dc:format":["application/pdf","1 online resource (186 p.) : ill."],"dc:identifier":["etd:53399","local:Kim_grad.msu_0128D_22456","https://doi.org/doi:10.25335/z5ts-dh32"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:relation":["Electronic Theses & Dissertations"],"dc:rights":["In Copyright"],"dc:subject":["Social psychology"],"dc:title":["RETHINKING MORAL NORMS IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE : MOUSE-TRACKING EVIDENCE OF ATTENUATED MORAL EXPECTATIONS AND GREATER HESITATION IN JUDGMENTS OF ARTIFICIAL AGENTS’ VIRTUOUS BEHAVIOR"],"dc:type":["text","Electronic dissertations"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-18T18:59:53Z"}