{"id":{"repo_id":"njit","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.njit.edu:theses-3602"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/njit/oai:digitalcommons.njit.edu:theses-3602","repository":{"repo_id":"njit","name":"NJIT","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"The next strike: Pioneering forward-thinking attack techniques with rowhammer in dram technologies","abstract":"<p>In the realm of DRAM technologies this study investigates RowHammer vulnerabilities in DDR4 DRAM memory across various manufacturers, employing advanced multi-sided fault injection techniques to impose attack strategies directly on physical memory rows. Our novel approach, diverging from traditional victim-focused methods, involves strategically allocating virtual memory rows to their physical counterparts for more potent attacks. These attacks, exploiting the inherent weaknesses in DRAM design, are capable of inducing bit flips in a controlled manner to undermine system integrity. We employed a strategy that compromised system integrity through a nuanced approach of targeting rows situated at a distance of two rows away from the victim row rather than adjacent rows. This method involved inducing bit flips in these non-adjacent rows, thereby demonstrating the vulnerability of DRAM to indirect, sophisticated attack patterns. Through extensive testing on commercial DDR4 DRAM products using DRAM BENDER, a multifaceted DRAM testing platform developed by CMU Safari, we demonstrate that these imposed attack strategies can compromise chips from major manufacturers and significantly degrade the performance of a modern Deep Neural Network (DNN) system, even under supposed complete protection. Our findings reveal new dimensions of RowHammer vulnerabilities in current DRAM modules and set the stage for developing more robust defenses against these sophisticated attack techniques, enhancing our understanding of DRAM vulnerabilities and aiding in developing more robust defense strategies in the future.</p>","abstract_html":"&lt;p&gt;In the realm of DRAM technologies this study investigates RowHammer vulnerabilities in DDR4 DRAM memory across various manufacturers, employing advanced multi-sided fault injection techniques to impose attack strategies directly on physical memory rows. Our novel approach, diverging from traditional victim-focused methods, involves strategically allocating virtual memory rows to their physical counterparts for more potent attacks. These attacks, exploiting the inherent weaknesses in DRAM design, are capable of inducing bit flips in a controlled manner to undermine system integrity. We employed a strategy that compromised system integrity through a nuanced approach of targeting rows situated at a distance of two rows away from the victim row rather than adjacent rows. This method involved inducing bit flips in these non-adjacent rows, thereby demonstrating the vulnerability of DRAM to indirect, sophisticated attack patterns. Through extensive testing on commercial DDR4 DRAM products using DRAM BENDER, a multifaceted DRAM testing platform developed by CMU Safari, we demonstrate that these imposed attack strategies can compromise chips from major manufacturers and significantly degrade the performance of a modern Deep Neural Network (DNN) system, even under supposed complete protection. Our findings reveal new dimensions of RowHammer vulnerabilities in current DRAM modules and set the stage for developing more robust defenses against these sophisticated attack techniques, enhancing our understanding of DRAM vulnerabilities and aiding in developing more robust defense strategies in the future.&lt;/p&gt;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kochar, Nakul"],"institution":null,"degree_name":"Master of Science in Electrical Engineering - (M.S.)","degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":"Electrical and Computer Engineering","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Shaahin Angizi","Durgamadhab Misra","Arnob Ghosh"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":null,"date_issued":"","date_published":null,"updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:42:38Z","subjects":["Computer architecture","Machine learning","RowHammer","DRAM","Security","Cyber","Computer Engineering","Computer Sciences","Electrical and Electronics"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/theses/2588","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/theses/2588","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.njit.edu%3Atheses-3602","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Shaahin Angizi","Durgamadhab Misra","Arnob Ghosh"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kochar, Nakul"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.created","label":"Dc Date Created","values":["2024-05-31T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Electrical and Computer Engineering"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Master of Science in Electrical Engineering - (M.S.)"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Computer architecture","Machine learning","RowHammer","DRAM","Security","Cyber","Computer Engineering","Computer Sciences","Electrical and Electronics"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/theses/2588"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["<p>In the realm of DRAM technologies this study investigates RowHammer vulnerabilities in DDR4 DRAM memory across various manufacturers, employing advanced multi-sided fault injection techniques to impose attack strategies directly on physical memory rows. Our novel approach, diverging from traditional victim-focused methods, involves strategically allocating virtual memory rows to their physical counterparts for more potent attacks. These attacks, exploiting the inherent weaknesses in DRAM design, are capable of inducing bit flips in a controlled manner to undermine system integrity. We employed a strategy that compromised system integrity through a nuanced approach of targeting rows situated at a distance of two rows away from the victim row rather than adjacent rows. This method involved inducing bit flips in these non-adjacent rows, thereby demonstrating the vulnerability of DRAM to indirect, sophisticated attack patterns. Through extensive testing on commercial DDR4 DRAM products using DRAM BENDER, a multifaceted DRAM testing platform developed by CMU Safari, we demonstrate that these imposed attack strategies can compromise chips from major manufacturers and significantly degrade the performance of a modern Deep Neural Network (DNN) system, even under supposed complete protection. Our findings reveal new dimensions of RowHammer vulnerabilities in current DRAM modules and set the stage for developing more robust defenses against these sophisticated attack techniques, enhancing our understanding of DRAM vulnerabilities and aiding in developing more robust defense strategies in the future.</p>"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The next strike: Pioneering forward-thinking attack techniques with rowhammer in dram technologies"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Shaahin Angizi","Durgamadhab Misra","Arnob Ghosh"],"dc:creator":["Kochar, Nakul"],"dc:date.created":["2024-05-31T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description.abstract":["<p>In the realm of DRAM technologies this study investigates RowHammer vulnerabilities in DDR4 DRAM memory across various manufacturers, employing advanced multi-sided fault injection techniques to impose attack strategies directly on physical memory rows. Our novel approach, diverging from traditional victim-focused methods, involves strategically allocating virtual memory rows to their physical counterparts for more potent attacks. These attacks, exploiting the inherent weaknesses in DRAM design, are capable of inducing bit flips in a controlled manner to undermine system integrity. We employed a strategy that compromised system integrity through a nuanced approach of targeting rows situated at a distance of two rows away from the victim row rather than adjacent rows. This method involved inducing bit flips in these non-adjacent rows, thereby demonstrating the vulnerability of DRAM to indirect, sophisticated attack patterns. Through extensive testing on commercial DDR4 DRAM products using DRAM BENDER, a multifaceted DRAM testing platform developed by CMU Safari, we demonstrate that these imposed attack strategies can compromise chips from major manufacturers and significantly degrade the performance of a modern Deep Neural Network (DNN) system, even under supposed complete protection. Our findings reveal new dimensions of RowHammer vulnerabilities in current DRAM modules and set the stage for developing more robust defenses against these sophisticated attack techniques, enhancing our understanding of DRAM vulnerabilities and aiding in developing more robust defense strategies in the future.</p>"],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/theses/2588"],"dc:subject":["Computer architecture","Machine learning","RowHammer","DRAM","Security","Cyber","Computer Engineering","Computer Sciences","Electrical and Electronics"],"dc:title":["The next strike: Pioneering forward-thinking attack techniques with rowhammer in dram technologies"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Electrical and Computer Engineering"],"thesis:degree_name":["Master of Science in Electrical Engineering - (M.S.)"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:42:38Z"}