{"id":{"repo_id":"usf","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-10363"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/usf/oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-10363","repository":{"repo_id":"usf","name":"University of South Florida","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Secure VLSI Hardware Design Against Intellectual Property (IP) Theft and Cryptographic Vulnerabilities","abstract":"Over the last two decades or so, VLSI hardware is increasingly subject to sophisticated attacks on both the supply chain and design fronts. There is no explicit trust that the manufacturers/providers are not producing counterfeit designs or that cryptographic algorithms we know to be secure in software are also secure in hardware. The novelty and key contributions of this work are as follows: 1) a continually refined method for Intellectual Property (IP) Protection that provides an approach for verification of IP ownership, 2) demonstrate how to break the PRESENT-80 cryptographic algorithm with significantly limited resources, and 3) provide a multitude of hardware based countermeasures to counter such attacks. First, in order to thwart intellectual property theft, the proposed state encoding based watermarking method and the mapping algorithm outperforms the prior techniques. We propose a hybrid genetic algorithm, dubbed the Darwinian Genetic Algorithm, for efficiently solving the difficult sub-graph matching problem. As a result, we outperformed prior work maximally 20-30\\% and on average 1-12\\% when considering the post-synthesis watermarked designs in terms of literals, area, and delay. Second, we demonstrate for the first time ever how the lightweight cryptographic algorithm PRESENT-80 can be broken via a Differential Plaintext Attack with significantly limited resources. Lastly, to prevent such attacks, we present a series of countermeasures to not only PRESENT-80, but for all substitution-permutation network ciphers, by inducing non-static behavior. We present novel interconnection network primitives, dynamic routing networks, and ultimately modify round invariant items to round based variants that necessitate decision making for an attacker.","abstract_html":"Over the last two decades or so, VLSI hardware is increasingly subject to sophisticated attacks on both the supply chain and design fronts. There is no explicit trust that the manufacturers/providers are not producing counterfeit designs or that cryptographic algorithms we know to be secure in software are also secure in hardware. The novelty and key contributions of this work are as follows: 1) a continually refined method for Intellectual Property (IP) Protection that provides an approach for verification of IP ownership, 2) demonstrate how to break the PRESENT-80 cryptographic algorithm with significantly limited resources, and 3) provide a multitude of hardware based countermeasures to counter such attacks. First, in order to thwart intellectual property theft, the proposed state encoding based watermarking method and the mapping algorithm outperforms the prior techniques. We propose a hybrid genetic algorithm, dubbed the Darwinian Genetic Algorithm, for efficiently solving the difficult sub-graph matching problem. As a result, we outperformed prior work maximally 20-30\\% and on average 1-12\\% when considering the post-synthesis watermarked designs in terms of literals, area, and delay. Second, we demonstrate for the first time ever how the lightweight cryptographic algorithm PRESENT-80 can be broken via a Differential Plaintext Attack with significantly limited resources. Lastly, to prevent such attacks, we present a series of countermeasures to not only PRESENT-80, but for all substitution-permutation network ciphers, by inducing non-static behavior. We present novel interconnection network primitives, dynamic routing networks, and ultimately modify round invariant items to round based variants that necessitate decision making for an attacker.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Lewandowski, Matthew Dean"],"institution":"University of South Florida","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Computer Science and Engineering","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Srinivas Katkoori, Ph.D.","Swaroop Ghosh, Ph.D.","Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.","Andrew Hoff, Ph.D.","Brendan Nagle, Ph.D."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-07-02T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2021-07-02T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:47:28Z","subjects":["Cryptography","Hardware Oriented Security and Trust","Intellectual Property Protection","Computer Engineering"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/9166","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/9166","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.usf.edu%3Aetd-10363","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Srinivas Katkoori, Ph.D.","Swaroop Ghosh, Ph.D.","Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.","Andrew Hoff, Ph.D.","Brendan Nagle, Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Lewandowski, Matthew Dean"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2021-07-02T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Computer Science and Engineering"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation","Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of South Florida"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Cryptography","Hardware Oriented Security and Trust","Intellectual Property Protection","Computer Engineering"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/9166"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Over the last two decades or so, VLSI hardware is increasingly subject to sophisticated attacks on both the supply chain and design fronts. There is no explicit trust that the manufacturers/providers are not producing counterfeit designs or that cryptographic algorithms we know to be secure in software are also secure in hardware. The novelty and key contributions of this work are as follows: 1) a continually refined method for Intellectual Property (IP) Protection that provides an approach for verification of IP ownership, 2) demonstrate how to break the PRESENT-80 cryptographic algorithm with significantly limited resources, and 3) provide a multitude of hardware based countermeasures to counter such attacks. First, in order to thwart intellectual property theft, the proposed state encoding based watermarking method and the mapping algorithm outperforms the prior techniques. We propose a hybrid genetic algorithm, dubbed the Darwinian Genetic Algorithm, for efficiently solving the difficult sub-graph matching problem. As a result, we outperformed prior work maximally 20-30\\% and on average 1-12\\% when considering the post-synthesis watermarked designs in terms of literals, area, and delay. Second, we demonstrate for the first time ever how the lightweight cryptographic algorithm PRESENT-80 can be broken via a Differential Plaintext Attack with significantly limited resources. Lastly, to prevent such attacks, we present a series of countermeasures to not only PRESENT-80, but for all substitution-permutation network ciphers, by inducing non-static behavior. We present novel interconnection network primitives, dynamic routing networks, and ultimately modify round invariant items to round based variants that necessitate decision making for an attacker."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Secure VLSI Hardware Design Against Intellectual Property (IP) Theft and Cryptographic Vulnerabilities"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Srinivas Katkoori, Ph.D.","Swaroop Ghosh, Ph.D.","Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.","Andrew Hoff, Ph.D.","Brendan Nagle, Ph.D."],"dc:creator":["Lewandowski, Matthew Dean"],"dc:date":["2021-07-02T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["Over the last two decades or so, VLSI hardware is increasingly subject to sophisticated attacks on both the supply chain and design fronts. There is no explicit trust that the manufacturers/providers are not producing counterfeit designs or that cryptographic algorithms we know to be secure in software are also secure in hardware. The novelty and key contributions of this work are as follows: 1) a continually refined method for Intellectual Property (IP) Protection that provides an approach for verification of IP ownership, 2) demonstrate how to break the PRESENT-80 cryptographic algorithm with significantly limited resources, and 3) provide a multitude of hardware based countermeasures to counter such attacks. First, in order to thwart intellectual property theft, the proposed state encoding based watermarking method and the mapping algorithm outperforms the prior techniques. We propose a hybrid genetic algorithm, dubbed the Darwinian Genetic Algorithm, for efficiently solving the difficult sub-graph matching problem. As a result, we outperformed prior work maximally 20-30\\% and on average 1-12\\% when considering the post-synthesis watermarked designs in terms of literals, area, and delay. Second, we demonstrate for the first time ever how the lightweight cryptographic algorithm PRESENT-80 can be broken via a Differential Plaintext Attack with significantly limited resources. Lastly, to prevent such attacks, we present a series of countermeasures to not only PRESENT-80, but for all substitution-permutation network ciphers, by inducing non-static behavior. We present novel interconnection network primitives, dynamic routing networks, and ultimately modify round invariant items to round based variants that necessitate decision making for an attacker."],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/9166"],"dc:subject":["Cryptography","Hardware Oriented Security and Trust","Intellectual Property Protection","Computer Engineering"],"dc:title":["Secure VLSI Hardware Design Against Intellectual Property (IP) Theft and Cryptographic Vulnerabilities"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Computer Science and Engineering"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation","Ph.D."],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)"],"thesis:institution_name":["University of South Florida"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:47:28Z"}