{"id":{"repo_id":"usf","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-11025"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/usf/oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-11025","repository":{"repo_id":"usf","name":"University of South Florida","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Preventing Variadic Function Attacks Through Argument Width Counting","abstract":"Format String attacks, first noted in June 2000 [1], are a type of attack in which anadversary has control of the string argument (the format string) passed to a string format function (such as printf). Such control allows the attacker to read and write arbitrary program memory. To prevent these attacks, various methodologies have been proposed, each with their own costs and benefits. I present a novel solution to this problem through argument width counting, ensuring that such format functions cannot access stack memory beyond the space where arguments were placed. Additionally, I show how this approach can be expanded to all variadic functions, and demonstrate an implementation of this approach within a C compiler.","abstract_html":"Format String attacks, first noted in June 2000 [1], are a type of attack in which anadversary has control of the string argument (the format string) passed to a string format function (such as printf). Such control allows the attacker to read and write arbitrary program memory. To prevent these attacks, various methodologies have been proposed, each with their own costs and benefits. I present a novel solution to this problem through argument width counting, ensuring that such format functions cannot access stack memory beyond the space where arguments were placed. 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Such control allows the attacker to read and write arbitrary program memory. To prevent these attacks, various methodologies have been proposed, each with their own costs and benefits. I present a novel solution to this problem through argument width counting, ensuring that such format functions cannot access stack memory beyond the space where arguments were placed. Additionally, I show how this approach can be expanded to all variadic functions, and demonstrate an implementation of this approach within a C compiler."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Preventing Variadic Function Attacks Through Argument Width Counting"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.","Mehran Mozaffari Kermani, Ph.D.","Yao Liu, Ph.D."],"dc:creator":["Ward, Brennan"],"dc:date":["2022-10-31T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["Format String attacks, first noted in June 2000 [1], are a type of attack in which anadversary has control of the string argument (the format string) passed to a string format function (such as printf). Such control allows the attacker to read and write arbitrary program memory. To prevent these attacks, various methodologies have been proposed, each with their own costs and benefits. I present a novel solution to this problem through argument width counting, ensuring that such format functions cannot access stack memory beyond the space where arguments were placed. Additionally, I show how this approach can be expanded to all variadic functions, and demonstrate an implementation of this approach within a C compiler."],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/9828"],"dc:subject":["Buffer Overflows","Computer Security","Format String Attacks","Computer Engineering","Computer Sciences"],"dc:title":["Preventing Variadic Function Attacks Through Argument Width Counting"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Computer Science and Engineering"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis","M.S.Cp."],"thesis:degree_name":["MS in Computer Engineering (M.S.C.P.)"],"thesis:institution_name":["University of South Florida"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:48:12Z"}