{"id":{"repo_id":"usf","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-11719"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/usf/oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-11719","repository":{"repo_id":"usf","name":"University of South Florida","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Violence, Rents, and Elites: Institutional Determinants of Political Order in Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Sudan","abstract":"This dissertation aims to investigate why some African states make progress in political development while others remain stagnant or regress. The study adopts a political economy approach within the new institutionalism tradition, focusing on the agency of domestic elites and the impact of violence constraints on institutional outcomes. Specifically, the study employs the violence trap framework, which identifies developing countries as fragile states, basic natural states, and mature natural states. The research applies this framework to case studies of Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Sudan using an analytic narratives methodology that combines elite interviews with primary and secondary source analysis. The findings suggest cyclical periods of success and reversal in Ethiopia’s modern state-building, transitions towards a mature natural state in Rwanda in the decades since the genocide, and a fragile state underpinned by continued private provision of violence and lack of elite bargains in South Sudan, illustrating the different outcomes that can result from elite preferences and violence constraints. Overall, the framework of the study combines rational choice and historical institutionalism and provides both rationalist and culturalist accounts of elite choice, making it a valuable contribution to the field. The main policy implication is that for lower access orders, development efforts should focus on codifying and broadening elite bargains and increasing commitments to constitutionalism, rather than top-down, standardized efforts at democratization.","abstract_html":"This dissertation aims to investigate why some African states make progress in political development while others remain stagnant or regress. The study adopts a political economy approach within the new institutionalism tradition, focusing on the agency of domestic elites and the impact of violence constraints on institutional outcomes. Specifically, the study employs the violence trap framework, which identifies developing countries as fragile states, basic natural states, and mature natural states. The research applies this framework to case studies of Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Sudan using an analytic narratives methodology that combines elite interviews with primary and secondary source analysis. The findings suggest cyclical periods of success and reversal in Ethiopia’s modern state-building, transitions towards a mature natural state in Rwanda in the decades since the genocide, and a fragile state underpinned by continued private provision of violence and lack of elite bargains in South Sudan, illustrating the different outcomes that can result from elite preferences and violence constraints. Overall, the framework of the study combines rational choice and historical institutionalism and provides both rationalist and culturalist accounts of elite choice, making it a valuable contribution to the field. The main policy implication is that for lower access orders, development efforts should focus on codifying and broadening elite bargains and increasing commitments to constitutionalism, rather than top-down, standardized efforts at democratization.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Demerew, Kaleb"],"institution":"University of South Florida","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Government and International Affairs","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Steven C. Roach, Ph.D.","Jongseok Woo, Ph.D.","Earl Conteh-Morgan, Ph.D.","John Ishiyama, Ph.D."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2023,"date_issued":"2023-03-16T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2023-03-16T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:50:05Z","subjects":["Africa","Institutions","New Institutionalism","Political Development","State-building","International Relations","Political Science"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10432","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10432","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.usf.edu%3Aetd-11719","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Steven C. 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The study adopts a political economy approach within the new institutionalism tradition, focusing on the agency of domestic elites and the impact of violence constraints on institutional outcomes. Specifically, the study employs the violence trap framework, which identifies developing countries as fragile states, basic natural states, and mature natural states. The research applies this framework to case studies of Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Sudan using an analytic narratives methodology that combines elite interviews with primary and secondary source analysis. The findings suggest cyclical periods of success and reversal in Ethiopia’s modern state-building, transitions towards a mature natural state in Rwanda in the decades since the genocide, and a fragile state underpinned by continued private provision of violence and lack of elite bargains in South Sudan, illustrating the different outcomes that can result from elite preferences and violence constraints. Overall, the framework of the study combines rational choice and historical institutionalism and provides both rationalist and culturalist accounts of elite choice, making it a valuable contribution to the field. The main policy implication is that for lower access orders, development efforts should focus on codifying and broadening elite bargains and increasing commitments to constitutionalism, rather than top-down, standardized efforts at democratization."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Violence, Rents, and Elites: Institutional Determinants of Political Order in Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Sudan"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Steven C. Roach, Ph.D.","Jongseok Woo, Ph.D.","Earl Conteh-Morgan, Ph.D.","John Ishiyama, Ph.D."],"dc:creator":["Demerew, Kaleb"],"dc:date":["2023-03-16T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["This dissertation aims to investigate why some African states make progress in political development while others remain stagnant or regress. The study adopts a political economy approach within the new institutionalism tradition, focusing on the agency of domestic elites and the impact of violence constraints on institutional outcomes. Specifically, the study employs the violence trap framework, which identifies developing countries as fragile states, basic natural states, and mature natural states. The research applies this framework to case studies of Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Sudan using an analytic narratives methodology that combines elite interviews with primary and secondary source analysis. The findings suggest cyclical periods of success and reversal in Ethiopia’s modern state-building, transitions towards a mature natural state in Rwanda in the decades since the genocide, and a fragile state underpinned by continued private provision of violence and lack of elite bargains in South Sudan, illustrating the different outcomes that can result from elite preferences and violence constraints. Overall, the framework of the study combines rational choice and historical institutionalism and provides both rationalist and culturalist accounts of elite choice, making it a valuable contribution to the field. The main policy implication is that for lower access orders, development efforts should focus on codifying and broadening elite bargains and increasing commitments to constitutionalism, rather than top-down, standardized efforts at democratization."],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10432"],"dc:subject":["Africa","Institutions","New Institutionalism","Political Development","State-building","International Relations","Political Science"],"dc:title":["Violence, Rents, and Elites: Institutional Determinants of Political Order in Ethiopia, Rwanda, and South Sudan"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Government and International Affairs"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation","Ph.D."],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)"],"thesis:institution_name":["University of South Florida"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:50:05Z"}