{"id":{"repo_id":"usf","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-11782"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/usf/oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-11782","repository":{"repo_id":"usf","name":"University of South Florida","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Specification, Enforcement, and Measurement of Integrity Policies","abstract":"The first step to improving an organization's security posture is to define the organization's security goals. At a technical level, these goals are expressed as security policies. Security policies are predicates over programs, that return true or false if the program adheres to the policy. Defining these policies correctly is thus essential to ensuring the overarching security goals are met, but it is often quite difficult to translate human-oriented goals into their technical policy counterparts. In addition, these policies must be specified so that they are enforceable while minimizing false positives and false negatives. Integrity policies, which specify how data should or should not be modified, are a common class of security policies. This dissertation explores how integrity policies can be specified, enforced, and measured across a variety of applications. This includes the development of a specialized graphical application for defining provenance policies, implementing a runtime monitor to enforce a memory access control policy, and crawling millions of GitHub projects to determine the potential impact of a proposed policy change for prepared-statement libraries.","abstract_html":"The first step to improving an organization&#x27;s security posture is to define the organization&#x27;s security goals. At a technical level, these goals are expressed as security policies. Security policies are predicates over programs, that return true or false if the program adheres to the policy. Defining these policies correctly is thus essential to ensuring the overarching security goals are met, but it is often quite difficult to translate human-oriented goals into their technical policy counterparts. In addition, these policies must be specified so that they are enforceable while minimizing false positives and false negatives. Integrity policies, which specify how data should or should not be modified, are a common class of security policies. This dissertation explores how integrity policies can be specified, enforced, and measured across a variety of applications. This includes the development of a specialized graphical application for defining provenance policies, implementing a runtime monitor to enforce a memory access control policy, and crawling millions of GitHub projects to determine the potential impact of a proposed policy change for prepared-statement libraries.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Dennis, Kevin"],"institution":"University of South Florida","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Computer Science and Engineering","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.","Xinming Ou, Ph.D.","Sriram Chellappan, Ph.D.","Achilleas Kourtellis, Ph.D.","Nathan Fisk, Ph.D."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-06-18T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-06-18T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:49:56Z","subjects":["Policy Enforcement","Policy Specification","Provenance","SQL Injection Attacks","Usability","Variadic Argument Attacks","Computer Engineering","Computer Sciences"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10495","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10495","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.usf.edu%3Aetd-11782","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.","Xinming Ou, Ph.D.","Sriram Chellappan, Ph.D.","Achilleas Kourtellis, Ph.D.","Nathan Fisk, Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Dennis, Kevin"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2024-06-18T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Computer Science and Engineering"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation","Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of South Florida"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Policy Enforcement","Policy Specification","Provenance","SQL Injection Attacks","Usability","Variadic Argument Attacks","Computer Engineering","Computer Sciences"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10495"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The first step to improving an organization's security posture is to define the organization's security goals. At a technical level, these goals are expressed as security policies. Security policies are predicates over programs, that return true or false if the program adheres to the policy. Defining these policies correctly is thus essential to ensuring the overarching security goals are met, but it is often quite difficult to translate human-oriented goals into their technical policy counterparts. In addition, these policies must be specified so that they are enforceable while minimizing false positives and false negatives. Integrity policies, which specify how data should or should not be modified, are a common class of security policies. This dissertation explores how integrity policies can be specified, enforced, and measured across a variety of applications. This includes the development of a specialized graphical application for defining provenance policies, implementing a runtime monitor to enforce a memory access control policy, and crawling millions of GitHub projects to determine the potential impact of a proposed policy change for prepared-statement libraries."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Specification, Enforcement, and Measurement of Integrity Policies"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.","Xinming Ou, Ph.D.","Sriram Chellappan, Ph.D.","Achilleas Kourtellis, Ph.D.","Nathan Fisk, Ph.D."],"dc:creator":["Dennis, Kevin"],"dc:date":["2024-06-18T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["The first step to improving an organization's security posture is to define the organization's security goals. At a technical level, these goals are expressed as security policies. Security policies are predicates over programs, that return true or false if the program adheres to the policy. Defining these policies correctly is thus essential to ensuring the overarching security goals are met, but it is often quite difficult to translate human-oriented goals into their technical policy counterparts. In addition, these policies must be specified so that they are enforceable while minimizing false positives and false negatives. Integrity policies, which specify how data should or should not be modified, are a common class of security policies. This dissertation explores how integrity policies can be specified, enforced, and measured across a variety of applications. 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