{"id":{"repo_id":"usf","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-12125"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/usf/oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-12125","repository":{"repo_id":"usf","name":"University of South Florida","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Employer Moral Hazard in Performance Evaluations: The Effects of Performance Measure Subjectivity and Justification on Employer Opportunism","abstract":"Although organizations may use multiple types of performance measures when evaluating employee performance, such as objective and subjective measures, performance measure subjectivity can introduce unverifiable information on the employee side, giving rise to employer opportunistic behavior. Employers may use the unverifiable information within subjective performance measures to increase their own personal compensation by undercompensating evaluated employees, creating a control problem known as employer moral hazard. With a 2x2 multi-period experiment, this study investigates the effect employer moral hazard has on the allocation of employee bonus compensation when there are differing levels of objective and subjective performance measures and a requirement or no requirement to justify performance evaluation decisions to employees. Results of repeated measures ANOVA tests for the main hypothesis reveal that neither the performance measure type nor justification requirement manipulations have a significant effect on employee bonus compensation. Additional univariate, repeated measures, and mediation analyses reveal that when employer budget-based compensation incentives are present employees evaluated using mostly subjective performance measures receive less bonus compensation compared to employees evaluated using mostly objective performance measures due to perceptions of accountability to the evaluated employee being lower. Additional analyses also reveal employee undercompensation is reversed after the introduction of a justification requirement, as employers feel more accountable to evaluated employees and exert more effort in the justification to make performance evaluation decisions that are justifiable to the evaluated employees. These findings are consistent with the manifestation of employer moral hazard and the subsequent mitigation of employer moral hazard. Contributions and limitations are discussed.","abstract_html":"Although organizations may use multiple types of performance measures when evaluating employee performance, such as objective and subjective measures, performance measure subjectivity can introduce unverifiable information on the employee side, giving rise to employer opportunistic behavior. Employers may use the unverifiable information within subjective performance measures to increase their own personal compensation by undercompensating evaluated employees, creating a control problem known as employer moral hazard. With a 2x2 multi-period experiment, this study investigates the effect employer moral hazard has on the allocation of employee bonus compensation when there are differing levels of objective and subjective performance measures and a requirement or no requirement to justify performance evaluation decisions to employees. Results of repeated measures ANOVA tests for the main hypothesis reveal that neither the performance measure type nor justification requirement manipulations have a significant effect on employee bonus compensation. Additional univariate, repeated measures, and mediation analyses reveal that when employer budget-based compensation incentives are present employees evaluated using mostly subjective performance measures receive less bonus compensation compared to employees evaluated using mostly objective performance measures due to perceptions of accountability to the evaluated employee being lower. Additional analyses also reveal employee undercompensation is reversed after the introduction of a justification requirement, as employers feel more accountable to evaluated employees and exert more effort in the justification to make performance evaluation decisions that are justifiable to the evaluated employees. These findings are consistent with the manifestation of employer moral hazard and the subsequent mitigation of employer moral hazard. Contributions and limitations are discussed.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Miller, Chandler A."],"institution":"University of South Florida","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Business Administration","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Uday Murthy, Ph.D.","Kristina Demek, Ph.D.","Carlos J. Angueira, Ph.D.","Joseph Vandello, Ph.D."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024-03-22T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2024-03-22T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:49:40Z","subjects":["Subjective Performance Measures","Objective Performance Measures","Employer Moral Hazard","Accountability","Performance Evaluations","Budget-Based Incentives","Accounting"],"languages":["EN-US"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10822","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10822","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.usf.edu%3Aetd-12125","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Uday Murthy, Ph.D.","Kristina Demek, Ph.D.","Carlos J. 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Employers may use the unverifiable information within subjective performance measures to increase their own personal compensation by undercompensating evaluated employees, creating a control problem known as employer moral hazard. With a 2x2 multi-period experiment, this study investigates the effect employer moral hazard has on the allocation of employee bonus compensation when there are differing levels of objective and subjective performance measures and a requirement or no requirement to justify performance evaluation decisions to employees. Results of repeated measures ANOVA tests for the main hypothesis reveal that neither the performance measure type nor justification requirement manipulations have a significant effect on employee bonus compensation. Additional univariate, repeated measures, and mediation analyses reveal that when employer budget-based compensation incentives are present employees evaluated using mostly subjective performance measures receive less bonus compensation compared to employees evaluated using mostly objective performance measures due to perceptions of accountability to the evaluated employee being lower. Additional analyses also reveal employee undercompensation is reversed after the introduction of a justification requirement, as employers feel more accountable to evaluated employees and exert more effort in the justification to make performance evaluation decisions that are justifiable to the evaluated employees. These findings are consistent with the manifestation of employer moral hazard and the subsequent mitigation of employer moral hazard. Contributions and limitations are discussed."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Employer Moral Hazard in Performance Evaluations: The Effects of Performance Measure Subjectivity and Justification on Employer Opportunism"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Uday Murthy, Ph.D.","Kristina Demek, Ph.D.","Carlos J. Angueira, Ph.D.","Joseph Vandello, Ph.D."],"dc:creator":["Miller, Chandler A."],"dc:date":["2024-03-22T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["Although organizations may use multiple types of performance measures when evaluating employee performance, such as objective and subjective measures, performance measure subjectivity can introduce unverifiable information on the employee side, giving rise to employer opportunistic behavior. Employers may use the unverifiable information within subjective performance measures to increase their own personal compensation by undercompensating evaluated employees, creating a control problem known as employer moral hazard. With a 2x2 multi-period experiment, this study investigates the effect employer moral hazard has on the allocation of employee bonus compensation when there are differing levels of objective and subjective performance measures and a requirement or no requirement to justify performance evaluation decisions to employees. Results of repeated measures ANOVA tests for the main hypothesis reveal that neither the performance measure type nor justification requirement manipulations have a significant effect on employee bonus compensation. Additional univariate, repeated measures, and mediation analyses reveal that when employer budget-based compensation incentives are present employees evaluated using mostly subjective performance measures receive less bonus compensation compared to employees evaluated using mostly objective performance measures due to perceptions of accountability to the evaluated employee being lower. Additional analyses also reveal employee undercompensation is reversed after the introduction of a justification requirement, as employers feel more accountable to evaluated employees and exert more effort in the justification to make performance evaluation decisions that are justifiable to the evaluated employees. These findings are consistent with the manifestation of employer moral hazard and the subsequent mitigation of employer moral hazard. Contributions and limitations are discussed."],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10822"],"dc:language":["EN-US"],"dc:rights.license":["default"],"dc:subject":["Subjective Performance Measures","Objective Performance Measures","Employer Moral Hazard","Accountability","Performance Evaluations","Budget-Based Incentives","Accounting"],"dc:title":["Employer Moral Hazard in Performance Evaluations: The Effects of Performance Measure Subjectivity and Justification on Employer Opportunism"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Business Administration"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation","Ph.D."],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)"],"thesis:institution_name":["University of South Florida"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:49:40Z"}