{"id":{"repo_id":"usf","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-12165"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/usf/oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-12165","repository":{"repo_id":"usf","name":"University of South Florida","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Democracy, Expertise, and the Disinformation Problem","abstract":"Experts are an essential part of our social epistemology. They grant us access to knowledge that would otherwise be inaccessible. Because of this, experts are also typically seen as invaluable political contributors. Without expert contributions, public policy risks being ill-informed and therefore incapable of addressing society’s needs. Recently, however, the extent to which expertise should inform public policy has come into question. Fueled largely by disinformation, there is a growing movement against traditional experts. Those within this movement argue that experts have overstepped their bounds and are working against the societies they are meant to be helping. Fearing that that the democratic system of political legitimization might empower this movement to install their own disinformed “experts” into positions of political authority, some philosophers have proposed alternative to democracy which prioritize expert voices over much of the population. Such systems, they argue, ensure that political authority is dispelled competently and that disinformation does not find its way into politics. However, as this dissertation argues, such systems are ultimately unable to live up to this aspiration. Like democracy, they are vulnerable to legitimizing disinformed positions as politically authoritative. Unlike democracy, though, these alternatives lack the mechanisms to easily expel disinformation once it becomes entrenched. Their structures of authority are simply too rigid to easily change. Additionally, these alternatives require moral transgressions in order to be properly implemented. Failing to ensure a more competent political system, these transgressions lack justification. Consequently, despite its shortcomings, this leaves democracy as the preferable system of political legitimization even as disinformation’s influence continues to expand.","abstract_html":"Experts are an essential part of our social epistemology. They grant us access to knowledge that would otherwise be inaccessible. Because of this, experts are also typically seen as invaluable political contributors. Without expert contributions, public policy risks being ill-informed and therefore incapable of addressing society’s needs. Recently, however, the extent to which expertise should inform public policy has come into question. Fueled largely by disinformation, there is a growing movement against traditional experts. Those within this movement argue that experts have overstepped their bounds and are working against the societies they are meant to be helping. Fearing that that the democratic system of political legitimization might empower this movement to install their own disinformed “experts” into positions of political authority, some philosophers have proposed alternative to democracy which prioritize expert voices over much of the population. Such systems, they argue, ensure that political authority is dispelled competently and that disinformation does not find its way into politics. However, as this dissertation argues, such systems are ultimately unable to live up to this aspiration. Like democracy, they are vulnerable to legitimizing disinformed positions as politically authoritative. Unlike democracy, though, these alternatives lack the mechanisms to easily expel disinformation once it becomes entrenched. Their structures of authority are simply too rigid to easily change. Additionally, these alternatives require moral transgressions in order to be properly implemented. Failing to ensure a more competent political system, these transgressions lack justification. Consequently, despite its shortcomings, this leaves democracy as the preferable system of political legitimization even as disinformation’s influence continues to expand.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Frohock, Richard Randall, IV"],"institution":"University of South Florida","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Stephen P. Turner, Ph.D.","Alex Levine, Ph.D.","Eric Winsberg, Ph.D.","Colin Heydt, Ph.D.","John Symons, Ph.D."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025-06-25T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2025-06-25T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:49:48Z","subjects":["AI","Epistemic Authority","Epistocracy","Justice","Political Authority","Epistemology","Ethics and Political Philosophy","Philosophy of Science"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10862","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10862","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.usf.edu%3Aetd-12165","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Stephen P. 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They grant us access to knowledge that would otherwise be inaccessible. Because of this, experts are also typically seen as invaluable political contributors. Without expert contributions, public policy risks being ill-informed and therefore incapable of addressing society’s needs. Recently, however, the extent to which expertise should inform public policy has come into question. Fueled largely by disinformation, there is a growing movement against traditional experts. Those within this movement argue that experts have overstepped their bounds and are working against the societies they are meant to be helping. Fearing that that the democratic system of political legitimization might empower this movement to install their own disinformed “experts” into positions of political authority, some philosophers have proposed alternative to democracy which prioritize expert voices over much of the population. Such systems, they argue, ensure that political authority is dispelled competently and that disinformation does not find its way into politics. However, as this dissertation argues, such systems are ultimately unable to live up to this aspiration. Like democracy, they are vulnerable to legitimizing disinformed positions as politically authoritative. Unlike democracy, though, these alternatives lack the mechanisms to easily expel disinformation once it becomes entrenched. Their structures of authority are simply too rigid to easily change. Additionally, these alternatives require moral transgressions in order to be properly implemented. Failing to ensure a more competent political system, these transgressions lack justification. Consequently, despite its shortcomings, this leaves democracy as the preferable system of political legitimization even as disinformation’s influence continues to expand."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Democracy, Expertise, and the Disinformation Problem"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Stephen P. Turner, Ph.D.","Alex Levine, Ph.D.","Eric Winsberg, Ph.D.","Colin Heydt, Ph.D.","John Symons, Ph.D."],"dc:creator":["Frohock, Richard Randall, IV"],"dc:date":["2025-06-25T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["Experts are an essential part of our social epistemology. They grant us access to knowledge that would otherwise be inaccessible. Because of this, experts are also typically seen as invaluable political contributors. Without expert contributions, public policy risks being ill-informed and therefore incapable of addressing society’s needs. Recently, however, the extent to which expertise should inform public policy has come into question. Fueled largely by disinformation, there is a growing movement against traditional experts. Those within this movement argue that experts have overstepped their bounds and are working against the societies they are meant to be helping. Fearing that that the democratic system of political legitimization might empower this movement to install their own disinformed “experts” into positions of political authority, some philosophers have proposed alternative to democracy which prioritize expert voices over much of the population. Such systems, they argue, ensure that political authority is dispelled competently and that disinformation does not find its way into politics. However, as this dissertation argues, such systems are ultimately unable to live up to this aspiration. Like democracy, they are vulnerable to legitimizing disinformed positions as politically authoritative. Unlike democracy, though, these alternatives lack the mechanisms to easily expel disinformation once it becomes entrenched. Their structures of authority are simply too rigid to easily change. Additionally, these alternatives require moral transgressions in order to be properly implemented. Failing to ensure a more competent political system, these transgressions lack justification. Consequently, despite its shortcomings, this leaves democracy as the preferable system of political legitimization even as disinformation’s influence continues to expand."],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/10862"],"dc:subject":["AI","Epistemic Authority","Epistocracy","Justice","Political Authority","Epistemology","Ethics and Political Philosophy","Philosophy of Science"],"dc:title":["Democracy, Expertise, and the Disinformation Problem"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation","Ph.D."],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)"],"thesis:institution_name":["University of South Florida"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:49:48Z"}