{"id":{"repo_id":"usf","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-12622"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/usf/oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-12622","repository":{"repo_id":"usf","name":"University of South Florida","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Making Sense of the Body: Cognitive Science, Disability, and Embodiment","abstract":"The purpose of this project is to analyze different methodological approaches in the philosophy of cognitive science, with the goal of determining their usefulness for explaining and understanding bodily awareness and skill-acquisition over time. The examples of skill-acquisition are limited to motor control, impaired by various kinds of disability—but then acquired over time, via technological or rehabilitative means. These phenomena of motor learning are then viewed through the lens of two competing theoretical approaches in cognitive science: neuromechanical cognitive science, and radical enactivist cognitive science. The strengths of the neuromechanical framework are found in its historical pedigree, and in the empirical evidence that justifies mechanical explanations in general. Its weaknesses are found in its difficulty to explain the connection between mechanistic processes in the brain, and intentional mental content. Secondly, the neuromechanical view will appeal to the notion of a “body schema” to account for bodily awareness and learning, but I argue that the body schema’s instantiation in the brain cannot be easily located. Radical enactivism’s strengths are in its emphasis on a developmentally-sound framework for explaining cognition: beginning with so-called basic cognition—without mental content—and developing into socially scaffolded cognition. Secondly, its explanation of cognition as the result of interactions between one’s brain, body and environment— takes seriously the dynamism of human cognition. Radical enactivism’s weakness is found in its apparent inability to explain the coherent structure of embodied activity over time. Ultimately, the strengths of these theories ought to be preserved, but within a new framework that prioritizes the social core of cognition.","abstract_html":"The purpose of this project is to analyze different methodological approaches in the philosophy of cognitive science, with the goal of determining their usefulness for explaining and understanding bodily awareness and skill-acquisition over time. The examples of skill-acquisition are limited to motor control, impaired by various kinds of disability—but then acquired over time, via technological or rehabilitative means. These phenomena of motor learning are then viewed through the lens of two competing theoretical approaches in cognitive science: neuromechanical cognitive science, and radical enactivist cognitive science. The strengths of the neuromechanical framework are found in its historical pedigree, and in the empirical evidence that justifies mechanical explanations in general. Its weaknesses are found in its difficulty to explain the connection between mechanistic processes in the brain, and intentional mental content. Secondly, the neuromechanical view will appeal to the notion of a “body schema” to account for bodily awareness and learning, but I argue that the body schema’s instantiation in the brain cannot be easily located. Radical enactivism’s strengths are in its emphasis on a developmentally-sound framework for explaining cognition: beginning with so-called basic cognition—without mental content—and developing into socially scaffolded cognition. Secondly, its explanation of cognition as the result of interactions between one’s brain, body and environment— takes seriously the dynamism of human cognition. Radical enactivism’s weakness is found in its apparent inability to explain the coherent structure of embodied activity over time. Ultimately, the strengths of these theories ought to be preserved, but within a new framework that prioritizes the social core of cognition.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Joslin, Cheyne L."],"institution":"University of South Florida","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Stephen Turner, Ph.D.","Alex Levine, Ph.D.","Lee Braver, Ph.D.","Joshua Rayman, Ph.D.","Wei Zhang, Ph.D.","Sara Green, Ph.D."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2026,"date_issued":"2026-03-23T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2026-03-23T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:51:54Z","subjects":["computationalism","disability","philosophy of cognitive science","radical enactivism","Other Education","Philosophy","Philosophy of Science"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/11319","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/11319","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.usf.edu%3Aetd-12622","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Stephen Turner, Ph.D.","Alex Levine, Ph.D.","Lee Braver, Ph.D.","Joshua Rayman, Ph.D.","Wei Zhang, Ph.D.","Sara Green, Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Joslin, Cheyne L."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2026-03-23T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation","Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of South Florida"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["computationalism","disability","philosophy of cognitive science","radical enactivism","Other Education","Philosophy","Philosophy of Science"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/11319"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The purpose of this project is to analyze different methodological approaches in the philosophy of cognitive science, with the goal of determining their usefulness for explaining and understanding bodily awareness and skill-acquisition over time. The examples of skill-acquisition are limited to motor control, impaired by various kinds of disability—but then acquired over time, via technological or rehabilitative means. These phenomena of motor learning are then viewed through the lens of two competing theoretical approaches in cognitive science: neuromechanical cognitive science, and radical enactivist cognitive science. The strengths of the neuromechanical framework are found in its historical pedigree, and in the empirical evidence that justifies mechanical explanations in general. Its weaknesses are found in its difficulty to explain the connection between mechanistic processes in the brain, and intentional mental content. Secondly, the neuromechanical view will appeal to the notion of a “body schema” to account for bodily awareness and learning, but I argue that the body schema’s instantiation in the brain cannot be easily located. Radical enactivism’s strengths are in its emphasis on a developmentally-sound framework for explaining cognition: beginning with so-called basic cognition—without mental content—and developing into socially scaffolded cognition. Secondly, its explanation of cognition as the result of interactions between one’s brain, body and environment— takes seriously the dynamism of human cognition. Radical enactivism’s weakness is found in its apparent inability to explain the coherent structure of embodied activity over time. Ultimately, the strengths of these theories ought to be preserved, but within a new framework that prioritizes the social core of cognition."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Making Sense of the Body: Cognitive Science, Disability, and Embodiment"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Stephen Turner, Ph.D.","Alex Levine, Ph.D.","Lee Braver, Ph.D.","Joshua Rayman, Ph.D.","Wei Zhang, Ph.D.","Sara Green, Ph.D."],"dc:creator":["Joslin, Cheyne L."],"dc:date":["2026-03-23T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["The purpose of this project is to analyze different methodological approaches in the philosophy of cognitive science, with the goal of determining their usefulness for explaining and understanding bodily awareness and skill-acquisition over time. The examples of skill-acquisition are limited to motor control, impaired by various kinds of disability—but then acquired over time, via technological or rehabilitative means. These phenomena of motor learning are then viewed through the lens of two competing theoretical approaches in cognitive science: neuromechanical cognitive science, and radical enactivist cognitive science. The strengths of the neuromechanical framework are found in its historical pedigree, and in the empirical evidence that justifies mechanical explanations in general. Its weaknesses are found in its difficulty to explain the connection between mechanistic processes in the brain, and intentional mental content. Secondly, the neuromechanical view will appeal to the notion of a “body schema” to account for bodily awareness and learning, but I argue that the body schema’s instantiation in the brain cannot be easily located. Radical enactivism’s strengths are in its emphasis on a developmentally-sound framework for explaining cognition: beginning with so-called basic cognition—without mental content—and developing into socially scaffolded cognition. Secondly, its explanation of cognition as the result of interactions between one’s brain, body and environment— takes seriously the dynamism of human cognition. Radical enactivism’s weakness is found in its apparent inability to explain the coherent structure of embodied activity over time. Ultimately, the strengths of these theories ought to be preserved, but within a new framework that prioritizes the social core of cognition."],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/11319"],"dc:subject":["computationalism","disability","philosophy of cognitive science","radical enactivism","Other Education","Philosophy","Philosophy of Science"],"dc:title":["Making Sense of the Body: Cognitive Science, Disability, and Embodiment"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation","Ph.D."],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)"],"thesis:institution_name":["University of South Florida"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:51:54Z"}