{"id":{"repo_id":"usf","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-6251"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/usf/oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-6251","repository":{"repo_id":"usf","name":"University of South Florida","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Essays on Mergers and Acquisitions","abstract":"This dissertation includes two essays that examine mergers and acquisitions. In the first essay we examine how pay-for-performance influences the quality of merger decisions before and after Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). Pay-for performance has a significant positive effect on acquirer returns of 0.9% pre-SOX and 1.1% post-SOX around the three day event window. Bidders with high pay-for-performance pay a 23.3% lower merger premium in listed target acquisitions. The positive effect of pay-for-performance is more important for public target acquisitions overall, for small acquirers pre-SOX, and for large acquirers post-SOX. In the long-run, bidders with high pre-merger pay-for-performance experience 27.6% higher returns after controlling for other merger characteristic. In the second essay we investigate the value of customer/supplier relationships in mergers acquisitions. The findings show that targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums compared to targets with weak customer/supplier relationships. However, targets that have a strong connection with a customer have lower odds of being acquired. Acquirers that purchase targets with strong customer/supplier relationships have negative long-run abnormal returns, suggesting that the acquirers may have overpaid for such targets. Implications of customer/supplier relationships on customers, rivals and competing rivals are presented.","abstract_html":"This dissertation includes two essays that examine mergers and acquisitions. In the first essay we examine how pay-for-performance influences the quality of merger decisions before and after Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). Pay-for performance has a significant positive effect on acquirer returns of 0.9% pre-SOX and 1.1% post-SOX around the three day event window. Bidders with high pay-for-performance pay a 23.3% lower merger premium in listed target acquisitions. The positive effect of pay-for-performance is more important for public target acquisitions overall, for small acquirers pre-SOX, and for large acquirers post-SOX. In the long-run, bidders with high pre-merger pay-for-performance experience 27.6% higher returns after controlling for other merger characteristic. In the second essay we investigate the value of customer/supplier relationships in mergers acquisitions. The findings show that targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums compared to targets with weak customer/supplier relationships. However, targets that have a strong connection with a customer have lower odds of being acquired. Acquirers that purchase targets with strong customer/supplier relationships have negative long-run abnormal returns, suggesting that the acquirers may have overpaid for such targets. Implications of customer/supplier relationships on customers, rivals and competing rivals are presented.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Krolikowski, Marcin"],"institution":"University of South Florida","degree_name":null,"degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Business Administration","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Ninon Sutton, Ph.D","Jianping Qi, Ph.D.","Daniel Bradley, Ph.D.","Christos Pantzalis, Ph.D."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014-04-08T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2014-04-08T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:42:33Z","subjects":["Contracting","Executive Compensation","Managerial Incentives","Networks","Sarbanes-Oxley Act","Accounting","Business Administration, Management, and Operations","Finance and Financial Management"],"languages":["EN-US"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/5055","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/5055","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.usf.edu%3Aetd-6251","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Ninon Sutton, Ph.D","Jianping Qi, Ph.D.","Daniel Bradley, Ph.D.","Christos Pantzalis, Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Krolikowski, Marcin"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2014-04-08T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Business Administration"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation","Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of South Florida"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Contracting","Executive Compensation","Managerial Incentives","Networks","Sarbanes-Oxley Act","Accounting","Business Administration, Management, and Operations","Finance and Financial Management"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["EN-US"]},{"key":"dc:rights.license","label":"Dc Rights License","values":["default"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/5055"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This dissertation includes two essays that examine mergers and acquisitions. In the first essay we examine how pay-for-performance influences the quality of merger decisions before and after Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). Pay-for performance has a significant positive effect on acquirer returns of 0.9% pre-SOX and 1.1% post-SOX around the three day event window. Bidders with high pay-for-performance pay a 23.3% lower merger premium in listed target acquisitions. The positive effect of pay-for-performance is more important for public target acquisitions overall, for small acquirers pre-SOX, and for large acquirers post-SOX. In the long-run, bidders with high pre-merger pay-for-performance experience 27.6% higher returns after controlling for other merger characteristic. In the second essay we investigate the value of customer/supplier relationships in mergers acquisitions. The findings show that targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums compared to targets with weak customer/supplier relationships. However, targets that have a strong connection with a customer have lower odds of being acquired. Acquirers that purchase targets with strong customer/supplier relationships have negative long-run abnormal returns, suggesting that the acquirers may have overpaid for such targets. Implications of customer/supplier relationships on customers, rivals and competing rivals are presented."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Essays on Mergers and Acquisitions"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Ninon Sutton, Ph.D","Jianping Qi, Ph.D.","Daniel Bradley, Ph.D.","Christos Pantzalis, Ph.D."],"dc:creator":["Krolikowski, Marcin"],"dc:date":["2014-04-08T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["This dissertation includes two essays that examine mergers and acquisitions. In the first essay we examine how pay-for-performance influences the quality of merger decisions before and after Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). Pay-for performance has a significant positive effect on acquirer returns of 0.9% pre-SOX and 1.1% post-SOX around the three day event window. Bidders with high pay-for-performance pay a 23.3% lower merger premium in listed target acquisitions. The positive effect of pay-for-performance is more important for public target acquisitions overall, for small acquirers pre-SOX, and for large acquirers post-SOX. In the long-run, bidders with high pre-merger pay-for-performance experience 27.6% higher returns after controlling for other merger characteristic. In the second essay we investigate the value of customer/supplier relationships in mergers acquisitions. The findings show that targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums compared to targets with weak customer/supplier relationships. However, targets that have a strong connection with a customer have lower odds of being acquired. Acquirers that purchase targets with strong customer/supplier relationships have negative long-run abnormal returns, suggesting that the acquirers may have overpaid for such targets. Implications of customer/supplier relationships on customers, rivals and competing rivals are presented."],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/5055"],"dc:language":["EN-US"],"dc:rights.license":["default"],"dc:subject":["Contracting","Executive Compensation","Managerial Incentives","Networks","Sarbanes-Oxley Act","Accounting","Business Administration, Management, and Operations","Finance and Financial Management"],"dc:title":["Essays on Mergers and Acquisitions"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Business Administration"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation","Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of South Florida"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:42:33Z"}