{"id":{"repo_id":"usf","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-6907"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/usf/oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-6907","repository":{"repo_id":"usf","name":"University of South Florida","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Security of Non-Volatile Memories - Attack Models, Analyses, and Counter-Measures","abstract":"The unprecedented demand for performance in the latest technologies will ultimately require changes in the way we design cache. Emerging high density embedded memories such as Spin-Transfer Torque Random Access Memory (STTRAM) have emerged as a possible candidate for universal memory due to its high speed, low power, non-volatility, and low cost. Although attractive, STTRAM is susceptible to contactless tampering through malicious exposure to magnetic field with the intention to steal or modify the bitcell content. In this thesis, we explore various attack techniques on STTRAM and then propose a novel array-based sensor to detect the polarity and magnitude of such attacks and then propose two design techniques to mitigate the attack. With our research, we have been able to successfully implement and accurately detect an attack while providing sufficient compensation window (few ns to ~100 us) to enable proactive protection measures. Finally, we show that variable-strength ECC can adapt correction capability to tolerate failures with various strength of an attack.","abstract_html":"The unprecedented demand for performance in the latest technologies will ultimately require changes in the way we design cache. Emerging high density embedded memories such as Spin-Transfer Torque Random Access Memory (STTRAM) have emerged as a possible candidate for universal memory due to its high speed, low power, non-volatility, and low cost. Although attractive, STTRAM is susceptible to contactless tampering through malicious exposure to magnetic field with the intention to steal or modify the bitcell content. In this thesis, we explore various attack techniques on STTRAM and then propose a novel array-based sensor to detect the polarity and magnitude of such attacks and then propose two design techniques to mitigate the attack. With our research, we have been able to successfully implement and accurately detect an attack while providing sufficient compensation window (few ns to ~100 us) to enable proactive protection measures. Finally, we show that variable-strength ECC can adapt correction capability to tolerate failures with various strength of an attack.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Jang, Jae-Won"],"institution":"University of South Florida","degree_name":"MS in Computer Engineering (M.S.C.P.)","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Computer Science and Engineering","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Swaroop Ghosh, Ph.D.","Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.","Helia Naeimi, Ph.D."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2015,"date_issued":"2015-01-01T08:00:00Z","date_published":"2015-01-01T08:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:40:50Z","subjects":["Contactless Tampering","On-Chip Tamper Mitigation","Replica","Variable ECC","Computer Engineering"],"languages":["EN-US"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/5709","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/5709","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.usf.edu%3Aetd-6907","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Swaroop Ghosh, Ph.D.","Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.","Helia Naeimi, Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Jang, Jae-Won"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2015-01-01T08:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Computer Science and Engineering"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis","M.S.Cp."]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["MS in Computer Engineering (M.S.C.P.)"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of South Florida"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Contactless Tampering","On-Chip Tamper Mitigation","Replica","Variable ECC","Computer Engineering"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["EN-US"]},{"key":"dc:rights.license","label":"Dc Rights License","values":["default"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/5709"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The unprecedented demand for performance in the latest technologies will ultimately require changes in the way we design cache. Emerging high density embedded memories such as Spin-Transfer Torque Random Access Memory (STTRAM) have emerged as a possible candidate for universal memory due to its high speed, low power, non-volatility, and low cost. Although attractive, STTRAM is susceptible to contactless tampering through malicious exposure to magnetic field with the intention to steal or modify the bitcell content. In this thesis, we explore various attack techniques on STTRAM and then propose a novel array-based sensor to detect the polarity and magnitude of such attacks and then propose two design techniques to mitigate the attack. With our research, we have been able to successfully implement and accurately detect an attack while providing sufficient compensation window (few ns to ~100 us) to enable proactive protection measures. Finally, we show that variable-strength ECC can adapt correction capability to tolerate failures with various strength of an attack."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Security of Non-Volatile Memories - Attack Models, Analyses, and Counter-Measures"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Swaroop Ghosh, Ph.D.","Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.","Helia Naeimi, Ph.D."],"dc:creator":["Jang, Jae-Won"],"dc:date":["2015-01-01T08:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["The unprecedented demand for performance in the latest technologies will ultimately require changes in the way we design cache. Emerging high density embedded memories such as Spin-Transfer Torque Random Access Memory (STTRAM) have emerged as a possible candidate for universal memory due to its high speed, low power, non-volatility, and low cost. Although attractive, STTRAM is susceptible to contactless tampering through malicious exposure to magnetic field with the intention to steal or modify the bitcell content. In this thesis, we explore various attack techniques on STTRAM and then propose a novel array-based sensor to detect the polarity and magnitude of such attacks and then propose two design techniques to mitigate the attack. With our research, we have been able to successfully implement and accurately detect an attack while providing sufficient compensation window (few ns to ~100 us) to enable proactive protection measures. 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