{"id":{"repo_id":"usf","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-8358"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/usf/oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-8358","repository":{"repo_id":"usf","name":"University of South Florida","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Improving the Security of Building Automation Systems Through an seL4-based Communication Framework","abstract":"Existing Building Automation Systems (BASs) and Building Automation Networks (BANs) have been shown to have serious cybersecurity problems. Due to the safety-critical and interconnected nature of building subsystems, local and network access control needs to be finer grained, taking into consideration the varying criticality of applications running on heterogeneous devices. In this paper, we present a secure communication framework for BASs that 1) enforces rich access control policy for operating system services and objects, leveraging a microkernel-based architecture; 2) supports fine-grained network access control on a per-process basis; 3) unifies the security control of inter-device and intra-device communication using proxy processes; 4) tunnels legacy insecure communication protocols (e.g., BACnet) through a secure channel, such as SSL, in a manner transparent to legacy applications. We implemented the framework on seL4, a formally verified microkernel. We conducted extensive experiments and analysis to compare the performance and effectiveness of our communication systems against a traditional Linux-based implementation of the same control scenario. Our experiments show that the communication performance of our system is faster or comparable to the Linux-based architecture in embedded systems.","abstract_html":"Existing Building Automation Systems (BASs) and Building Automation Networks (BANs) have been shown to have serious cybersecurity problems. Due to the safety-critical and interconnected nature of building subsystems, local and network access control needs to be finer grained, taking into consideration the varying criticality of applications running on heterogeneous devices. In this paper, we present a secure communication framework for BASs that 1) enforces rich access control policy for operating system services and objects, leveraging a microkernel-based architecture; 2) supports fine-grained network access control on a per-process basis; 3) unifies the security control of inter-device and intra-device communication using proxy processes; 4) tunnels legacy insecure communication protocols (e.g., BACnet) through a secure channel, such as SSL, in a manner transparent to legacy applications. We implemented the framework on seL4, a formally verified microkernel. We conducted extensive experiments and analysis to compare the performance and effectiveness of our communication systems against a traditional Linux-based implementation of the same control scenario. Our experiments show that the communication performance of our system is faster or comparable to the Linux-based architecture in embedded systems.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Habeeb, Richard"],"institution":"University of South Florida","degree_name":"MS in Computer Science (M.S.C.S.)","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Computer Science and Engineering","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Xinming Ou, Ph.D.","Jarred Ligatti, Ph.D.","Yao Liu, Ph.D."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-03-22T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2018-03-22T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:43:53Z","subjects":["Cyber Physical Systems","Cybersecurity of Smart Buildings","High-Assurance Systems","Microkernel","Access Control Mechanisms","Computer Sciences"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/7161","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/7161","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.usf.edu%3Aetd-8358","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Xinming Ou, Ph.D.","Jarred Ligatti, Ph.D.","Yao Liu, Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Habeeb, Richard"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2018-03-22T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Computer Science and Engineering"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis","M.S.C.S."]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["MS in Computer Science (M.S.C.S.)"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of South Florida"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Cyber Physical Systems","Cybersecurity of Smart Buildings","High-Assurance Systems","Microkernel","Access Control Mechanisms","Computer Sciences"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/7161"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Existing Building Automation Systems (BASs) and Building Automation Networks (BANs) have been shown to have serious cybersecurity problems. 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We conducted extensive experiments and analysis to compare the performance and effectiveness of our communication systems against a traditional Linux-based implementation of the same control scenario. Our experiments show that the communication performance of our system is faster or comparable to the Linux-based architecture in embedded systems."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Improving the Security of Building Automation Systems Through an seL4-based Communication Framework"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Xinming Ou, Ph.D.","Jarred Ligatti, Ph.D.","Yao Liu, Ph.D."],"dc:creator":["Habeeb, Richard"],"dc:date":["2018-03-22T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["Existing Building Automation Systems (BASs) and Building Automation Networks (BANs) have been shown to have serious cybersecurity problems. Due to the safety-critical and interconnected nature of building subsystems, local and network access control needs to be finer grained, taking into consideration the varying criticality of applications running on heterogeneous devices. In this paper, we present a secure communication framework for BASs that 1) enforces rich access control policy for operating system services and objects, leveraging a microkernel-based architecture; 2) supports fine-grained network access control on a per-process basis; 3) unifies the security control of inter-device and intra-device communication using proxy processes; 4) tunnels legacy insecure communication protocols (e.g., BACnet) through a secure channel, such as SSL, in a manner transparent to legacy applications. We implemented the framework on seL4, a formally verified microkernel. We conducted extensive experiments and analysis to compare the performance and effectiveness of our communication systems against a traditional Linux-based implementation of the same control scenario. Our experiments show that the communication performance of our system is faster or comparable to the Linux-based architecture in embedded systems."],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/7161"],"dc:subject":["Cyber Physical Systems","Cybersecurity of Smart Buildings","High-Assurance Systems","Microkernel","Access Control Mechanisms","Computer Sciences"],"dc:title":["Improving the Security of Building Automation Systems Through an seL4-based Communication Framework"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Computer Science and Engineering"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis","M.S.C.S."],"thesis:degree_name":["MS in Computer Science (M.S.C.S.)"],"thesis:institution_name":["University of South Florida"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:43:53Z"}