{"id":{"repo_id":"usf","oai_identifier":"oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-8375"},"canonical_url":"https://search.ndltd.org/etd/usf/oai:digitalcommons.usf.edu:etd-8375","repository":{"repo_id":"usf","name":"University of South Florida","base_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/"},"display":{"title":"Towards Utilization of Distributed On-Chip Power Delivery Against EM Side-Channel Attacks","abstract":"Non-invasive side-channel attacks (SCAs) are potent attacks on a cryptographic circuit that can reveal its secret key without requiring lots of equipment. EM side-channel leakage is typically the derivative of the power consumption profile of a circuit. Since the fluctuations of the supply voltage strongly depend on the topology and features of the power distribution network (PDN), design of the PDN has a direct impact on EM side-channel leakage signature. In this thesis, we explore the security implications of distributed on-chip voltage regulators against EM side-channel attacks. Extensive HFSS simulations have demonstrated that the maximum EM radiation can be reduced by 33 dB and 11 dB, respectively, at the top and bottom sides of an integrated circuit through distributed on-chip voltage regulation. The primary reason is that the power is delivered locally through partially shorter and thinner metal lines as compared to off-chip implementation.","abstract_html":"Non-invasive side-channel attacks (SCAs) are potent attacks on a cryptographic circuit that can reveal its secret key without requiring lots of equipment. EM side-channel leakage is typically the derivative of the power consumption profile of a circuit. Since the fluctuations of the supply voltage strongly depend on the topology and features of the power distribution network (PDN), design of the PDN has a direct impact on EM side-channel leakage signature. In this thesis, we explore the security implications of distributed on-chip voltage regulators against EM side-channel attacks. Extensive HFSS simulations have demonstrated that the maximum EM radiation can be reduced by 33 dB and 11 dB, respectively, at the top and bottom sides of an integrated circuit through distributed on-chip voltage regulation. The primary reason is that the power is delivered locally through partially shorter and thinner metal lines as compared to off-chip implementation.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Khan, Ahmed Waheed"],"institution":"University of South Florida","degree_name":"MS in Electrical Engineering (M.S.E.E.)","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Electrical Engineering","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Selcuk Kose, Ph.D.","Gokhan Mumcu, Ph.D.","Mehran Mozaffari Kermani, Ph.D."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-04-20T07:00:00Z","date_published":"2018-04-20T07:00:00Z","updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:43:27Z","subjects":["Hardware security","EM side channel attacks","distributed voltage regulation","Security Implications","power grid lines","Electrical and Computer Engineering"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[],"person_identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/7178","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier","record_url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/7178","record_label":"Repository record","record_kind":"record","record_source":"dc:identifier","download_url":null,"download_label":null,"download_source":null,"access_status":null,"embargo_until":null,"access_note":null},"source_record":{"url":"https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/do/oai/?verb=GetRecord&metadataPrefix=oai_etdms&identifier=oai%3Adigitalcommons.usf.edu%3Aetd-8375","prefix":"oai_etdms"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Selcuk Kose, Ph.D.","Gokhan Mumcu, Ph.D.","Mehran Mozaffari Kermani, Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Khan, Ahmed Waheed"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2018-04-20T07:00:00Z"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Electrical Engineering"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis","M.S.E.E."]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["MS in Electrical Engineering (M.S.E.E.)"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of South Florida"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Hardware security","EM side channel attacks","distributed voltage regulation","Security Implications","power grid lines","Electrical and Computer Engineering"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/7178"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Non-invasive side-channel attacks (SCAs) are potent attacks on a cryptographic circuit that can reveal its secret key without requiring lots of equipment. EM side-channel leakage is typically the derivative of the power consumption profile of a circuit. Since the fluctuations of the supply voltage strongly depend on the topology and features of the power distribution network (PDN), design of the PDN has a direct impact on EM side-channel leakage signature. In this thesis, we explore the security implications of distributed on-chip voltage regulators against EM side-channel attacks. Extensive HFSS simulations have demonstrated that the maximum EM radiation can be reduced by 33 dB and 11 dB, respectively, at the top and bottom sides of an integrated circuit through distributed on-chip voltage regulation. The primary reason is that the power is delivered locally through partially shorter and thinner metal lines as compared to off-chip implementation."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Towards Utilization of Distributed On-Chip Power Delivery Against EM Side-Channel Attacks"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Selcuk Kose, Ph.D.","Gokhan Mumcu, Ph.D.","Mehran Mozaffari Kermani, Ph.D."],"dc:creator":["Khan, Ahmed Waheed"],"dc:date":["2018-04-20T07:00:00Z"],"dc:description":["Non-invasive side-channel attacks (SCAs) are potent attacks on a cryptographic circuit that can reveal its secret key without requiring lots of equipment. EM side-channel leakage is typically the derivative of the power consumption profile of a circuit. Since the fluctuations of the supply voltage strongly depend on the topology and features of the power distribution network (PDN), design of the PDN has a direct impact on EM side-channel leakage signature. In this thesis, we explore the security implications of distributed on-chip voltage regulators against EM side-channel attacks. Extensive HFSS simulations have demonstrated that the maximum EM radiation can be reduced by 33 dB and 11 dB, respectively, at the top and bottom sides of an integrated circuit through distributed on-chip voltage regulation. The primary reason is that the power is delivered locally through partially shorter and thinner metal lines as compared to off-chip implementation."],"dc:identifier":["https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/7178"],"dc:subject":["Hardware security","EM side channel attacks","distributed voltage regulation","Security Implications","power grid lines","Electrical and Computer Engineering"],"dc:title":["Towards Utilization of Distributed On-Chip Power Delivery Against EM Side-Channel Attacks"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Electrical Engineering"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis","M.S.E.E."],"thesis:degree_name":["MS in Electrical Engineering (M.S.E.E.)"],"thesis:institution_name":["University of South Florida"]},"updated_at":"2026-11-19T08:43:27Z"}