Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 2000. Graduate Programme in Social and Political Thought. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 273-293). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ59135.

This dissertation aims to show that Thomas Pogge’s central contention – that citizens and governments of the affluent countries have unduly harmed the global poor through their collaboration in the imposition upon the latter an unjust global institutional scheme – remains sound despite the various criticisms his theory has provoked. In the first chapter, I will focus on elaborating and clarifying various important aspects of Pogge’s framework of institutional analysis: that an adequate institutional analysis must be comprehensive with regard to the objects being assessed, and it must be performed in a holistic manner. I will also critically examine and rebut the view that, in the absence of a world government, the project of global justice makes little, if any, sense. In chapter two I will focus on three main criticisms that have been made against the moral substance of Pogge’s conception of global justice – his human-rights-based principle of global justice and his institutional construal of negative duty. The first criticism argues that Pogge’s notion of negative duty is unduly inflated and blurs the distinction between institutional harm-doing and –allowing. The second argues that Pogge’s theory is incomplete in relation to the goal of poverty eradication and should be supplemented with the notion of positive duty. The third argues that Pogge’s principle is over-demanding with regard to the affluent. I will contend that each of these three criticisms is flawed: the first criticism is flawed for it fails to properly interpret Pogge’s principle in light of the ecumenical argumentative strategy adopted by Pogge; the second is problematic for it tends to rely upon an underestimation of the extent to which the existing global order has unjustly contributed to world poverty; and the third criticism can be defused by our adopting a temporally extended construal of Pogge’s notion of a “pattern-preference”. / published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

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Sexual orientation, especially between males, has historically been met with harsh criminal sanctions. Only in this century has the issue been one of fundamental freedom and private choices. This study analyses the legal history of the concept of choice in sexual orientation in the European Commission of Human Rights (the Commission) and the European Court of Human Right (the Court), and documents the evolution of sexual orientation rights from the 1950s until today specifically focusing on why the human rights protection has changed. Until 1975 the Commission did not consider absolute criminalisation contrary to the right to respect for privacy or as discrimination, but this approach started to change in 1975. A stricter test of what is considered necessary in a democratic society led to the Dudgeon judgement in 1980 where absolute criminalisation of homosexuality was found to be contrary to the right to respect for privacy in the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). This judgement has largely been responsible for decriminalisation throughout the Council of Europe member-States. This decriminalisation was limited to private, adult acts that were consensual and this was the norm until 1997. In that year, unequal ages of consent also was found to be contrary to the Convention. The study showed that this evolution was facilitated mainly by a European consensus, based on the legislation of the member-States and expert knowledge. The European consensus doctrine has proven to be a very complex concept, and this study argues that a regional approach to the consensus enquiry is a better solution than the present doctrine, and solves some of the problems it has proven to cause.

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