Across the Latin American region, invalid votes regularly âwinâ over candidates from smaller political parties. This dissertation assesses how individual and contextual factors affect individuals' decision to assume the costs of turning out to vote but then choose not to select a candidate, and to what political effect. First, I find that most invalid votes in Latin American presidential elections are cast as a protest signal that reflects disappointment with specific policy outcomes or with a particular slate of candidate offerings rather than with democracy itself. Second, I argue and show that elite polarization, the number of candidates competing, and flux in the partisan options shape invalid voting by changing the ease with which citizens navigate politics, as well as their perceptions of the representativeness of the political space. Third, I find that efforts to mobilize the invalid vote have occurred in more than twenty Latin American presidential elections since 1980, mostly as an expression of discontent with candidate options, or with corruption in politics, although evidence of accompanying increases in government corruption is limited. Finally, I show that small ideological and radical parties respond to historical rates of invalid voting in making strategic decisions about where to enter competition in Peru.

This dissertation draws upon research in political science, psychology, and sociology to explore how inter-and intra-group social status influences political attitudes across divergent groups and issue areas, such as religion and gender. Using a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze both existing and original data, I find that concern about group status is an important force behind support for group-based policies. In other words, group members desire social esteem and adjust their policy preferences in an effort bolster both their groupâs social position and their position within the group.

<p> The interests of African Americans are underrepresented in Congress. The Congressional Black Caucus was formed to further the interests of African Americans. However, how effective the CBC may be in its congressional representation of the African American community is subject to dispute. It was hypothesized that throughout the 102^nd through the 112^th Congress (1992&ndash;2012), the CBC&rsquo;s legislative behavior persuaded party leaders to advance the CBC&rsquo;s legislative agenda. Archival data gathered by Scott Adler and John Wilkerson in their Congressional Bills Project 1947&ndash;2012 was utilized to complete the study. Linear regression T-tests and Chi-square tests were used to assess CBC members&rsquo; legislative behavior and the likelihood of the CBC introducing legislation that supported its legislative agenda. The results of the study show that the CBC demonstrated a robust legislative behavior of bill sponsorship, floor speeches and press conferences in support of its legislative agenda. The presence of the CBC in Congress is substantive, necessary to the success of legislation affecting African American interest and its&rsquo; legislative behavior is statistically significant compared to non-CBC members of Congress. The study validates, as essential, the presence of African American members of Congress.</p>

This study examines the strengths and influence of International News Media Coverage in Politics as manifested in the "Arab Spring." Key variables that shape global news coverage are examined with Western media institutions in particular being the focal point. The analytical agenda or purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between international news media and politics by evaluating news media coverage of protests, demonstrations and uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, in an effort to determine how the Western media has shaped political views on those countries and other parts of the world using its technology, political principles and advantages. A case study analysis approach was used to explore the systemic factors that influence international news coverage and how these factors determine the volume and content of news that flows from various parts of the world. The researcher found that news coverage does not change the policy, but it does create the environment in which the policy is made and that the media remains crucial in focusing international attention on the Arab Spring, but they do not determine the policy, the key decisions, nor their implementations. The conclusion drawn from the findings suggests that although global news media is increasingly becoming a source of rapid real time information, it is used by politics to convey its ideological messages and propaganda.

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In this dissertation, I explore the relationship between legal systems, the rule of law, and states' cooperative and conflictual behavior. I analyze how domestic legal systems (common, civil, Islamic, etc.) influence a state's foreign policy behavior towards other states and international regimes. I also consider the extent to which the legitimacy of a domestic legal system modifies the relationship between legal systems and foreign policy behavior. In particular, I address the following questions: 1) How does the similarity of domestic legal system influence a state's foreign policy behavior towards other states and international institutions?, and 2) How does the legitimacy of a domestic legal system shape states' behavior towards other states and international institutions. I put forth a legal normative argument, which traces the reasons standing behind states' actions to their internal legal structure. I argue that states with similar and highly legitimate legal systems are more likely to cooperate with one another than states representing divergent and weakly legitimate legal traditions. In the same way, a nation is more likely to be supportive of an international institution if its legal rules and procedures resemble the nation's domestic legal order. My argument can be summarized as follows: International cooperation, both formal and informal, can be understood as contractual relationships. Domestic legal systems have an important effect on the way that states bargain over international contracts, because they affect the costs, benefits, and uncertainties of interstate cooperation. In particular, domestic legal system types and legitimacy influence contractual relations as far as the probability of signing interstate contracts, design of contracts, and their enforcement. I test my argument empirically in three different areas: states' propensity to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice; alliances; and the link existing between states' legal tradition and their conflictual interstate behavior. I find that both of the characteristics of the internal legal structure, legal system type and legitimacy, have a substantial impact on the way that states behave on the international arena. / Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2006. / Date of Defense: August 4, 2006. / Alliances, International Court Of Justice, MID, Comparative Law, Legal Systems / Includes bibliographical references. / Dale L. Smith, Professor Directing Dissertation; Nathan Stoltzfus, Outside Committee Member; Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Committee Member; Paul R. Hensel, Committee Member; Jeffrey K. Staton, Committee Member.

Who, if anyone, controls the massive government bureaucracy responsible for the elaboration, implementation, and enforcement of laws and executive orders? Typical managerial techniques---screening, reward, and punishment---are hampered by the rules of the civil service system. All but the most senior bureaucrats are hired and promoted according a non-political examination and review system, and most are protected from punishment or termination by tenure. I argue that the executive can control the bureaucracy by creating competition for budget allocations within and between agencies, a process I call strategic budgeting. These incentives work under realistic assumptions: highly imperfect monitoring, bounded rationality of executives and bureaucrats, ideological motivations, and professional norms are all a part of the model. I test the predictions of my theory in the laboratory and in data from the American states, finding evidence to confirm that strategic budgeting is an effective strategy for bureaucratic management. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2008. / Date of Defense: June 25, 2008. / Quantal Response, Budgeting, Bureaucracy, Principal Agent / Includes bibliographical references. / William D. Berry, Professor Directing Dissertation; Tim Salmon, Outside Committee Member; John T. Scholz, Committee Member; Bumba Mukherjee, Committee Member; T.K. Ahn, Committee Member.

Does the developing world significantly differ from the developed world when it comes to "correlates" of war? Do economic factors influence interstate conflict in the developing world more so than they do in the developed world? How and why do economic development, growth, and importance to the great powers shape conflict behavior of developing countries? And finally, does economic development condition democracy's purported peaceful influence on interstate relations in the developing world? In this study, I try to provide partial answers to these questions analyzing the militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) in the developing world between 1951 and 2000 and the negotiated settlement in such disputes. I provide a theoretical approach that rests on the concept of satisfaction and relate economic factors to interstate conflict in the developing world through their effects on states' satisfaction with the international and local status quo. Briefly, I argue that whereas economic development and growth increase the satisfaction of a developing state with the international and regional status quo and thus make it less conflict-prone, increasing economic importance of developing states to the great powers increase the costs of those states' militarized conflicts for the great powers, thereby augmenting the incentives for the great powers to prevent the militarization of disputes among developing states with higher economic importance to them. I also argue that, because economic conditions influence the foundation, performance, and survival of democratic systems, democratic institutions in less developed countries will not be as solid and functional as the ones in more developed countries and thus democracy will not have any independent effect on interstates conflicts of developing states; instead, democracy's influence on interstate relations of a developing country will be contingent on that country's economic development level. My arguments on economic development, economic importance to the great powers, and democracy received significant empirical support. My findings underline the importance of economic factors in shaping the conflict behavior of developing countries. An important policy implication of this study is that to achieve sustainable global peace, policies that would foster economic development in the developing world as well as economic integration of developing countries with the world economy ought to be encouraged and supported on a global scale. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2008. / Date of Defense: April 24, 2008. / Interstate Conflict, Economic Development, Economic Growth, Economic Importance, Dispute Settlement, Developing Countries / Includes bibliographical references. / Dale L. Smith, Professor Directing Dissertation; Barney Warf, Outside Committee Member; Mark Souva, Committee Member; Paul Hensel, Committee Member.

Does privatization of state-owned assets result in economic growth? This paper seeks to theoretically and empirically link this market reform strategy to the outcome of economic growth. By taking a deeper look at developing countries, particularly sub-Saharan Africa and juxtaposing institutional and economic variables I will be able to test the relationship between privatization and economic growth. / A Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science. / Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2009. / Date of Defense: August 18, 2009. / Market Liberalization, Developing Countries / Includes bibliographical references. / Dale L. Smith, Professor Directing Thesis; Ray Block, Committee Member; Charles Barrilleaux, Committee Member.

The prevailing wisdom among scholars of civil war is that weak states, or resource-poor states, are the most prone to this form of political violence. Yet, a large portion of resource poor states never experience civil war. What can account for why resource-poor states, like El Salvador, are prone to civil war while resource-poor states, such as Bhutan, are not? I offer a theory of civil war onset that explains how dissidents and states interact to produce civil war. This theory moves beyond structural explanations and explains how the choices of states and dissidents jointly produce violence. From the theory, I derive the expectation that states that repress their citizens are the most likely to kill citizens and to generate dissident violence. In short, the resolution to the puzzle is: State leaders from resource-poor states, who choose to repress, are the most likely to generate violence that exceeds the civil war threshold. This insight not only resolves an academic puzzle but when tested provides a model with better in-sample prediction of civil war than previous models. After explicating the theory and discussing concepts, I empirically evaluate the hypotheses implied by these arguments using a large cross-national dataset including a global sample from 1975 to 1999. I utilize structural equation modeling as well as two-stage procedures to estimate the direct and indirect effects of variables outlined in the theory. Using a novel approach to reducing bias in my data, time-dependent propensity score matching, I isolate the causal effects of repression on a state's likelihood of experiencing civil war. I then extend the insights of the model to other forms of political violence including interstate conflict and insurgency and offer hypotheses relating to current debates over counterinsurgency policy and the relationship between state making and interstate war. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2008. / Date of Defense: June 23, 2008. / Political Violence, International Relations, Civil War / Includes bibliographical references. / Will H. Moore, Professor Directing Dissertation; Richard Feiock, Outside Committee Member; William Berry, Committee Member; Dale L. Smith, Committee Member; Jason Barabas, Committee Member.