Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references. / Nuclear weapon testing is the final step in the nuclear development process, an announcement of ability and strength. The consequences of a nuclear test are far from easy to bear, however: economic sanctions can be crippling and nuclear capability automatically makes one a nuclear target. Why, then, do states test nuclear weapons? This thesis aims to determine the answer to this question using India as a model. It is well known that India tested nuclear weapons in 1974 and in 1998, but less well known are the near-tests of 1983, 1995, and 1996. This thesis examines the situation in these years and the details of the nuclear decisions based on four hypotheses: technical concerns, security and power, domestic politics, and norms and ideas. This study shows that while all four of these theories play a role, technical concerns (contrary to popular belief) are very minor portion of the overall decision to test a nuclear weapon and are relegated to an excuse for scientists. Domestic politics, especially the political fortunes of those in power, play a large role, especially when combined with real, existential security concerns. Similarly, the prestige and status that leaders believe is imparted by nuclear ability is of major import. Understanding the reasons for nuclear testing will lead to fewer nuclear surprises in the future and may help to address the concerns of the growing number of states with latent nuclear capabilities. / by Whitney Lyke Raas. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, February 2007. / Page 642 blank. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, p. 575-641). / The study explores the nexus between illicit economies and military conflicts. It investigates when and how access by belligerents to the production and trafficking of illicit substances affects the strength of belligerents and governments. Although narcotics trafficking is often treated as sui generis, the study situates the drug trade within the larger class of markets for illicit products and services. The study presents a general theory of the relationship between illicit markets and military conflict - the political capital of illicit economies -- and contrasts it with conventional wisdom on connections between drug trafficking and military conflict. The political capital of illicit economies argues that belligerents derive much more than simply large financial profits from their sponsorship of illicit economies. They also obtain freedom of action and, crucially, legitimacy and support from the local population, called political capital. If belligerents choose to become negatively involved in the illicit economy (attempt to destroy it), they not only fail to increase their military capabilities, but also suffer costs in terms of political capital. The extent and scope of belligerents' gains/ losses from their involvement in the illicit economy depend on four factors: / (cont.) the state of the overall economy; the character of the illicit economy; the presence of traffickers; and the government response to the illicit economy. These factors reflect both structural conditions outside of the immediate control of the belligerents and the government and strategic policy choices available to either the belligerents or the government. Contrary to the conventional wisdom about narcotics and military conflict, eradication of narcotics cultivation has dubious effects on the capabilities of the belligerents and is extremely unlikely to severely weaken them. However, it alienates the local population from the government and results in the population's unwillingness to provide intelligence on the belligerents - a crucial requirement for success against the belligerents. Thus, eradication of illicit crops increases the political capital of the belligerents without significantly weakening their military capabilities. The primary cases explored in the study are Peru, Colombia, and Afghanistan. Additional evidence is drawn from the cases of Burma, Northern Ireland, Turkey, and India. / by Vanda Felbab-Brown. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2009. / "June 2009." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 355-367). / This study considers cross-national and inter-temporal variation in national oil policies in Japan, France, and the United States. A test was performed of the extent to which policies in these countries continue to emphasize national control over the petroleum supply chain, or have adopted more liberal forms of market governance. It was found that national petroleum policies converged on liberal outcomes in the 1980s and 1990s. In each country regulatory, trade and other policy instruments were restructured to give the forces of supply and demand an increasingly important role in trade in crude oil and petroleum products. It was also found that convergence on liberal outcomes was partially reversed in some countries, but not others. This was explained through the interests and policy preferences of state actors with responsibility for setting oil policy, and domestic oil firms. In two of the cases - the United States and Japan - policies promoting national control remained in the interests of state actors and firms, meaning these policies were restructured but not discarded in response to changes in the structure of the petroleum market. In the case of France, policies supporting national control were jettisoned as national firms became increasingly internationally competitive and disinterested in obtaining state support. It was argued that the findings are significant for our understanding of liberal convergence in the advanced industrial states. Alternative explanations of this phenomenon explain outcomes by arguing either that domestic actors have little capacity to shape policy outcomes, or by assuming the policy preferences of domestic actors uniformly match liberal policy outcomes. / (cont.) The findings presented here suggest: 1) the policy preferences of domestic actors remain important; 2) the policy preferences of domestic actors need not uniformly match liberal policy outcomes when inimical to interests. This suggests that identifying whether changes in international markets or other processes will lead to a convergence on liberal policy outcomes, or whether this process is likely to be reversed, requires us to identify the effects of shifts in international markets or other kinds of changes on the underlying interests and policy preferences of multiple domestic political actors. / by Llewelyn Hughes. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1977. / Vita. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, leaves 484-495). / by Zakaria bin Haji Ahmad. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1982. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY / Bibliography: leaves 264-273. / by Susumu Yamakage. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references. / by Wade Jacoby. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 338-354). / by Amy Blitz. / Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2018. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 261-267). / In the modern world, social order is most often maintained by states, using a complex web of institutions, norms, and systems to control the population and govern their actions. In this dissertation, I ask how groups establish and maintain social control absent these powerful structures. To answer this question, I propose a new theoretical construct, based on a foundation of social science and observation of the competition for social control that occurred in Baghdad, Iraq from 2006 to 2008. I identify and test what is both necessary and sufficient for a group to establish social control over a population under conditions approaching anarchy. I argue that to establish social control, a group must do three things. First, a group must possess specific latent capacities that enable them to credibly control violence. Second, groups must apply violence in purposeful ways, ascending a hierarchy of increasingly complex collective activities to establish social control. Finally, social control is achieved only when the group uses violence to provide a specific set of benefits that provide utility not only to the group, but also to the population it seeks to control. I define this step as adjudication. Implications and applications are discussed. / by Timothy Flynn Wright. / Ph. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1989. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 538-560). / by Thomas Wallace Graham. / Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2009. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 181-186). / An observational study was conducted to determine the most likely explanation of American support for Israel. Several extant hypotheses were considered, most particularly, and at greatest length, that of a pro-Israel domestic lobby in the United States, but also that it had to do with Cold War containment, common values, or precedent. It was ultimately concluded that the domestic lobby hypothesis could not account for American support, since the level of that support correlated negatively with the resources of the lobby, and because sudden, temporary changes in the level of American support did not coincide with any similar changes in the resources of the lobby. Furthermore, statistical analysis indicated that there was on balance no benefit for politicians who supported the lobby's agenda, and no cost for those who opposed it. Likewise, the other explanations also proved unsatisfactory. The containment hypothesis, for instance, could not explain why American support continued after the Cold War ended, while the common values hypothesis could not explain why American support did not begin until 1971, nor why it peaked in 1979 and began to decline in the eighties. Finally, it was concluded that the best explanation of American support was that it gave the United States the leverage to restrain Israeli belligerence, for which the United States was blamed by the Arab states. In this way, the U.S. was able to minimize damage to its relations with the Arabs resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict. / by Richard Kraus. / S.M.