Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2015. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 209-229). / This dissertation addresses the puzzle of why individuals in authoritarian systems seek office in formal institutions, which are often dismissed as weak and ineffective. I argue that individuals seek office mainly to protect their property from government expropriation in China. In contrast to prior work, I argue that instead of being passive takers of existing institutional arrangements, private entrepreneurs in China actively seek opportunities within formal institutions to advance their interests. By holding seats in local legislatures, entrepreneurs signal to local bureaucrats that they have access to higher-level government officials to report illicit predatory behavior. This signal, in turn, deters local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other types of informal payments. I deploy both qualitative and quantitative methods to support the argument. First, to understand state-business relations in China, I conducted 106 in-depth interviews with private entrepreneurs, government officials, and local scholars in five provinces during 16 months of fieldwork. I show that even while government expropriation is an endemic problem, private entrepreneurs who are also legislative officeholders are less likely to experience severe expropriation. Second, using a nationally representative survey of private entrepreneurs, I quantitatively show that entrepreneurs who have seats in the local legislatures on average spend 25 percent less on informal payments to local officials compared to entrepreneurs without such a political status. To investigate the causal link between formal office and protection of property, I conducted field experiments on Chinese bureaucrats to understand how local bureaucracies respond to constituents with connections to formal institutions. These experiments involved directly contacting officials to examine how they respond to realistic messages from citizens. Using an experimental manipulation, I demonstrate that Chinese bureaucrats are 35 percent more likely to respond to a constituent with connections to formal institutions. These findings challenge prominent theories of authoritarian politics, which see authoritarian institutions as instruments to arrange power sharing, rent distribution, or information collection. Adopting an "institution as resource" perspective, I show that within authoritarian institutions, entrepreneurial actors can seek opportunities to advance their interests and improve their well-being through formal means, even when these formal institutions are relatively weak.. / by Yue Hou. / Ph. D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references. / This thesis argues that regime legitimacy creates military resilience. A regime is legitimate when its constituents believe-whether because of ideological solidarity, patriotism, nationalism, or good governance-that a government has the right to exercise authority in its regime. Military resilience, which contributes to military effectiveness, refers to the willingness of troops to stay committed in combat. In modern war, dispersion of forces creates the need for a very high degree of troop commitment, making resilience more important than in previous forms of warfare. Resilient units do not disintegrate through desertion, and furthermore commit themselves actively under fire. In arguing that legitimacy matters, this thesis revives a debate between two theories of military resilience. The first school, which comes out of the tradition of the mass army, holds that broad attributes like legitimacy, patriotism, and nationalism are crucial to resilience. In recent political science, a second school has been significantly more influential; these scholars argue that factors like small-unit cohesion and professionalism are the key explanatory variables for military resilience. Settling the debate between these competing methods of generating resilience is critical to effective army building. This thesis strongly supports a revival of the first school of thought, based on the evidence from two cases where legitimacy experienced a sudden shock. The first case examines the military resilience of foreign legions forced to fight for Nazi Germany in World War II. / (cont.) It finds that those units were rarely resilient, even given otherwise similar conditions to German units, and what little resilience existed can be explained primarily through patriotism to soldiers' original homelands. The second case examines the Yugoslav People's Army during and after the disintegration of federated Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The evidence suggests that the army lacked resilience, experiencing mass desertion, when fighting for a disintegrated regime. It regained in resilience when it was reconstituted as a nationalist Serbian army in 1992. / by Jacob Hale Russell. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, leaves 460-481). / Japan is a country known for its suspicion of foreigners, but Japanese citizens have established non-government organizations to support illegal foreign migrants. The problems and conditions of illegal foreign workers are rooted in Japanese government policies. The 1990 Immigration Control Law created a category of illegal foreign workers. Later, the Ministry of Health and Welfare excluded illegal foreigners from Japan's insurance system. Illegal foreign workers face challenges in dealing with employers, state officials, medical institutions, and family life. These problems range from unpaid wages and enormous medical cost to marriage/divorce registration and the forced break up of the families due to deportation. To solve these problems, Japanese engage in associative activism and institutional experimentation, which has transformed local politics in Japan. Illegal Asian workers in Japan rarely seek assistance from existing government organizations or ethnic associations. Government organizations provide mainly information and interpretation services and government officials lack the know-how to help illegal foreign workers with serious labor and immigration problems. Ethnic associations in Japan do not support their illegal compatriots. Illegal foreigners turn instead to Japanese NGOs, which have extensive experience in helping the underprivileged in Japanese society. Japanese activists, who found these NGOs, came from other social movement organizations. Christians, community workers unions organizers, women activists, labor lawyers, health workers, and civil rights activists have created separate support groups to help solve problems for illegal foreigners. Japanese activists created these groups in order to: a) acquire and accumulate knowledge on how best to help illegal foreigners; b) strengthen their bargaining power with employers and state officials; and, c) gain financial support for their activities. By working on behalf of illegal foreigners, these Japanese activists build a new community of action. Local governments have invited these activists to share their expertise and are increasingly relying on these support groups to provide public services to illegal foreigners. In some localities, local government officials have joined these groups and experimented with new institutions of governance. As a result, local governments are now breaking with national policies regarding illegal foreign workers. Japan has done quite a bit over the last two decades to open its borders and accommodate immigration. Associative activism by Japanese citizens impresses upon other industrialized societies that Japan's efforts to accommodate immigration are surprisingly humanitarian for a historically xenophobic culture. / by Apichai W. Shipper. / Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2018. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 260-280). / Debt has become an essential part of families' daily lives in many countries. This dissertation examines under what circumstances credit markets replace the role of welfare states to address social risks and promote social mobility in advanced democracies. It sheds light on the socio-economic and political consequences of growing debt levels. I offer a theory that explains variation in household debt across and within countries by demonstrating that credit fills gaps between households' financial needs and demand for social services on the one hand and welfare states' supply of social services on the other-a gap I refer to as social policy shortfall. The transformation of stable Fordist economies into flexible knowledge economies led to increasingly fragmented employment patterns and life-course trajectories. Welfare states, however, have often not kept up with these disruptions and leave households with larger financial burdens. Households increasingly go into debt to address the financial consequences of social risk such as unemployment or sickness as well as to seize social opportunity by investing in childcare and family, education, and housing. Cross-nationally, two factors explain the variation in household debt: the size and type of social policy shortfall determine individuals' financial needs. But whether credit emerges as a private alternative to welfare states is contingent upon the structure of a country's credit regime, which shapes how easily individuals can borrow money. Drawing on full-population administrative records from Denmark and micro-level panel data from the U.S. and Germany, I show that the permissive credit regimes of the U.S. and Denmark grant households easy access to credit, but the distribution of debt across households differs because welfare states in both countries protect and support households differently. In Germany, the restrictive credit regime results in less borrowing even in light of social policy reforms. The findings have implications for how scholars and policymakers think about the role of financial markets and household debt in a world of changing labor markets and welfare states. It shows how credit markets and welfare states appear to fulfill similar functions but follow different underlying logics, each with its own socio-economic and distributional consequences that shape and amplify insecurity and inequality. / by Andreas Bernhard Wiedemann. / Ph. D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-81). / This thesis is a study of the causes of "Konfrontasi" or Confrontation, the low-intensity war waged by the Republic of Indonesia, under the leadership of President Sukarno, against the Federation of Malaysia, which became independent in 1963. The Confrontation lasted between 1963 and 1966. The thesis compares three categories of hypotheses or arguments for its causes - threat, ideology, and domestic politics - and evaluates each type of argument in tum. The "threat" argument claims that Malaysia posed a security threat to Indonesia, and that the Confrontation was the outcome of a security dilemma between both states. The "threat" of Malaysia has some substantive elements necessary to justify Indonesian aggression, but it is shown to be largely an exaggerated claim, and does not provide a sufficient motive for the conflict. The "ideology" argument claims that the Indonesia Confrontation was driven by the ideology of the Indonesian Revolution and the central role of Indonesia in leading a struggle of New Emerging Forces against the Old Established Forces of neo-colonialism, colonialism and imperialism. It is shown that this argument has more substance than the "threat" argument, since Indonesian ideology traces its existence independently to earlier Indonesian historical experience, and Confrontation could not have been rationalized without recourse to ideological principles. However, this thesis also shows how the "ideology" hypothesis for Confrontation is over-determined, as Indonesian ideology did not necessarily make Confrontation an inevitable and necessary outcome. Ideology was necessary, but insufficient for motivating the decision to confront Malaysia. Finally, the "domestic politics" argument draws its claims from the idea that the Indonesian Confrontation was a "diversionary war" against the Malaysia, where the latter filled the role of "scapegoat," "bogeyman" or "safety valve." According to this argument, the Confrontation was started in order to contain serious internal disunities in the Indonesian government, most notably between the army and the ascendant communist party, and to unite these conflicting elements in a nationalist cause. This thesis finds the greatest evidence and theoretical support for this "domestic politics" explanation of Confrontation, and finds this account to be the most consistent and satisfactory argument. / by LuFong Chua. / S.M.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 304-325). / The dissertation examines whether policy can foster the political incorporation and democratic participation of immigrants. The study compares immigrants' political responses to immigrant policy in Sweden and Germany. Sweden is the critical case because Sweden's immigrant policy attempts to shorten the intergenerational integration of immigrants into the host society. The Swedish government extended the benefits of its universalistic welfare state to non citizens, "topped off' benefits through direct measures specifically for immigrants, and extended voting and office holding rights to non-citizens. The study examines three main questions. Does extending the welfare state and the political franchise to immigrants alter the general immigrant experience of intergenerational integration into the host society? Is Sweden's extension and support for immigrant political rights successful in promoting immigrant political participation? Is Sweden's immigrant policy successful in defining the forms of immigrant political participation, configuring immigrant associational patterns, and influencing immigrant political goals? Sweden's extension of its universalistic welfare state does not seem to alter immigrants' intergenerational integration into the host society. There is little difference in the economic and social situations of immigrants in Sweden and Germany, a country which makes a less comprehensive attempt to integrate immigrants into its society. Sweden's extension and support for immigrants' political rights are partially successful in promoting immigrant political participation. Sweden's immigrant policy is successful in defining the forms of immigrant political participation, configuring immigrant associational patterns, and influencing how immigrants achieve their political goals. The study suggests that civic tradition and associational life are factors that need not translate into greater political participation. Still, government policies can strongly influence how immigrants perceive and participate in politics. / by David P. Jeffrey. / Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 309-346). / Intra-service politics can help explain many behaviors and outcomes across a variety of military services and countries. The thesis begins by developing a framework for understanding intra-service politics based on a review of organization theory. Every military service contains a variety of communities or unions organized by specific missions, functions or technologies. These communities compete with one another to determine a service's dominant culture and missions; and the distribution of a service's budgets, equipment and personnel. Three patterns intra-service relations are proposed: a strong and independent central leadership capable of acting as an honest broker between competing communities (e.g., the German Army of the interwar period); a single monarchical community dominating a service (e.g., the U.S. Air Force); and an oligarchy of communities controlling a service (e.g., the U.S. Army). In the latter two patterns, doctrinal developments, capabilities, and distribution of resources will mirror and tend to reinforce the power of the dominant unions. In order to test the relevancy and plausibility of the oligarchic pattern, the bulk of the thesis is taken up with three case studies examining the division design process in the U.S. Army during the 1970s and 1980s: the Division 86 design, the High Technology Light Division, and the Light Infantry Division. Overall, the evidence from these three case studies suggests the utility of an explanation based on intra-service community politics for certain behaviors. Moreover, it suggests a U.S. Army dominated by an oligarchy composed of an armored/mechanized infantry ("heavy") community, an artillery community, an aviation community and a light infantry community. The oligarchy itself has a multi-tiered structure, one where the light infantry community has the least power and influence, while the heavy and artillery communities have the most; the aviation community occupies a position in-between, wielding considerable power but never being the equal of the two dominant ground force communities. / by Robert Allen Zirkle. / Ph.D.

Thesis (M.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1988. / Bibliography: leaves 88-89. / by Wayne Brooke Nelson. / M.S.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2009. / Vita. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (v. 2, p. 739-769). / Two longstanding questions preoccupying political scientists, military officers and policymakers alike are how should and how do political leaders interact with military professionals? This thesis argues that historic patterns of civil-military relations underlay distinct national defense policymaking institutions, which, in turn, shape how states produce and employ force. Thus, long after states are no longer prey to military interventions in politics, the institutions originally created to protect government from the armed forces will continue to shape how governments use military force. In states where civil-military conflict prompted sustained periods of institutional development, present day governments will possess institutional resources to exert maximal civilian control over defense policymaking. States with harmonious civil-military legacies will lack these institutional structures and will exercise a lesser degree of civilian control. Each form of political control embodies distinct comparative advantages, one privileging the integration of military activities with the state's foreign policy, while the other provides for greater military effectiveness. Termed "civil-military legacy theory," the analytical framework of the dissertation is rooted in historic institutionalism. The theory is tested by examining the elaboration of military doctrine, the acquisition of new weapons and the conduct of military interventions in France and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom and France have, since the Second World War, possessed and expended comparable resources on defense. The United Kingdom and France have, however, diametrically opposite experiences of civil-military relations. The United Kingdom has never experienced a significant civil-military crisis; France has six times seen a general become head of state without being elected, and nine times seen military factions attempt to supplant the government. As predicted, France's history of fractious civil-military relations led it to develop civil-military control institutions that permit civilian leaders to micromanage military doctrine, procurement and operations. Conversely, the United Kingdom's record of civil-military concord has resulted in the armed forces retaining authority over an autonomous sphere of military competence. The principle of civilian control of the armed forces is acknowledged in both cases, but its practice varies widely, with a functional division of labor in the British case and more intrusive civilian control in the French. / by Marc Ronald DeVore. / Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2018. / Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (pages 193-216). / This dissertation develops and tests a new individual-level theory specifying the relationship between threat perception and policy preferences. The project takes a unified approach to studying the space of danger-mitigating political behaviors. It is designed to demonstrate that a single psychological model can apply to both citizens and elites and in both domestic and foreign policy issue areas. The first paper develops Threat-Heuristic Theory, a new individual-level model of the psychological processes linking the detection of danger to specific policy preferences for mitigating it. The paper presents a review of the literature in biology and cognitive science regarding evolved systems of threat perception and response, on which the theory draws. The paper demonstrates that the theory's core explanatory variable, threat classification, is not a proxy for other constructs already incorporated into political science. The paper also illustrates that the domain of complex dangers, characterized by low levels of agreement in threat classification, contains issues of interest to political science. The second paper applies the theory to explain variation in preferences for specific forms of immigration restriction in the U.S. The paper highlights the importance of understanding threat classification in order to move beyond explanations of pro/anti-immigrant sentiment towards a model that captures preferences for real-world policy options. The third paper applies the theory to a small number of elite policy-makers in order to explain their support for particular measures included in U.S. national security strategies of the early Cold War and of the first George W. Bush Administration. The paper demonstrates how "bad strategy' and problematic policy preferences can arise systematically through the operation of Threat-Heuristic Theory's psychological model and need not be solely explained by bureaucratic politics or error. / by Marika Landau-Wells. / Ph. D.