China has two contrasting images in the West: a cute panda and an evil dragon. In recent years, a near-consensus seems to be forming among policy makers in Washington that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is more of an evil dragon than a cute panda, using "sharp power" to threaten U.S. interests and world peace. The PRC is regarded by the current U.S. administration as a "strategic competitor," and a new Cold War seems to be looming between the world's two largest economies. Is the rise of China destined to cause conflicts or even war? After analyzing the conflict behavior of the PRC documented in the Correlates of War project's Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (v4.3), this research shows that China's rise does not seem to make conflict more likely. Instead, with the growth of its power, Beijing has become increasingly reluctant to use force against other states. Drawing on the economic norms theory, the author argues that the development of the capitalist-market economy since late 1970s has fundamentally changed China's economic conditions, social norms and political culture. This transformation has helped the PRC form increasing interests in maintaining a robust global marketplace and a peaceful world order, thus making war or serious conflicts with other nations almost unimaginable. Currently, China is more a panda rather than a dragon. However, the West needs to remember that though vegetarian and non-predatory, pandas are bears with sharp teeth and nails. When pressured and cornered, they can be dangerous. The misunderstanding and fear of China, rather than the rise of China itself, is the real cause of the recent rise of US-China frictions.

Great powers have often sought to achieve their strategic goals through the allocation of military aid. The United States is no exception, as it has frequently used military aid to influence the policies and military capacity of its allies and partners. However, our understanding of the effects of US military aid on the conflict behavior of recipient states - and especially the mechanisms underlying these effects - remains poorly understood. The results of previous studies of U.S. military aid are often contradictory, and are mostly based on over-aggregated, country-level data. In this dissertation, I argue that examining the individual-level effects will give us a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying country-level associations between US military aid and recipient behavior. I examine three research questions related to the manner in which military aid influences conflict in recipient countries. First, I explore the individual effects of U.S. IMET using semi-structures in-depth interviews and an original survey of Hungarian military officers and non-commissioned officers. This paper investigates the transmission of professional values and "democratic" norms to individual participants through the U.S. IMET programs. Second, I investigate the effects of U.S. IMET participation on civil conflict duration. I argue that government forces with more robust U.S. IMET participation will accumulate more and better military human capital, which incentivize rebels to hide and minimize their operations leading to a prolonged civil conflict. Finally, while exploring recipient states international conflict behavior I theorize that American educated and trained foreign military personnel return home with a better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of national power, civil-military relations, the value of cooperation and the cost of war. I argue that these military personnel advise their political masters against the use of military force during international disputes leading to a decreased probability of MID initiation. I find support for each of the main arguments presented in the dissertation. Overall, this dissertation represents one of the first attempts to move beyond country-level data and explore the micro-foundations of US military assistance.

To what extent do elite and social group cues affect the public's willingness to embrace their leader's actions during domestic and international security crises? Studies traditionally have focused on top-down elite cue-driven models to study how the public's attitudes are influenced during international and domestic security crises, largely disregarding the bottom-up effects social peer groups can have on individuals' attitudes. This is problematic as the public is regularly exposed to cue messages from elites and social peer groups, both of which are expected to help determine how successful leaders will be in mobilizing public support on a tactical level. To address this dissertation, conducted three studies drawing on prospect theory and audience costs evaluating to what extend elite and social group cues are able to moderate the American and Indian public's willingness to support or oppose the use of force in the context of humanitarian interventions, trade disputes, international and domestic security crises. Relying on ten survey experiments, the results from the three studies present robust evidence that the tactical use of elite and social group cues is not particularly effective as these information signals are unable to consistently induce preference shifts among the public during domestic and international security crises.

The Internet of Things (IoT) integrates a wide range of devices into a network to provide intelligent services. The lack of security mechanisms in such systems can cause an exposure of sensitive private data. Moreover, a networks of compromised IoT devices can allow adversaries the ability to bring down crucial systems. Indeed, adversaries have exploited software vulnerabilities in these devices for their benefit, and to execute various malicious intents. Therefore, understanding the software of these emerging systems is of the utmost importance. Building towards this goal, in this dissertation, we undertake a comprehensive analysis of the IoT software by employing different analysis techniques. To analyze the emerging IoT software systems, we first perform an in-depth and thorough analysis of the IoT binaries through static analysis. Through efficient and scalable static analysis, we extract artifacts that highlight the dynamics of the malware. In particular, by analyzing the strings, functions, and Control Flow Graphs (CFGs) of the IoT malware, we uncover their execution strategy, unique textual characteristics, and network dependencies. Additionally, through analysis of CFGs, we show the ability to approximate the main function. Using the extracted static artifacts, we design an effective malware detector. Noting that IoT malware have increased their sophistication and impact, the static approaches are prone to obfuscation that aims to evade analysis attempts. Acknowledging these attempts and to mitigate such threats, it is essential to profile the shared and exclusive behavior of these threats, such that they are easily achievable and aware of the capabilities of the widely-used IoT devices. To that end, we introduce MALInformer, an integrated dynamic and static analysis framework to analyze Linux-based IoT software and identify behavioral patterns for effective threat profiling. Leveraging an iterative signatures selection method, by taking into account the normalized frequency, cardinality, and programs covered by the signatures, MALInformer identifies distinctive and interpretable behaviors for every threat category. The static and dynamic analyses show the exploitability of the emerging systems. These weaknesses are typically reported to vulnerability databases along with the information that enable their reproduction and subsequent patching in other and related software. These weaknesses are assigned a Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) number. We explore the quality of the reports in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), unveiling their inconsistencies which we eventually fix. We then conduct case studies, including a large-scale evaluation of the cost of software vulnerabilities, revealing that the consumer product, software, and the finance industry are more likely to be negatively impacted by vulnerabilities. Overall, our work builds tools to analyze and detect the IoT malware and extract behavior unique to malware families. Additionally, our consistent NVD streamlines vulnerability management in emerging internet-connected systems, highlighting the economics aspects of vulnerabilities.

West Africa's dominant sources of security threats have shifted in the past 20 years from large-scale civil wars to low-intensity conflicts previously unaccentuated. This dissertation takes on three of these new security threats; a) crop farmer (farmer) and animal herder (herder) tensions, b) small arms proliferation, and c) corruption and security. The clashes between farmers and herders have assumed significant security dimensions in the past decade, yet, we have a limited understanding of the conflict processes. I examined farmer-herder contestations in chapter two from climate-change conflict nexus and common-pool resource (CPR) governance perspectives. First, I argue that the recent farmer-herder skirmishes are evidence of climate volatility, positing that extreme climatic factors have contributed to these clashes' frequency and severity. Second, I assess how local CPR regimes in the conflict hotspots exacerbate the tension by considering these resources' social embeddedness and the implications of different user stratifications. The analysis draws on detailed interview data gathered in the conflict hotspots in the Kwahu enclave in the Eastern Region of Ghana in 2020 to explain the mechanisms. The climate-conflict literature has developed an affinity for large-N approaches, with few studies emphasizing qualitative methods. Qualitative approaches can emphasize location-specific conditions of the conflict dynamics to illustrate variations at the micro-level. For which no quantitative data exist, for instance, power relations between groups or CPR design principles to cope with the exigencies of climate extremes and intergroup tensions, fieldworks or interview approaches can provide better contextualization. They can pinpoint the broader causal dynamics critical for understanding climate–conflict links but are easily ignored by methods focusing on the narrow relationships between mainly two variables. The study reveals that a) seasonal variability affects farmer-herder conflicts, with the intensity (frequency and fatality) peaking during the heart of the drought period and b) ambiguous CPR governance regimes and weak land rights also feature prominently as the conflict driver. The third chapter investigates how state legitimacy influences the demand for small arms and light weapons (SALW) and how this, in effect, provokes conflicts in the West African subregion. Specifically, I evaluate the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) nonproliferation regime on small arms. I argue that the state's legitimacy is the mechanism that determines if it will import arms outside the legal routes and if conflict will follow. The analysis uses qualitative evidence of SALW proliferation data with a state legitimacy index to explain the tendency to comply with the collective security agreement. The second part uses case studies about Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire (CD1), and Nigeria to draw further inferences on how state legitimacy crises induce small arms demands and undermine compliance with the nonproliferation agreement. The findings reveal that state legitimacy bodes well for not acquiring arms outside the legal channels. The evidence also suggests that state capacity, an essential mechanism in treaty compliance, has little impact on states' ability to implement the regime. State capacity plays a marginal role because countries with domestic legitimacy problems acquired arms with little adherence to the security regime because of 'insecurity and the constant need to be on high alert. This makes state capacity a secondary factor as countries decide not to enforce the regime rules because of domestic legitimacy problems. In Ghana, state legitimacy pointed in the direction of compliance, while in CDI and Nigeria, diminished state legitimacy led to conflict, reducing the ability to implement the regime. Chapter four explores links between political corruption, and national security, using Boko Haram in Nigeria as a case study. I argue that corruption is a security problem because it diverts resources away from national security issues, predisposes resource distribution to patronage networks that co-opt state institutions, and distorts counterinsurgency success. The empirical analysis, drawn from micro-qualitative evidence from financial statements, military records, and terrorism data, finds that corruption enervated military capacity while strengthening insurgency effectiveness. This study makes links between corruption and insurgency in a novel way and expands our grasp of what makes counterinsurgency successful. Chapter five summarizes the general findings and reveals how the project contributes to our understanding of security dynamics in the West African subregion. Overall, the evidence illustrates that it is difficult to provide security without some fundamental government legitimacy, governance effectiveness, and more importantly, without considering how ecological scarcity, which has become more pronounced recently, threatens security nationally and at the micro-levels.

Recent tensions in US civil-military relations point to a potential sea-change in the way US military officers interact with the public political space. This study considers that relationship with three linked papers. It considers the partisanship of officers, using a novel survey of 471 US Army officers and cadets to determine the political inclinations and activity of that group as well as to assess the willingness of officers to use force internationally. It uses a separate, nationally representative, survey experiment to weigh the influence of military conditions on public opinion regarding the use of force in international crises. The study finds that officers are, in fact, highly influential in US politics, but remain unlikely to use that influence. It finds that officers remain true to their professional ethics both externally by refraining from political action and internally by developing politically moderate views. It also finds that service as an officer has a moderating effect on an individual's willingness to use force, so that initial selection effects which make the officer population initially more hawkish are moderated over time. It finally reinforces the potential political impact of officers by showing that the conditions they establish internationally have a significant impact on the way the public views the use of force during international crises. Through these three findings, this work makes a contribution to the civil-military relations sub-field, specifically that work considering the civil-military relations gap and provides confidence in the military institution.

Today's hyper-connected consumers demand convenient ways to tune into information without switching between devices, which led the industry leaders to the wearables. Wearables such as smartwatches, fitness trackers, and augmented reality (AR) glasses can be comfortably worn on the body. In addition, they offer limitless features, including activity tracking, authentication, navigation, and entertainment. Wearables that provide digestible information stimulate even higher consumer demand. However, to keep up with the ever-growing user expectations, developers keep adding new features and interaction methods to augment the use cases without considering their privacy impacts. In this dissertation, we explore the privacy dimension of wearables through inference attacks facilitated by machine learning approaches. We start our investigation by exploring the attack surface introduced by fitness trackers. We propose an inference attack that breaches location privacy through the elevation profiles collected by fitness trackers. Our attack highlights that adversaries can infer the location from elevation profiles collected via fitness trackers. Second, we investigated the attack surface introduced by the smartwatches. We introduce an inference attack that exploits the smartwatch microphone to capture the acoustic emanations of physical keyboards and successfully infers what the user has been typing. With this attack, we showed that smartwatches add yet another privacy dimension to be considered. Third, we examined the privacy of AR domain. We designed an inference attack exploiting the geometric projection of hand movements in air. The attack framework predicts the typed text on an in-air tapping keyboard, which is only visible to the user. Our studies uncover various attack surfaces introduced by wearables that have not been studied in literature before. For each attack, we propose possible countermeasures to diminish the ramifications of the risks. We hope that our findings shed light to the privacy risks of wearables and guide the research community to more aware solutions.

Yes / The context in Mali has changed considerably in the last few years. Progress on poverty eradication, growth and democratization was stalled as conflict erupted in 2012 but resumed in 2013 and is now slowly getting back on track. A preliminary agreement was signed in 2013 setting the frame for peace talks that are still on-going with Algeria as chief mediator. In spite of these negotiations, violent clashes and attacks by armed groups continue in the northern regions of the country. The post-conflict setting in Mali has created new challenges for the Swedish development cooperation portfolio.

State fragility has severe political implications. In the literature, fragile states have been referred to as "chaotic breeding grounds" for human rights violations, terrorism, violent extremism, crime, instability, and disease (Patrick 2011, 3-4). International organizations have also expressed concern regarding the potential of "fragile states" to disrupt collective security as threats such as transnational terrorism and human displacement from violent conflict have the potential to permeate borders (Patrick 2011, 5). This research project aims at extending our understanding of state fragility by examining three distinct dimensions of state fragility proposed in the literature: i) state authority, ii) state legitimacy, and iii) state capacity. I narrow the scope of these dimensions by focusing on 1) violent group grievance, 2) political legitimacy, and 3) state economic capacity, respectively. The first dimension, state authority, is related to a government's control of unlawful intrastate violence. The second dimension, legitimacy, is linked to the public acceptance of the right of an authority to govern law through its practice and influence (Weber 1958, 32-36; Gilley 2006, 48; Connolly 1984, 34). The third dimension, capacity, represents a state-society relationship characterized mainly by the state's ability to provide public goods and protection of citizens and residents from "harm" such as natural disasters and economic downfalls (Grävingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum 2012, 7). This dissertation examines each of these dimensions using quantitative analyses based on large-N datasets and cross-sectional longitudinal models to fill gaps in the literature on state fragility. In particular, I hypothesize 1) number of refugees increases the level of intrastate violent group grievance (state authority), 2) state human rights violations decreases popular support and thus public perceptions of state legitimacy, and 3) population constraints, such as food insecurity and disease increase economic decline and thus compromise the state's economic capacity. Internal violence, loss of legitimacy, and a weakened economy may increase levels of state fragility. Each of these three studies controls for alternative explanations and covers the time period between 2006 and 2014. The analysis results confirm the main hypotheses of this study and are expected to offer a more concise conceptual framework of state fragility, and better empirical understanding of potential contributors to state fragility.

This dissertation explores the role of exogenous shocks such as economic shocks and natural disasters in producing political unrest in the form of anti-government protests and ethnic riots. It is integrated by three articles, each covering a different topic. The first article argues that economic shocks play a crucial role in protest mobilization in rentier states conditional on weaker repressive capacity or higher taxation. Empirically, it conducts a cross-national study of high resource-dependent states in the period of 1995-2014. The second article contends that there is a variation in the degree to which a country's regions are exposed to economic shocks. Higher regional exposure to economic shocks is argued to increase the likelihood of regional anti-government protests in competitive autocracies. The argument is tested in a subnational analysis of Russia using an original dataset of regional anti-government protest and regional economic data in the period of 2007-2015. The third article develops a theory of natural disasters and ethnic riots. It argues that climate-induced meteorological disasters increase the chances of ethnic riots because of declined state capacity that creates uncertainty about enforcement of existing ethnic contracts. The feelings of uncertainty result in a strong group categorization, stereotyping, and polarization. The argument is tested in a subnational study of Hindu-Muslim riots in Indian states in the period of 1951-2015. The results of the studies in this dissertation offer three key findings: (1) higher resource rents lower protest likelihood in autocratic rentier states with higher repressive capacity; (2) regional unemployment is a strong predictor of anti-government protest; (3) natural disasters in the form of precipitation and temperature anomalies increase the chances of ethnic riots. The findings suggest a conclusion that exogenous shocks are important predictors of anti-government protests and ethnic riots.