Texte remanié de: Dissertation--Berlin--Humboldt-Universität, 2004. / Bibliogr. p. 317-338.

Diss.--Berlin--Technische Universität. / Bibliogr. p. 222-229.

Rapport de stage diplôme de conservateur des bibliothèques : Bibliothéconomie : Villeurbanne, ENSSIB : 2004.

Zugl. aktualisierte und erg. Fassung von: Aachen, Techn. Hochsch., Diss.

Zugl.: Berlin, Univ. der Künste, Diss., 2009

Inaug.-diss.--München. / "Schrifttum": p. 8-10.

Hausarbeit

Thesis (doctoral)--Freie Universität, Berlin, 1999.

In this dissertation I examine Isaiah Berlin's view of pluralism. Where some have claimed that Berlin cannot justify his commitment to liberalism given his ideas about moral pluralism---that his views are subjective---I argue that he can justify his commitment to liberalism, and avoid the problems of relativism. The departing point of my study is that unlike many, I do not think it is necessary to explicate Berlin's opinions about history, nationalism, or similar ideas---that what he says about pluralism is logically distinct from his other views. My argument has two basic parts. In the first I argue that Berlin's conception of pluralism is best understood as a response to monism, and not necessarily as a position which stands alone. As I argue, Berlin's commitment to liberalism depends less upon direct links between liberalism and pluralism, than a critique of monism which shows how vis-a-vis the corruption of positive liberty, monism leads to authoritarianism. The second part of my argument revolves around the idea that pluralism and relativism are distinct ideas, as seen in their treatment of the idea of incommensurability. Pluralism, I argue, unlike relativism, allows for comparative judgments to be made between values and cultures, because of certain assumptions it holds regarding human nature. Thus the charge that Berlin is a relativist is incorrect, in so far as it fails to consider the theoretical differences between pluralism and relativism.

Isaiah Berlin's idea of value pluralism has traditionally been seen as supportive to liberalism. Recently however, the idea of an implicit connection between pluralism and liberalism has been questioned by theorists arguing that there is no theoretical link between both, and that in fact, pluralism presents obstacles to liberalism. / In this thesis, I present pluralism as being a romantic response to Enlightenment-inspired liberal theory. My claim is that liberalism, even though it cannot be derived from a pluralist moral theory, provides strong support, both in practice and historically, to our pluralist moral condition. In chapter 1, I explain Berlin's conception of history and the importance of the context. I also contrast pluralism with other liberal theories to lay the foundation of my argument. In chapter 2, I present Berlin's highly original conception of human nature, and his defence of negative liberty. In chapter 3, I demonstrate how pluralism is a romantic response to traditional liberalism by exploring two liberal themes that were both redefined in new terms following the romantic revolt, namely rationality and tolerance. Finally, in chapter 4, I argue that pluralism does not entail liberalism, but that none the less a liberal society is the political arrangement best suited to the fact that human beings disagree about ends, and that values and ways of life are incompatible and incommensurable.