Thesis (MPH) --University of Limpopo, 2012. / Background: Little is known about sexual coercive behaviour at colleges and campuses across South Africa. Research in this area has primarily been conducted in the United States of America. Sexual violence against women is a serious public health issue that may result in unwanted pregnancies, complications as a result of termination of pregnancies, increased risk of sexually transmitted infections, physical abuse by partners, substance use and an array of emotional and psychological problems. The negative consequences of sexual coercive behaviour may have an added negative impact on academic performance; which increase the burden of disease in South Africa. The aim of this study was to gain insight into sexual coercion among students in a South African university in order ~o augment the current knowledge on this phenomenon and to be an impetus for further research Method: This cross-sectional study investigated sexual coercion and possible predictors of sexual coercion at the University of Limpopo: Medunsa Campus. Using a systematic random sampling, the Sexual Experiences Survey was administered to female undergraduate students registered for the 2010 academic year. Results: A total of 335 students participated in this study. A sexual coercion incidence of 27.16 % within the past year, and a sexual coercion prevalence of28.74% since age 14 was found. Rape was the most common unwanted sexual act reported by respondents. Half of the respondents that were raped sihce age 14 were raped again within the past 12 months. Date rape was the least unwanted sexual act experienced by respondents. Age, nationality, years at Medunsa and sexual orientation did not influence susceptibility to sexual coercion. However, residing on campus increases the likelihood of attempted verbal coercion twofold. Conclusion: Particular attention needs to be given to rape as it has the most deleterious medical, psychological and social repercussions. The majority of perpetrators of rape are not intimate partners, therefore developing and implementing strategies to reduce sexual coercion becomes challenging. In addition, those students who reside on campus are especially vulnerable to attempted verbal coercion, which can easily escalate into unwanted sexual intercourse. Recommendations: Consistent implementation of laws governing sexual violence against women and children, intolerance of policing authorities to the culture of violence that is endemic to South Africa, improved psychological resources on campus, emphasis on the laws governing the conduct of students and alternative constructions of discourses relating to sexual rights are needed to curb this public health issue in South Africa. Keywords: sexual coercion, female students, gender inequality, violence, sexual and mental health, law implementation, resources.

This thesis is concerned with the mental representation and online processing of conceptual structure. In particular, it investigates two issues: First, it explores some of the processing mechanisms underlying the comprehension of conceptual combinations. Second, it explores some of the processing mechanisms underlying the production of coerced expressions. These two issues are investigated experimentally using a priming paradigm. Noun-noun combinations like dog scarf are common in everyday discourse but often have more than one interpretation. How do language users arrive at an interpretation of the relationship between the two nouns? The first half of the thesis reports four expression-picture matching experiments that used priming to investigate the influence of modifier and head constituents on the comprehension of novel ambiguous noun-noun combinations. Experiment 1 examined the effects of lexical repetition and semantic relation. Results showed reliable relation priming, regardless of whether the modifier or head was repeated between prime and target: Participants tended to choose target pictures involving the same relation as a preceding prime picture. Experiment 2 demonstrated significant relation priming when neither constituent was repeated. Experiment 3 showed significant relation priming when each picture contained both possible semantic relations, arguing against a possible visual-priming account of the effect. Experiment 4 showed that relation priming did not have an effect on the time taken to comprehend a combination. The findings are interpreted in light of competing models of conceptual combination. The second half of the thesis reports four experiments designed to investigate the effects of priming on the production of complement coercions like The author began the book. Recent work in lexical semantics has demonstrated that verbs such as begin and enjoy semantically select for event complements. Where such verbs occur with entity-denoting nouns (e.g., begin the book, enjoy the wine), the NP complement undergoes semantic type coercion, inducing a reference shift to the event associated with that NP. Using a combined picture-description/sentence completion task, participants were presented with pictures followed by sentence fragments which they were instructed to complete. Experiment 5 showed a reliable effect of Prime: Participants tended to produce a target description involving the same level of semantic specification as the preceding prime. Experiment 6 did not show fully significant priming in the absence of (coercing) verb overlap between prime and target. Experiment 7 revealed evidence of semantic and syntactic components to the priming effect. Experiment 8 showed no evidence for differing global and local contextual influences on priming. Taken together, the results of Experiments 5–8 are interpreted in terms of a model of language production based on Levelt, Roelofs, and Meyer (1999). Overall, this study offers insight into the representation and processing of conceptual structure in comprehension and production from a psycholinguistic perspective.

This discussion looks at immigration through philosophical debates of democracy, coercion, and autonomy. There seems to be a fundamental contradiction between democratic state's border control and democratic legitimacy. First, I discuss the democratic legitimacy and the need for democratic justifications with the invasion of autonomy.Then, I discuss Arash Abizadeh's argument that border control is coercive and invades personal autonomy, and David Miller's response that border control does not amount to coercion, but is prevention. I conclude border control invades autonomy even if it is not coercive, and thus, democratic justifications are needed. Ultimately, I suggest that open borders should be encouraged because it is the better alternative to what is required of democratic justification for close borders.

Offenders in some restorative justice programs are required to offer an apology as a condition of successful completion of the restorative justice procedure, or else return to court. Apologies can be required even when victims do not attend the restorative justice procedure. Apologising can result in several benefits for apologisers, but previous research suggests that coercion and lack of victim presence in restorative justice procedures may reduce those benefits. Participants (n = 120) took part in a deceptive live study designed to elicit confessions for a transgression and subsequent apologies. In this study, I manipulated coercion (Coerced, Not coerced) and victim presence (Direct, Surrogate, Ambiguous), to test their effects on the outcome benefits that offenders derived from offering an apology. Findings indicated that victim presence and coercion significantly impact outcome benefits for apologisers, including: perceptions of personal responsibility, accountability for consequences, transgression exaggeration and procedural fairness judgments. Implications for restorative justice programs are discussed. / UOIT

As a classical liberal, or libertarian, I am concerned to advance liberty and minimize coercion. Indeed on this view liberty just is the absence of coercion or costs imposed on others. In order to better understand the notion of coercion I discuss Robert Nozick's classic essay on the subject as well as more recent contributions. I then address the question of whether law is coercive, and respond to Edmundson and others who think that it isn't. Assuming that the law is in fact coercive, there is still a question,as with all coercive acts, as to whether that coercion is justified. Edmundson thinks that this places a special burden on the state of justifying its existence, whereas it simply places the same burden on the state as anyone else. What I reject is the longstanding doctrine of Staatsrason, namely that the state is not subject to the same moral rules as its subjects. With respect to the relation of morality to law, Edmundson thought that another of the fallacies of which philosophical anarchists were guilty was that of assuming that there was a sphere of morality where law had no business. On the contrary, our concern is with spheres of law which appear to have little to do with morality, which is to say laws against wrongs of the malum prohibitum variety, as opposed to wrongs which are malum in se. I then turn to a matter with which Edmundson begins his study, namely how it is that states acquire the authority to do what they do, namely coerce their subjects. While the fact that the philosopher's stone of political obligation has proved rather elusive may mean that a legitimate state lacks the authority to demand obedience pure and simple, Edmundson contends that it can at the very least demand that we do not interfere in the administration of justice. I argue that this attempt to sidestep the justification of the authority of the state fails and that we seem in the end to be having to take the state's word for it that we must do X on pain of penalty P. Nor, as I go on to argue, is it any help to appeal to democracy to remedy a failed justification of the authority of the state. There either is a moral justification of state coercion in order to prevent harm to innocent subjects, or there isn't, and this holds,if it does, not only at the level of individuals, but also at the level of the state, regardless of its constitutional form. After concluding that the attempts of Edmundson and others to refute the anarchic turn in recent political philosophy have failed, it would seem that the withering away of the state foreseen in Marx's eschatology is not as improbable as maybe it once appeared.

As a classical liberal, or libertarian, I am concerned to advance liberty and minimize coercion. Indeed on this view liberty just is the absence of coercion or costs imposed on others. In order to better understand the notion of coercion I discuss Robert Nozick's classic essay on the subject as well as more recent contributions. I then address the question of whether law is coercive, and respond to Edmundson and others who think that it isn't. Assuming that the law is in fact coercive, there is still a question,as with all coercive acts, as to whether that coercion is justified. Edmundson thinks that this places a special burden on the state of justifying its existence, whereas it simply places the same burden on the state as anyone else. What I reject is the longstanding doctrine of Staatsrason, namely that the state is not subject to the same moral rules as its subjects. With respect to the relation of morality to law, Edmundson thought that another of the fallacies of which philosophical anarchists were guilty was that of assuming that there was a sphere of morality where law had no business. On the contrary, our concern is with spheres of law which appear to have little to do with morality, which is to say laws against wrongs of the malum prohibitum variety, as opposed to wrongs which are malum in se. I then turn to a matter with which Edmundson begins his study, namely how it is that states acquire the authority to do what they do, namely coerce their subjects. While the fact that the philosopher's stone of political obligation has proved rather elusive may mean that a legitimate state lacks the authority to demand obedience pure and simple, Edmundson contends that it can at the very least demand that we do not interfere in the administration of justice. I argue that this attempt to sidestep the justification of the authority of the state fails and that we seem in the end to be having to take the state's word for it that we must do X on pain of penalty P. Nor, as I go on to argue, is it any help to appeal to democracy to remedy a failed justification of the authority of the state. There either is a moral justification of state coercion in order to prevent harm to innocent subjects, or there isn't, and this holds,if it does, not only at the level of individuals, but also at the level of the state, regardless of its constitutional form. After concluding that the attempts of Edmundson and others to refute the anarchic turn in recent political philosophy have failed, it would seem that the withering away of the state foreseen in Marx's eschatology is not as improbable as maybe it once appeared.

Diss. Linköping : Univ.

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Are cyber capabilities a useful method for coercive diplomacy? If so, what conditions favor successful cyber coercion to produce a desired victim response? This research explores how cyber coercion can be used as a tool of statecraft to change an adversary’s behavior and examines two cases over three temporal values. Examining the two cases of North Korea versus Sony and Russia versus Estonia illustrates practical lessons about the constraints and abilities of the employment of cyber coercion as well as how victim responses operate on a spectrum and can change over time. In examining George’s seven factors that favor coercive diplomacy and applying them to these cases, this research reveals four additional factors that ought to be included when addressing the dynamics that contribute to a victim changing their behavior in response to cyber coercion. The difference between a low-level attack (e.g. web defacement) compared with a high-level attack (e.g. paralyzing backbone servers) communicates two vastly different levels of threat to a victim and incurs extremely different costs for the victim. These technical aspects of cyber statecraft and their ramifications for cyber coercion are not covered by George’s earlier works on coercive diplomacy, as few people in the 1990s were even considering cyber as a threat landscape. This research does not provide one generalizable theory of how to conduct cyber coercion; rather, it provides a Utilitarian theory that identifies additional factors that favor cyber coercion and contributes to a conditional generalization. Further, it introduces the idea of examining this change in behavior over time to properly assess the impact of cyber coercion on the totality of the victim’s behavior. Extending the time intervals reveals additional critical data necessary to fully analyze the nature of a cyber coercion dyad. Finally, it provides a hybrid method to attain attribution by fusing social science methodology with cybersecurity techniques. Together, this data and method serve to correct the conventional wisdom on two influential cases; this research traces the process that proves why a correction for each case is warranted; and, it shows how the choices an aggressor makes in its cyber coercive strategy can result in different outcomes for the victims.

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