Common-law spousal relationships have become increasingly common with a growing number of Canadians electing to enter into them. This thesis appreciates the injustices suffered by common-law spouses during and at the termination of their spousal relationships, and reinforces the view that the denial of marital property benefits dishonors the dignity of common-law spouses. Common-law spouses experience similar needs as their married counterparts when the relationship ends. Most of the current functions of marriage can be fulfilled within common-law spousal relationships and should more appropriately be called functions of the family. / Both Canadian courts and the legislatures have acknowledged and responded to the injustices that often flow from power imbalances in unmarried persons' families and have thereby given increased recognition to common-law spousal relationships. They have taken stock of the fact that by not recognizing the rights of common-law spouses in Canada on the basis of their marital status is an affront to justice. Legislatures have also enacted various statutes and have amended existing ones to extend certain rights to common-law spouses. / The various ways in which the rights of common-law spouses have been recognized in Canada will be examined and discussed, in particular the remedial notion of constructive trust which is imposed by courts to prevent injustice and unjust enrichment. It is argued this notion of constructive trust has proven effective, especially in cases where property is being divided after a long-term intimate relationship. Common-law spouses have advanced constitutional challenges in their quest to benefit from marital benefits and protections in their relationships since it is argued that both relationships are functionally the same. / Finally, this thesis suggests lessons that can be learned from the Canadian developments of recognizing common-law spouses. It also concludes by examining similar developments that have taken place in other countries of Europe and Africa.

The aim of my thesis is to explore Calvin's understanding of the term „the common good‟ (commune bonum, bien commun): its theological grounding within his works, and its role as an inspiration for both ecclesial and social application. I seek to illustrate how his notion of the common good is constructed theologically (part A) and practically (part B). Although Calvin‟s notion of the common good has been partly dealt with by numerous scholars (mainly from a variety of socio-economic perspectives), there has been no comprehensive or systematic study to illustrate its theological significance and its doctrinal context. The aim of this study is to illuminate the wide-ranging and consistent thought on the common good discernable within Calvin‟s works; it is hoped that this indepth study of the topic will be a valuable addition to Calvin scholarship. The structure of Part A reflects how Calvin‟s three theological foundations - God‟s image, sanctification, and Law - are shaped dynamically through the three stages of humankind‟s salvation - before the Fall, after the Fall, and in Christ‟s redemption. Chapters Two - Four show how these theological foundations operate towards the restoration of God‟s original order designed for the common good in the correlation between the two fields of church and humankind, both at the divine and moral level and the spiritual and social level. In addition, the willingness and mutuality which constitute the cornerstone of Christ‟s redemption are decisive in the realization of the common good. Chapter Two argues, first, that Calvin‟s notion of the common good, drawn from his doctrine of God‟s image, is shaped by the threefold dimension of that image - the relational, substantial, and communal. For the restoration of the original order in God's creation, the universal love of humankind based upon the surviving substantial-communal image of God in humanity plays a limited part; however, the Christian‟s sanctified universal love based upon the restored relational-communal image of God in Christ plays a pivotal role. With relation to the restored image in Christ, Chapter Three shows that the most essential element of sanctified life for participating in the divine economy for the common good within the Trinitarian mode is Christian self-denial; that is, the composition of the present life designed for eternal life through the multiple sub-analyses of Christ‟s example, consecration, humility, and stewardship. Chapter Four shows how Calvin‟s integrated legalistic approach, in terms of the common good, can help us to explore another facet of his multiple understanding of God‟s image in humanity with regards to both ecclesial and social life. For Calvin, the three uses or functions of the Law can be regarded as both distinctively and inseparably incorporated into work for the common good of all people. In relation to the Law in Christ, Christian freedom can be analyzed from pedagogical, responsive, and pastoral perspectives in terms of the life for the common good. As the Decalogue is a spiritual-moral space within the mutual function of the third use and second use of the Law, Calvin‟s understanding of the two tablets demonstrates how his interpretation of both divine and natural law in terms of the common good can be co-embodied in the right relation between God and humanity and amongst people. With the above theological background in mind, Part B of this thesis, through Chapters Five and Six, continues to elucidate how, for Calvin, the notion of „the common good‟ reveals its value when it is established within the divine system of voluntary giftgiving, where it can engage with the mutual relation of the common good of the church and the common good of humankind. Calvin‟s discussion of the above theological foundations of the common good plays a vital role in the formation of its application both at ecclesial and social levels: the common good of the church (commune ecclesiae bonum) is actualized when the gifts of the Spirit given to believers in union with Christ are shared mutually, in a way which reflects the restoration of God‟s image in believers - through prayer, sacrament, office, and property through the third use of the Law. The common good of humankind (publicum generis humani bonum) is actualized when the common grace given to humanity is exchanged and shared mutually through politics, economics, and social welfare, through the interplay between the third and second use of the Law. This thesis concludes that, although the ecclesial and social common good are cooperative in a distinctive but inseparable way, the former takes priority over the latter for the current and consummative restoration of the original order both at divine and moral levels.

No description available.

Thesis (LL.M. (Labour Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2008.

Thesis (LL.M. (Labour Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2008.

No description available.

Koi Herpesvirus (KHV), a species-specific DNA virus of the family Herpesviridae, is responsible for mass mortalities of common carp (Cyprinus carpio carpio L.) throughout the world. KHV’s broad geographical distribution and relatively high mortality rate among infected fish, creates significant disposal issues when die-offs occur, especially taking into account the body burden of contaminants in the fish. In locales where adequate disposal facilities are unavailable, or are unable to accommodate additional loadings of contaminated fish carcasses, concerns regarding human and environmental health are raised. During the summer of 2008, residents of the Lake Simcoe Region of southern Ontario, Canada, were faced with a massive die-off of carp, infected with KHV. Carp within the Great Lakes and much of the world are known to bioaccumulate (and biomagnify) contaminants, such as, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), pesticides (e.g., dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane, DDT, and toxic metals (e.g., mercury). These contaminants have been associated with numerous adverse effects on both human and environmental health, and are thus of important considerations when planning for large-scale carcass disposal, following fish die-offs. Although suites of microbiological tests and water quality assessments are frequently conducted to identify causative factors during extensive fish-kills - assessments of relative contaminant burdens in the carcasses, which should dictate the most appropriate method of carcass disposal - are rarely performed. A case study on Snake Island, Lake Simcoe, Ontario was conducted to further examine the implications of this policy. Soil samples from two known disposal sites and three presumed control locations were sampled on Snake Island and sent to the Analytical Services Unit of Queen’s University for chemical analysis. Although none of the soil samples exceeded any legal guidelines in the present study, there is still concern as future die-offs of other fish species or piscivorous birds and the disposal of large numbers of carcasses may be an issue.

Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation argues that if we are to respect the common sense perspective then Pyrrhonian scepticism can be neither avoided nor defeated. While Pyrrhonian scepticism can be diagnosed it cannot be cured, at least, so long as we take a non-revisionary attitude towards common sense. The fundamental reason for this is that Pyrrhonian scepticism derives from the application of norms of inquiry that constitute part of the content of common sense in unusual but not fanciful or impossible situations. Implicit in this dissertation is a distinction between Cartesian and Pyrrhonian scepticisms, and for present purposes these two scepticisms can be distinguished on two criteria. First, unlike Cartesian scepticism, Pyrrhonian scepticism is not global in its doubts. It is not global because it does not attempt to question our entitlement to entire domains of commitment, for instance commitments to anything beyond the content of our perceptions, all at once. Nor does Pyrrhonism attempt to deny the possibility of knowledge. Rather, Pyrrhonian scepticism questions our entitlement to one commitment at a time and is hence iterative rather than global. This leads to the second far more interesting criterion in that unlike its Cartesian cousin Pyrrhonian scepticism claims not to be revisionary of the common sense perspective. In fact Pyrrhonian scepticism represents itself as the common sense perspective under special conditions. On this reading Pyrrhonian scepticism is a form of common sense scepticism. The claim that Pyrrhonian scepticism is commonsensical calls for a clarification of in what exactly the common sense perspective consists, and its relationship to scepticism. Of particular interest in this regard is a position that has been called Common Sense Naturalism (CSN). CSN consists, in part, in three important claims. First, that we are constrained, both logically and psychologically, to take ourselves to have an entitlement to common sense. Second, that because we are thus constrained, we have an entitlement to those commitments that constitute the content of common sense. Third, that the content of common sense is inherently anti-sceptical. These three claims jointly warrant Page 5 Page 6 the conclusion that appeals to commitments to which we are commonsensically entitled can feature prominently in refutations of scepticism. I argue that CSN is incorrect in that even if we have an entitlement to our common sense commitments we have an equally valid entitlement to Pyrrhonian scepticism, as Pyrrhonian scepticism can be derived from the common sense perspective itself. I also argue that CSN is correct but misleading in suggesting that we are constrained, both logically and psychologically, to take ourselves to have an entitlement to the content of common sense. CSN is correct in that we are always forced to take ourselves to be entitled to some commonsensical commitments but overlooks the fact that the content of these commitments varies, becoming at times amenable to Pyrrhonian scepticism. In fact what we take to be commonsensical is sensitive to our mood at the time. This can be used to explain that feature of the phenomenology of scepticism according to which Pyrrhonian scepticism is a recurrent but not a constant problem. Presenting these arguments requires both that the nature of CSN be clarified (chapter 1), that the relationship between common sense and Pyrrhonian scepticism be established (Chapter 2). Finally, we must also provide an account of the content of common sense be given (Chapter 3) which provides warrant for continued inquisitive activities even after the emergence of Pyrrhonian scepticism from within common sense.

This thesis examines common-law and civil-law jurisdictions in order to find differences between them. These differences are then being qualified as either relevant or irrelevant for the categorisation of individual jurisdictions. This reflects the argument that only features occurring in only one of the legal families can be relevant when categorising jurisdictions. Only such features can be, from the author’s point of view, specific and typical for their legal family and inherent features of them.The first thing to be considered under this premise is the respective sources of law (Chapter 1). These are in civil-law jurisdictions traditionally statutes and in commonlaw jurisdictions predominantly courts’ decisions. There are, of course, statutes also in common-law jurisdictions and previous courts’ decisions play an important role also in civil-law systems. The differences are not inherent. Furthermore, there are fundamental legal concepts, that is important concepts underlying the respective rules. These concepts may explain differences between the rules. The examination of sources of law, altogether, does not reveal any distinguishing factors.Chapters 2–5 discuss the issue of attitudes of common-law and civil-law judges to statutory interpretation. Chapter 2 examines the respective methods of statutory interpretation. This does not reveal any differences as to common-law and civil-law judges’ attitudes; for instance, greater adherence of common-law judges to the literal meaning of rules arguably does not exist. As shown in Chapter 3, this is true also in the area of Criminal Law under the special safeguards this subject provides. Chapter 4 asserts terminology causes differences between the systems; this is true even in case of identical terminology which is sometimes being interpreted in a diametrically different way. Moreover, differences can also be compensated for elsewhere in the legal system. Altogether, Chapter 4 does not reveal any inherent differences between the systems. As Chapter 5 shows, there is an ongoing process of convergence between common-law and civil-law systems, which means the categorisation into legal families becomes even less plausible.Chapter 6 shows that the categorisation into legal families is not only incorrect but also highly misleading and that there are numerous scholarly statements relying incorrectly on the family concept. The proposition (Chapter 7) is that it may nevertheless be feasible to structure comparative-law texts according to the wellknown legal families, as these show a common historical background. However, for conducting research into particular foreign legal rules (micro-comparative research), the family concept becomes a misleading starting-point. Insofar the concept should be abandoned or, at least, used only together with an appropriate warning.

The common gecko, Hoplodactylus pacificus (Gray, in McCann (1955) ), is widely distributed throughout New Zealand. As yet no specific ecological study of this lizard has been published, though Sharell (1966) mentions habitat preferences and hibernation behaviour, and Whitaker (1968) has published some data for H. pacificus on Poor Knights Islands (mentioned in this report) and describes their observed foraging behaviour. In this study, carried out from late March through to May 1970, I have recorded information on snout-vent lengths, weights, individual movements, and habitat preference, and have also estimated the population density. This particular lizard does not seem to be active during the Autumn months and no observations of food preferences and foraging behaviour were able to be made.