This thesis analyses legal institutions which appear to be developing in a similar way and reveals the significance of historical, legal and cultural backgrounds. ADR processes are perceived and developed as international and necessarily standardized, or simply as culturally neutral institutions. However, this analysis shows that alternative conflict resolution methods remain culturally embedded. This analysis is based on the role of the judge in ADR in France and B.C. The comparative method seemed appropriate to conduct the analysis as it facilitates a focus on cultural influences which reveals differences in the definition of the judge's role in ADR in both jurisdictions. The first chapter examines comparative law - its nature and objectives, as well as the potential pitfalls. Courts have been chosen as the institutions on which to base our research of the cultural element in ADR because they appear to be culturally embedded. The second chapter attempts to trace historical evolution and political factors which shaped the judicial institution in both jurisdictions. The role of the judge in proceedings is analyzed with particular emphasis on the process of judging. The professional education of judges in both jurisdictions is also examined. To frame the analysis two of the roles of judges which have often been used in the literature are used, namely the role of dispute settlement and the role of policy maker. A third chapter outlines the similar development of ADR in France and B.C. and explores the reasons behind this. Finally, a comparison of the intervention by the judge in enforcing settlement agreements, enforcing arbitration agreements and conducting court mediation is made. The analysis relies on the definition of judges' role as defined by the legislator, and the interpretation of that definition by the courts. It is concluded that, while no absolute pattern of the influence of cultural and historical background on the shaping of the role of the judge in ADR can be identified, this influence exists nonetheless. The similarities between, and the perceived unification of ADR institutions are therefore superficial, as ADR is molded through institutions such as judges, influenced at the same time by the cultural identity of the jurisdictions in which they operate.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1936. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 101).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1961. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis analyses legal institutions which appear to be developing in a similar way and reveals the significance of historical, legal and cultural backgrounds. ADR processes are perceived and developed as international and necessarily standardized, or simply as culturally neutral institutions. However, this analysis shows that alternative conflict resolution methods remain culturally embedded. This analysis is based on the role of the judge in ADR in France and B.C. The comparative method seemed appropriate to conduct the analysis as it facilitates a focus on cultural influences which reveals differences in the definition of the judge's role in ADR in both jurisdictions. The first chapter examines comparative law - its nature and objectives, as well as the potential pitfalls. Courts have been chosen as the institutions on which to base our research of the cultural element in ADR because they appear to be culturally embedded. The second chapter attempts to trace historical evolution and political factors which shaped the judicial institution in both jurisdictions. The role of the judge in proceedings is analyzed with particular emphasis on the process of judging. The professional education of judges in both jurisdictions is also examined. To frame the analysis two of the roles of judges which have often been used in the literature are used, namely the role of dispute settlement and the role of policy maker. A third chapter outlines the similar development of ADR in France and B.C. and explores the reasons behind this. Finally, a comparison of the intervention by the judge in enforcing settlement agreements, enforcing arbitration agreements and conducting court mediation is made. The analysis relies on the definition of judges' role as defined by the legislator, and the interpretation of that definition by the courts. It is concluded that, while no absolute pattern of the influence of cultural and historical background on the shaping of the role of the judge in ADR can be identified, this influence exists nonetheless. The similarities between, and the perceived unification of ADR institutions are therefore superficial, as ADR is molded through institutions such as judges, influenced at the same time by the cultural identity of the jurisdictions in which they operate. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

University of Macau / Faculty of Law

No description available.

<p> I pursue the double bind of the political institution through one of its symptoms, guilt, and the relationship between the attribution of guilt and the very law which announces and justifies the double bind of the political institution. My dissertation is an interdisciplinary engagement with various contemporary&mdash;explicitly political&mdash;invocations of the notion of guilt. Specifically, I'm interested in the ways in which the attribution of guilt to subjects, to leaders, and to institutions operates in various discourses and disciplines, including politics, literature, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and law. These various political uses of the concept of guilt &ndash; as criminality (chapters 1 and 2), as femininity (chapter 3), and as homogenized resistance (chapter 4) &ndash; are a kind of shorthand, a cover, for the law. I will be arguing that "guilting" operates dominantly as justification, erecting a screen on which the undecidability of the law is simultaneously displaced and projected as the certainty of guilt. The irony is that guilt always reveals the law only in its failure. By guilting "the sovereign" revolutionary movements inaugurate and certify a new law; similarly, the government (judicial, police, and military bureaucracy) preserves the law through the guilting of its supposed others (criminals, the enemy). This desire for the law that the analysis of guilt reveals is a desire to master contingency and difference: it is a desire for a purified, contained, predictable, and thoroughly utopian space of relationality, a site where difference is rendered docile. In following the nuances of different political iterations of guilt as well as its political uses as justification for violence and force, each chapter reveals guilt as a crisis endemic to the law itself. However, in so far as it is a crisis of identity, each chapter, I hope, provides openings through which our own personal and phenomenological attachments to those very identities can be considered and challenged, perhaps allowing for the possibility of a working through those very attachments and the recognition of the irretrievable heterogeneity of their meanings.</p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1997. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [343]-354).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 399-446).

Thesis--Copenhagen. / "Tillæg. Udkast til lov om entreprenørens omsætningsbeskyttelse": p. [377]-379. "Trykfejl": slip attached to p. [3] of cover. "Litteratur": p. [vii]-xxiii.