Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1984. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 47-49).

Thesis (M.S.)--Boston University

The impact of external debt on economic growth is a debatable issue between scholars since the onset of the debt crisis in 1980’s. This thesis examines whether external debt affects the economic growth of selected heavily indebted poor African countries through the debt overhang and debt crowding out effect. This is carried out by using data for eight heavily indebted poor African countries between 1991 to 2010.The result from estimation shows that external debt affects economic growth by the debt crowding out effect rather than debt overhang. Moreover, in an attempt to mark out debt servicing history, the thesis found the selected countries are not paying (servicing) more than 95% of their accumulated debt.

Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität zu Köln.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 232-244). Available also in an electronic version.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Available also in a digital version from UMI/Dissertation Abstracts International.

Inaug.-diss.--Berlin. / Vita.

This thesis explores the micro-structure of the market for syndicated loans from the demand and supply side and aims to provide a detailed micro-economic analysis. The focus is on the determinants of loan pricing to both developing and industrialised countries. Particular attention is paid to the characteristics of both lenders and borrowers. The thesis comprises four papers. Paper 1 defines key concepts and provides a historical outlook on the international market for syndicated loans since the late 1970s. Paper 2 analyses in an extensive risk-return framework the determinants of the pricing of syndicated credits granted to developing country borrowers between 1993 and 2001. It concludes that risk is properly reflected in loan pricing, although the effect of purely micro-economic price determinants is in several instances weaker when variables reflecting macro-economic conditions in borrowers' countries are also introduced into the model. Analysis of market structure allows us to make inferences about the effects of bank market power and perceived risk concentration in syndicated lending to developing country borrowers. Paper 3 extends the second one in a first attempt to our knowledge to analyse the determinants of the pricing of developing and industrialised country loans and bonds taken together in the 1990s. On average, we find that developing country bonds have been riskier than developing country loans and industrialised country loans riskier than industrialised country bonds. We analyse how spill-over effects may have taken place from one market segment to the other in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. We also compare market access and structure on the respective market segments. We find that banks and investors may have exercised their market power to the greatest extent or that the penalising effect of higher perceived risk concentration may have been most pronounced in the case of bank loans being made to developing country borrowers. Paper 4 is the first of its kind to investigate the effects of bank characteristics on the structure and pricing of syndicated loans at an international level, using a unique dataset. We show that the pricing of loans is likely to be lower as banks participating in those loans become less liquidity-constrained or better capitalised, or enjoy a regulatory advantage. The relationship between bank characteristics and loan pricing generally appears to be stronger in the case of senior banks than of junior banks. This confirms the stronger pricing power of senior banks when arranging loans, while junior participants tend to act more as price takers. Contrary to the existing literature we find evidence of senior banks offloading larger shares of riskier loans in a potentially opportunistic way to outsider junior banks with little knowledge of the borrower. They also tend to hold higher portions of loans they arrange when they are better capitalised. In addition, as information about the borrower becomes less transparent, junior banks rely more on the reputation of the senior bank, to determine their level of commitment, than when borrower information is widely available to the public.

Thesis advisor: David A. Deese / For centuries, debt has been an important financing vehicle for governments around the world, and ever since the liberalization of cross-border capital movement that started in the US in 1974 and spread quickly through the rest of the West in the second half of the 1970s, states have been borrowing billions of dollars in the international private capital market. All governments are not willing or able to pay their debts at all times, however, and when they are not, a sovereign debt crisis is born. Unlike domestic bankruptcy proceedings, there is no standard default resolution mechanism in sovereign debt, leaving the debt restructuring process ad-hoc, highly unpredictable, and extremely susceptible to political influence. This dissertation studies the behavior of creditor governments---the home governments of private creditors who have lent to foreign states---during such crises and how they step in to intervene in the process of crisis resolution and sovereign debt restructuring. It turns out that creditor government intervention can vary greatly from case to case, and it varies mainly in two dimensions: whether the creditor government compels the debtor state to repay debt (and, in order to do so, commit to structural economic reforms and fiscal austerity), and whether the creditor government uses its own public funds to provide temporary but immediate financial relief to the distressed debtor (known as a “bail-out”). This dissertation argues that the variation in creditor government behavior can best be explained by two factors in the creditor country: the interest of finance and public sentiment against foreign bailout. Strong, concentrated interests of big players in finance causes the creditor government to demand full debt repayment from and impose austerity demands on the debtor. Strong public opposition to foreign bailouts, driven by ongoing economic recessions in the creditor country itself, constrains the creditor government’s ability to tap into public funds to provide bilateral finance. This dissertation tests the theory using a mixed-methods research design, exploiting both quantitative and qualitative data to test three hypotheses proposed in support of the theory. It presents an original data set that comprises over 700 observations of creditor government intervention from 1981 to 2016, and uses structured comparisons of study cases to uncover causal mechanisms between the interest of finance, public sentiment, and creditor government behavior. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.