Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2004. Graduate Programme in Communication and Culture. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 197-203). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ99232

"Thesis approved for the degree of doctor of divinity in the University of London."

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 1891.

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Any enquiry into Ethics must presuppose at least three very important and possibly awkward assumptions, awkward from the point of view of the methodological and even metaphysical problems raised. It must presuppose that it enquires into something, that what it enquires into has a certain definite and circumscribed meaning of its own and that this meaning though not necessarily definable in exact terms is describable and communicable. The first assumption expanded postulates that in the course of our general experience we come upon certain particulars which may be termed moral experience. That is, some judgments (which at least at first blush and prior to any further analysis which might reduce them to other categories) appear to be specifically moral are in fact and habitually pronounced by men. The prototype of these judgments are propositions of the type: "this is good", "this is right", "this is bad", "this is wrong". The second assumption demands that these propositions are not meaningless, that in pronouncing "this is right", "this is good" men do refer to and try to imply something. The exact nature of this something and its degree of reality and objectivity are not defined by the assumption. The third assumption demands that such judgments besides referring to something be communicable. That is, that one man may understand in the most general way what another man wishes to signify when pronouncing "this is good", "this is right", whether he agree to it or not, whether he take this judgment to imply the same principles, and whatever his justification of or opposition to such judgments may be. In spite of these qualifications it might appear that too much has been assumed to begin with, since, when more fully expounded, the three presuppositions may be seen to comprise the whole of Ethics: determine its subject matter, define its laws and provide the grounds of its validity. On the other hand it seems to me that no Ethical enquiry would be possible at all unless these three assumptions were made. For if there were nothing for us to examine, we would not come up against moral judgments at all; if they defined nothing, we should not know that they were moral judgments; and if their reference were not understood at least in a general way and in principle by other men, how could we talk about them at all, let alone enquire into their nature? So that these three suppositions appear to form a sort of irreducible minimum of hypothesis which any enquiry into ethics has to assume in order to be possible at all. Again, though these three suppositions are made and used without proof, some subsequent discussion on their meaning and implication may possibly be of help in clarifying their nature, the extent of their import and the manner of their validity. It may also furnish us with some reasons and grounds for their vindication in retrospect. I shall try not to make use of any other unproved assumption beyond these three and what may be directly inferred from them as a basis for the argument in this paper. Should any other fundamental and additional assumption have been employed, it was used unconsciously and the validity of the argument will be affected accordingly.

I defend a modified version of Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve's Competing Claims View that captures an additional consideration of fairness in the context of variable populations. I call this consideration `worthwhileness'. Part 1 goes on to argue that this view describes the expected value of a lottery in a way that is consistent with the axiological framework of Averagism. Also, I propose a novel definition of `overpopulation', and explain why considerations of fairness so-described by Averagism support our other moral reasons for avoiding overpopulating the world. In part 2, I design and run a toy model to determine which development policy-option is best in terms of satisfying the Competing Claims View. One of these options is ambiguous insofar as it combines two intuitions which have time and again proven themselves rather diffcult to jointly pin down. Putting them together forms what I will hereafter call, after its leading proponent, Broome's Intuition About Neutrality (`BN'). I argue that there is at least one combination of a (mathematically) well-behaved axiology and bridge principle that yields a moral theory which satisfies the normative reading of BN. Armed with all the right ingredients, we can now run the model. Based on some conservative assumptions, we find that we ought to take steps towards: (a) militating against the threat of a broken world; and (b) prolonging humankind's place in the stars (to some extent).

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<p> The goal of this quantitative non-experimental, correlational research study was to examine what individual characteristics correlated with the decision-making processes of students pursuing an undergraduate degree in criminal justice. The sample was drawn from students at several traditional (brick and mortar) degree programs, and once institutional review boards approval were gained, data collection commenced. The Congruent and Incongruent Moral Dilemma&rsquo;s test of dual-process, developed by Conway and Gawronski (2013), was used to collect data concerning ethical decision-making. The survey was collected through Survey Monkey and the data were analyzed using IBM SPSS 24 software. Of the 313 responses collected, 138 were usable. The participants were asked to choose between what was an acceptable (congruent dilemmas showing utilitarianism) or unacceptable harm (incongruent dilemmas showing deontology) in a series of ethical decision-making scenarios. The differences between the two dilemmas were found to have significance. The results indicated that age and education (criminal justice versus other majors) were significant, but not as predictors of ethical decision-making; with criminal justice majors having a higher selection of deontology than non-majors. Gender was the significant predictor of ethical decision-making. Women, having higher levels of deontology than men. Results found that with increased religious attendance, and those without military experience had higher levels of deontology but were not significant predictors of ethical decision-making. Furthermore, as individuals increased their socio-economic status there was a decrease in deontological inclinations. Finally, the results of traditional on-campus program and non-traditional program students was not a significant predictor of ethical decision-making. These findings are evidence that individual characteristics influence deontological and utilitarian inclinations and help resolve some of the theoretical ambiguities in prior research. This research can help inform academic institutions, criminal justice organizations, and students preparing for a career in public safety to be better prepared to make quick and ethical decisions in the field and help focus training and educational programs to assist with this process.</p><p>

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